Forensic science and juror decision making: can jurors be taught to recognise bias? by Forndran, Alexandre Benjamin
 
 
Forensic Science and Juror Decision Making: Can Jurors Be 
Taught to Recognise Bias? 
Alexandre Benjamin Forndran 




 Dr. Carolyn Semmler, Dr. Rebecca Heyer 
 
 
Dissertation submitted for the Award of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
School of Psychology 
University of Adelaide 
 
 






 Table of Contents  
 
Table of Contents ...................................................................................................................... i 
List of Tables and Figures ........................................................................................................ x 
List of Appendices ................................................................................................................... xi 
Abstract .................................................................................................................................. xiv 
Declaration ............................................................................................................................ xvii 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................... xix 
 
Chapter 1. Research Overview ........................................................................................... 21 
1.1 Forensic Science and the Law ................................................................................... 21 
1.1.1 Current Issues Facing Forensic Science ........................................................... 22 
1.1.2 Culture, Context, and Forensic Bias................................................................. 23 
1.1.2.1 The National Academy of Science Report (2009) on Forensic  
Science ................................................................................................................. 24 
1.1.2.2 The President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology 
Report (2016) ....................................................................................................... 24 
1.1.3 Forensic Science in Australia and New Zealand ............................................. 25 
1.1.4 Forensic Science and Cognitive Bias ............................................................... 26 
1.2 Issues of Forensic Science and Bias in the Courts .................................................... 31 
1.2.1 Cognitive Bias and the Courtroom ................................................................... 31 
1.3 The Role of Supplementary Materials in the Courtroom ......................................... 33 
1.3.1 Jury Instructions ................................................................................................ 34 
1.3.2 Forensic Reports ............................................................................................... 35 




1.4 Improving Juror Information Processing and Decision Making: The  
Challenges ......................................................................................................................... 37 
1.5 Models of Juror Information Processing .................................................................... 41 
1.5.1 The Story Model ................................................................................................ 41 
1.5.2 The Integrative Multi-Level Theory Model ..................................................... 42 
1.5.3 Bayes’ Theorem................................................................................................. 43 
1.5.4 The Heuristic-Systematic Model ...................................................................... 44 
1.5.5 Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory .................................................................. 47 
1.5.6 The Role of Extralegal Factors ......................................................................... 48 
1.6 Summary ..................................................................................................................... 50 
 
Chapter 2.  Study 1. Forensic Evidence and Juror Decision Making: Can Jurors 
Recognise Bias in Forensic Reports? .................................................................................. 55 
2.1 Abstract ....................................................................................................................... 55 
2.2 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 56 
2.3 Cognitive Bias in the Courtroom ............................................................................... 58 
2.4 The Role of Supplementary Materials ....................................................................... 59 
2.4.1 The Found and Edmond (2012) Forensic Report ............................................. 60 
2.5 Summary ..................................................................................................................... 62 
2.6 Method ........................................................................................................................ 64 
2.6.1 Participants ........................................................................................................ 64 
2.6.2 Measures ............................................................................................................ 65 
2.6.2.1 Stimulus Materials ................................................................................... 65 
2.6.2.1.1 Trial Transcript ............................................................................... 65 
2.6.2.2 Found and Edmond (2012) Format Forensic Report .............................. 66 
iii 
2.6.2.2.1 Forensic Report Manipulation ....................................................... 67 
2.6.2.2.1.1 Section - Information that the examiner was provided  
with .......................................................................................................... 67 
2.6.2.2.1.2 Section - Conclusions ........................................................... 67 
2.6.2.3 Participant Questionnaire ........................................................................ 67 
2.6.2.3.1 Forensic Confidence Scale ............................................................. 67 
2.6.3 Design ............................................................................................................... 68 
2.6.4 Procedure .......................................................................................................... 68 
2.6.5 Data Screening .................................................................................................. 69 
2.7 Results ........................................................................................................................ 69 
2.7.1 Manipulation Checks ........................................................................................ 69 
2.7.1.1 Forensic Confidence ................................................................................ 69 
2.7.1.2 Expert Bias............................................................................................... 70 
2.7.1.3 Expert Study’s Validity ........................................................................... 71 
2.7.2 Verdict ............................................................................................................... 71 
2.7.3 Likelihood of Guilt ........................................................................................... 72 
2.7.4 Forensic Confidence ......................................................................................... 72 
2.7.5 Detection of Forensic Bias ............................................................................... 72 
2.8 Discussion .................................................................................................................. 73 
2.9 Limitations of the Study and Considerations for Future Research ........................... 75 
 
Chapter 3.  Study 2. The Effects of Emotional and Rational Information Processing on 
Juror Decision Making ........................................................................................................ 79 
3.1 Abstract ...................................................................................................................... 79 




3.3 Models of Juror Information Processing and Decision Making ............................... 80 
3.3.1 The Story Model ................................................................................................ 80 
3.3.2 The Heuristic-Systematic Model ...................................................................... 81 
3.3.3 Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory .................................................................. 83 
3.3.3.1 The Need for Cognition ........................................................................... 84 
3.4 Juror Reasoning and the Role of Bias ........................................................................ 85 
3.4.1 The Purpose of Supplementary Materials ........................................................ 86 
3.4.1.1 The Found and Edmond (2012) Forensic Report Format ....................... 86 
3.5 Summary ..................................................................................................................... 87 
3.6 Method ........................................................................................................................ 90 
3.6.1 Participants ........................................................................................................ 90 
3.6.2 Measures ............................................................................................................ 90 
3.6.2.1 Jury Instructions ....................................................................................... 90 
3.6.2.1.1 Emotional Jury Instructions ............................................................ 90 
3.6.2.1.2 Rational Jury Instructions ............................................................... 91 
3.6.2.2 Trial Transcript ......................................................................................... 91 
3.6.2.3 Found and Edmond (2012) Format Forensic Report .............................. 91 
3.6.2.3.1 Forensic Report Manipulation ........................................................ 92 
3.6.2.3.1.1 Section - Information that the examiner was provided  
with ........................................................................................................... 92 
3.6.2.3.1.2 Section - Conclusions ............................................................ 92 
3.6.2.4 Forensic Evidence .................................................................................... 93 
3.6.2.4.1 Emotional Forensic Evidence ......................................................... 93 
3.6.2.4.2 Rational Forensic Evidence. ........................................................... 93 
3.6.2.5 Participant Questionnaire ......................................................................... 94 
v 
3.6.2.5.1 Forensic Confidence Scale ............................................................. 94 
3.6.2.5.2 Need for Cognition Scale ............................................................... 94 
3.6.3 Design ............................................................................................................... 95 
3.6.4 Procedure .......................................................................................................... 95 
3.6.5 Data Screening .................................................................................................. 96 
3.7 Results ........................................................................................................................ 96 
3.7.1 Manipulation Checks ........................................................................................ 96 
3.7.1.1 Need for Cognition .................................................................................. 97 
3.7.1.2 Emotional Involvement ........................................................................... 97 
3.7.1.3 Mental Effort ........................................................................................... 97 
3.7.1.4 Damages Awarded .................................................................................. 98 
3.7.1.4.1 Study Condition ............................................................................. 98 
3.7.2 Verdict ............................................................................................................... 98 
3.7.3 Forensic Confidence ......................................................................................... 99 
3.7.3.1 Instruction and Evidence Type ............................................................... 99 
3.7.3.2 Found and Edmond (2012) Forensic Report .......................................... 99 
3.7.3.3 Instruction and Evidence Type and Found and Edmond (2012) Forensic 
Report ................................................................................................................... 99 
3.7.4 Education ........................................................................................................ 100 
3.7.4.1 Secondary Education ............................................................................. 100 
3.7.4.2 Tertiary Education ................................................................................. 100 
3.8 Discussion ................................................................................................................ 100 
3.9 Can Jury Instructions and Evidence Type Manipulate Information  
Processing? ..................................................................................................................... 101 




3.11 Limitations of the Study and Considerations for Future Research .......................105 
 
Chapter 4.  Study 3. Effects of Cognitive Load on Juror Decision Making in the 
Presence of Forensic Bias ...................................................................................................109 
4.1 Abstract .....................................................................................................................109 
4.2 Introduction ...............................................................................................................110 
4.3 How Do People Reason? A Dual Processing Approach .........................................110 
4.3.1 Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory ................................................................111 
4.3.1.1 Cognitive Load .......................................................................................112 
4.3.3.1.1 Cognitive Load in the Courtroom ................................................118 
4.4 Juror Biases and Forensic Evidence .........................................................................113 
4.4.1 The Forensic Evidence Evaluation Bias Scale ...............................................113 
4.4.2 The Forensic Confidence Scale ......................................................................114 
4.5 Summary ...................................................................................................................114 
4.6 Experiment 1 .............................................................................................................118 
4.6.1 Method .............................................................................................................118 
4.6.2 Participants ......................................................................................................118 
4.6.3 Dependent Measures .......................................................................................118 
4.6.3.1 Stimulus Materials .................................................................................118 
4.6.3.1.1 Word Memorisation Task .............................................................118 
4.6.3.1.2 Trial Transcript .............................................................................118 
4.6.3.1.3 Questionnaire ................................................................................120 
4.6.4 Design ..............................................................................................................120 
4.6.5 Procedure .........................................................................................................120 
4.6.6 Data Screening .................................................................................................121 
vii 
4.7 Results ...................................................................................................................... 122 
4.7.1 Word Memorisation Task ............................................................................... 122 
4.7.2 Reading Comprehension Task ....................................................................... 122 
4.8 Experiment 2 ............................................................................................................ 123 
4.8.1 Method ............................................................................................................ 123 
4.8.2 Participants ...................................................................................................... 123 
4.8.3 Dependent Measures ....................................................................................... 124 
4.8.3.1 Forensic Evidence Evaluation Bias Scale ............................................. 124 
4.8.3.2 Stimulus Materials ................................................................................. 124 
4.8.3.2.1 Trial Transcript ............................................................................. 124 
4.8.3.2.2 Questionnaire ............................................................................... 125 
4.8.3.2.2.1 Forensic Confidence Scale ................................................. 125 
4.8.4 Design ............................................................................................................. 126 
4.8.5 Procedure ........................................................................................................ 126 
4.8.6 Data Screening ................................................................................................ 127 
4.9 Results ...................................................................................................................... 128 
4.9.1 Manipulation Checks ...................................................................................... 128 
4.9.1.1 Study Condition ..................................................................................... 128 
4.9.1.2 Study Completion Time ........................................................................ 129 
4.9.1.3 Pre-Trial Forensic Bias .......................................................................... 129 
4.9.2 Verdict ............................................................................................................. 129 
4.9.2.1 Study Condition ..................................................................................... 129 
4.9.2.2 Gender .................................................................................................... 130 
4.9.2.3 Forensic Confidence .............................................................................. 130 




4.9.3.1 Forensic Confidence and Likelihood of Guilt .......................................131 
4.9.4 Recognition of Bias .........................................................................................132 
4.10 Discussion ...............................................................................................................133 
4.11 The Effects of Cognitive Load ...............................................................................133 
4.12 Comparing Verdict and Likelihood of Guilt ..........................................................134 
4.13 Limitations of the Study and Considerations for Future Research .......................135 
4.14 Where to from here? Implications for the Adversarial System .............................138 
 
Chapter 5. Overview ...........................................................................................................141 
5.1 Abstract .....................................................................................................................141 
5.2 Introduction ...............................................................................................................142 
5.3 Study 1: Forensic Evidence and Juror Decision Making: Can Jurors Recognise  
Bias in Forensic Reports? ...............................................................................................143 
5.3.1 Study 1: Findings .............................................................................................145 
5.3.2 Study 1: Limitations of the Research and Contribution to the  
Literature ...................................................................................................................145 
5.4 Study 2: Effects of Emotional and Rational Information Processing on Juror  
Decision Making .............................................................................................................147 
5.4.1 Study 2: Findings .............................................................................................149 
5.4.2 Study 2: Limitations of the Research and Contribution to the  
Literature ...................................................................................................................150 
5.5 Study 3: Effects of Cognitive Load on Juror Decisiong Making in the Presence of 
Forensic Bias ...................................................................................................................153 
5.5.1 Study 3: Findings .............................................................................................155 
ix 
5.5.2 Study 3: Limitations of the Research and Contribution to the  
Literature .................................................................................................................. 156 
5.6 Conclusions of the Research: Is there a Problem with the Adversarial 
 System? .......................................................................................................................... 159 
5.7 Recommendations for Future Research .................................................................. 167 
5.7.1 The Probative Value of Scientific Literacy .................................................... 169 
5.7.2 How Do Jurors Think? Cognitive Load and Cognitive Experiential  
Self-Theory .............................................................................................................. 170 
5.8 Summary .................................................................................................................. 172 
 
References ............................................................................................................................ 175 






















Table 1.  Participant Characteristics ................................................................................. 70 
Chapter 3: 
Table 1.  Participant Characteristics ................................................................................. 97 
Chapter 4: 
Table 1.  Participant Characteristics ...............................................................................128 
Figure 1. Scatterplot illustrating the linear relationship between Juror Likelihood of guilt 
estimates and Forensic Confidence scores. ....................................................................131 
 









List of Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Study 1 Trial Transcript ........................................................................... 195 
Appendix B: Study 1 Forensic Report ........................................................................... 202 
Appendix C: Forensic Confidence Scale ....................................................................... 204 
Appendix D: Study 1 Participant Questionnaire ........................................................... 206 
Appendix E: Study 2 Trial Transcript ........................................................................... 210 
Appendix F: Emotionally Arousing Jury Instructions .................................................. 219 
Appendix G: Emotionally Arousing Forensic Evidence .............................................. 220 
Appendix H: Study 2 Forensic Report .......................................................................... 223 
Appendix I: Rational Jury Instructions .......................................................................... 226 
Appendix J: Rational Forensic Evidence ...................................................................... 227 
Appendix K: Study 2 Participant Questionnaire ........................................................... 230 
Appendix L: Forensic Evidence Evaluation Bias Scale ............................................... 237 
Appendix M: Study 3 Trial Transcript .......................................................................... 238 
Appendix N: Courts Administration of South Australia Transcript ............................. 249 


























Forensic science plays a central role in the administration of judicial and legal processes, 
and crime scene investigations. Fingerprint, bite-mark, and DNA comparisons, as well as 
analyses of audio and video recordings, have proven invaluable to investigators and legal 
practitioners. Yet research has indicated that forensic science is not infallible, and that the 
strength and validity of forensic evidence is often overstated. Studies have found that a range of 
cognitive biases, including contextual and motivational biases, may substantially influence 
forensic procedure. Authors of the 2016 President’s Council of Advisors on Science and 
Technology (PCAST) report on forensic comparison evidence argue that issues affecting forensic 
science are considerable, and will likely continue to influence forensic evidence admitted into 
courts. Technological advances have not served to reduce incidents of error attributable to bias 
as outcomes of analyses still rely on human judgement. Recommendations for strategies to 
reduce bias in forensic labs have been identified; however, researchers have stressed that 
implementing these may only gradually reduce instances of questionable forensic evidence 
entering courtrooms. Judges have been assigned a gatekeeper role in determining the admittance 
of forensic evidence into court; however, research has found that they are ill-equipped to reliably 
do so. This leaves jurors with the responsibility to identify and critique weak or flawed forensic 
evidence. However, studies have shown that jurors are prone to erroneous decision making. In 
light of this, it is troubling that literature has paid limited attention to the impact of forensic bias 
on court proceedings. 
Jurors are often influenced by extraneous information such as demographic 
characteristics of a defendant and victim, and the nature of a crime. They have also been found 
to overestimate their comprehension of forensic evidence. Attempts to improve juror decision 
making have included the introduction of supplementary materials such as juror instructions and 
forensic reports. However, such tools have not been empirically supported. Found and Edmond 
xv 
(2012) proposed a forensic report format to address the limitations of traditional forensic reports 
for effectively conveying information to jurors. Claims about the efficacy of their proposed 
format have not been substantiated, and cognitive psychology literature and current juror decision 
making research do not support Found and Edmond’s (2012) conclusions.  
The pervasive use of forensic evidence in court proceedings has implications for 
strategies to address the effects of cognitive biases on judicial outcomes.  Unfortunately, current 
materials have not been shown to improve jurors’ evaluations of evidence, pointing to a critical 
gap in literature on juror information processing and decision making. This thesis will therefore 
attempt to empirically evaluate Found and Edmond’s (2012) proposed report format. It will also 
explore research on juror decision making in the context of forensic and other evidence. 
Differences between current juror information processing paradigms will be investigated in order 
to determine whether they effectively account for the complexities of juror behaviour. 
Furthermore this thesis will contribute new perspectives to the field of juror research by exploring 
alternative approaches to improving the accuracy and reliability of juror information processing 
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Chapter 1.  
Research Overview 
Forensic science has become a fundamental component of the contemporary evidence-
based legal process (Edmond, 2015; Giannelli, 2010). An increasingly broad range of scientific 
branches are currently consulted and employed in law enforcement, and over the course of legal 
procedures, including trials (Edmond et al., 2013; Giannelli, 2010; Goodman-Delahunty & 
Hewson, 2010). Forensic methods of evidence collection and analysis of fingerprint, CCTV 
image, DNA and other samples have proven invaluable in the provision of just legal services and 
outcomes (Edmond, 2015; McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009). The growing reliance and 
confidence in forensic science has raised some concerns, as evidenced by the National Academy 
of Sciences (NAS) (2009) report, and more recently within the 2016 President’s Council of 
Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) report on forensic comparison evidence. 
1.1 Forensic Science and the Law 
Forensic science refers to the objective collection and analysis of evidence for the 
purposes of aiding investigative and judicial branches of the law (Kassin et al., 2013; McQuiston-
Surrett & Saks, 2009). Early forensic science involved fingerprint analysis, firearms 
examinations, and a range of pattern evidence examinations such as hair, bite-mark, and 
handwriting comparisons, modelled on scientific research protocols employed by academics and 
researchers in the natural sciences (Dror et al., 2006; Edmond et al., 2013; NAS, 2009). It has 
since come to include DNA analysis, fire and explosives analysis, and even digital evidence 
examinations (Dror et al., 2006; Kassin et al., 2013; NAS, 2009). Though forensic procedures 
mimic those used in research based on the natural sciences, forensic evidence examinations, 
including comparisons, generally involve a significant human component (Kassin et al., 2013; 
Wells et al., 2013). It has recently been proposed that human error plays a more prominent role 




Since their inception, forensic science disciplines have been a trusted source of 
information and evidence, and have contributed to the successful conviction of criminals, and 
exoneration of innocent people (NAS, 2009; PCAST, 2016). Scientific and technological 
advances have ensured that the forensic sciences have continued to contribute to the provision of 
law enforcement (Dror & Mnookin, 2010; NAS, 2009; PCAST, 2016). Yet these same advances 
have also revealed that the forensic sciences have at times contributed to wrongful convictions 
(Dror & Mnookin, 2010; NAS, 2009; PCAST, 2016). Further investigations into the underlying 
causes for wrongful convictions resulting from flawed forensic evidence have shed light on a 
broad number of issues still facing the forensic sciences today (Dror et al., 2006; Dror & 
Mnookin, 2010; Kassin et al., 2013; NAS, 2009; PCAST, 2016). One such issue is that of the 
increasingly broad range of forensic science disciplines with implications for generalised validity 
and standardisation (Edmond et al., 2009; NAS, 2009; PCAST, 2016). 
1.1.1 Current Issues Facing Forensic Science 
Forensic science encompasses a plethora of scientific disciplines, each with their own 
distinct technologies, theoretical and practical frameworks, techniques, and practices (Edmond 
et al., 2009; NAS, 2009; PCAST, 2016). Most forensic experts also undertake highly specialised 
training. This creates distinctions between forensic scientists, and scientists without forensic 
specialisations, both of whom may be hired to assist in forensic investigations (Dror et al., 2006; 
Edmond, 2013; NAS, 2009). Despite such a broad range of disciplines, the forensic sciences have 
significant issues due to widely lacking standardised methods and practices across and within 
particular disciplines (Dror et al., 2006; Dror & Mnookin, 2010; NAS, 2009; PCAST, 2016). A 
general lack of mandatory certification and accreditation of forensic practitioners and 
laboratories has also meant that reliability and validity of forensic practices and evidence varies 
greatly across and within forensic disciplines (Edmond et al., 2009; Giannelli, 2007; NAS, 2009; 
PCAST, 2016). The lack of standardised methods and practices may also contribute to the risk 
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of human error in the provision of forensic science services. Literature has explored a number of 
implications regarding human error. (Dror et al., 2006; Giannelli, 2007; Kassin et al., 2013; 
PCAST, 2016; Saks et al., 2003).  
1.1.2 Culture, Context, and Forensic Bias 
Forensic scientists work within a broad framework of socio-cultural, economic, and 
political contexts, all of which may influence examiners’ judgments when collecting, analysing, 
and presenting forensic evidence (Kassin et al., 2013; Page et al., 2012; Saks et al., 2003). Since 
the turn of the century, contextual influences and biases have had a greater influence over the 
provision of law enforcement and legal services, in part as a consequence of a global focus on 
preventing terrorism (Dror et al., 2006; Giannelli, 2010; Peacock et al., 2004). Psychology 
training of forensic experts and law enforcement has been proposed, though it has not been found 
to mitigate the effects of human error within forensic laboratories (Costanzo, 2013; Giannelli, 
2007; Saks et al., 2003). The effects of such errors have been compounded by the growing 
complexity of forensic science and evidence, and the increasingly politicised and socio-culturally 
driven public scrutiny of the legal system and its proceedings (Dror et al., 2006; Giannelli, 2007; 
Giannelli, 2010; PCAST, 2016; Wells et al., 2013). Contrary to popular belief, the introduction 
of technology has not dramatically reduced the frequency or impact of human error (Dror & 
Mnookin, 2010). Although technological advancements have been beneficial to some forensic 
disciplines, examiners’ judgments are still central to the outcome of pattern evidence 
comparisons (Dror & Mnookin, 2010; Peacock et al., 2004; Stavrianos et al., 2012). This is an 
issue in light of literature increasingly pointing to the effects of bias on human behaviour as a 
prominent source of error in forensic laboratories (Dror & Mnookin, 2010; Freitag & Found, 
2017; Newman et al., 2011; Saks et al., 2003; Wells et al., 2013). To better understand the causes 




representing a milestone with regard to efforts undertaken to identify the challenges facing 
forensic science.  
1.1.2.1 The National Academy of Science Report (2009) on Forensic Science 
The purpose of the 2009 NAS report was to identify the range of issues plaguing forensic 
science, and to provide recommendations for the purpose of overhauling forensic science 
research and practices to improve the validity and reliability of the forensic science community’s 
contributions to law enforcement. Authors of the report attributed flawed forensic analyses and 
unreliable forensic evaluations to a range of factors (NAS, 2009). These included a growing 
number of forensic disciplines, a lack of oversight regarding certification, accreditation, and 
training, and a lack of scientific evidence through research to support methods used to conduct 
forensic comparisons and analyses (NAS, 2009).  Authors also attributed a lack of standardised 
tools, methods, and measures to a significant lack of funding, and a lack of structure, motivation, 
and direction with regard to validating forensic science as a discipline (NAS, 2009). Although 
the report provided comprehensive recommendations, the recently published PCAST report on 
forensic science indicates that few of these recommendations were sufficiently implemented 
(PCAST, 2016).  
1.1.2.2 The President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology 
Report (2016)  
The PCAST (2016) report sought to investigate the effectiveness of recommendations 
made in the NAS (2009) report. For investigators and legal professionals seeking to incorporate 
forensic science and evidence during fact-finding endeavours, the report aimed to identify 
specific barriers. Findings indicated that some areas of concern had grown in significance since 
publication of the NAS (2009) report, with authors identifying two critical gaps in current 
forensic science research and practice (PCAST, 2016). Authors cited “the need for clarity about 
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the scientific standards for the validity and reliability of forensic methods” and “the need to 
evaluate specific forensic methods to determine whether they have been scientifically established 
to be valid and reliable” as significant challenges facing current forensic science disciplines 
(PCAST, 2016, p. x). Despite the comprehensive nature of the report’s review and 
recommendations, many of which echo findings of the NAS (2009) report, cognitive bias is only 
briefly addressed. Authors discounted the impact of cognitive bias, suggesting that the 
standardisation of tools and methods in forensic science would be sufficient (PCAST, 2016). 
Publication of the NAS (2009) report prompted renewed interest into examining the state of 
forensic science in Australia and New Zealand (Houck et al., 2011; Robertson, 2017; Ross, 2011, 
2012). 
1.1.3 Forensic Science in Australia and New Zealand 
In response to the NAS (2009) report, Ross (2011, 2012) observed that forensic science 
in Australia and New Zealand has faced similar challenges to those present in the United States 
and the United Kingdom. Factors which were identified to support Ross’ (2011, 2012) claims are 
Australia’s lack of a national forensic science research strategy, fragmentation of resources 
resulting in a lack of funding, limited research scope and expertise, and difficulties with 
operationalising research outcomes. Interestingly, Houck et al. (2011) and Ross (2012) note that 
although this is concerning, close working relationships between Australian and New Zealand 
forensic science communities have enabled more effective and direct responses to some of the 
NAS (2009) report’s recommendations. Houck et al. (2011) argued that the smaller, more 
focused research community has benefited the state of forensic science in Australia and New 
Zealand. They claim that this aligns with the NAS (2009) report’s call for localised forensic 
science communities that are robust and developed in collaboration with the higher education 
sector (Houck et al., 2011). The subject of cognitive bias in Australian courts did not feature in 




have indicated that Australian researchers have begun to recognise that the effects of cognitive 
bias on forensic science cannot be so readily dismissed (Edmond, 2015; Edmond et al., 2016; 
Freitag & Found, 2017; Robertson, 2017). As a result, psychology and legal scholars have sought 
to develop a more robust understanding of cognitive bias in forensic science (Edmond et al., 
2016; Freitag & Found, 2017; Giannelli, 2010; Hawkins & Scherr, 2017; Kassin et al., 2013; 
Mossiere & Maeder, 2016).  
1.1.4 Forensic Science and Cognitive Bias 
Cognition, and the use of cognitive processes, refers to internal mental states and 
processes employed by humans for everyday functioning (Tran et al., 2011). The questionable 
reliability of cognitive processes including memory, perception, and decision making, has been 
well documented (Dror et al., 2006; Page et al., 2012; Tran et al., 2011). Studies on cognition 
and behaviour have demonstrated that humans are prone to committing errors due to 
overconfidence, misconceptions regarding cognitive functions, and erroneous judgment 
strategies. Such human fallibility is commonly referred to as cognitive bias (Dror et al., 2006; 
Tran et al., 2011). Research has identified a number of cognitive biases impacting forensic 
procedures and outcomes, only briefly discussed in NAS (2009) and the PCAST (2016) reports. 
Cumulatively these biases, in the context of forensic science, are often referred to as forensic 
confirmation bias (Kassin et al., 2013). The two most commonly reported of these are 
motivational bias, and contextual bias (Dror et al., 2006; Giannelli, 2010; Kassin et al., 2013; 
Page et al., 2012; Wells et al., 2013).  
Contextual bias is a frequently cited issue in forensic sciences, characterised by the 
impairment of a forensic expert’s judgment due to contextual influences (Dror et al., 2006). A 
forensic examiner made aware of details concerning the crime or suspect, influenced by police 
or other parties involved with the case, or by socio-economic, cultural, or political factors, is 
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likely to conduct biased forensic evaluations and comparisons (Dror et al., 2006; Page et al., 
2012). The extent of such effects has become increasingly well documented. 
Dror et al. (2006) selected several fingerprint identification decisions made by experts 
over their respective investigations, all of which were deemed positive matches. The experts who 
originally conducted the identifications were recruited to repeat their comparisons, without being 
informed of their having previously matched the prints they were presented with. The experts 
were provided with extraneous information suggesting that the prints were a non-match, as a 
consequence of which four out of five experts made different identification decisions (Dror et al., 
2006). Another frequently cited example of such an occurrence is the Madrid bomber case.  
In 2004, the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) positively, yet 
erroneously, identified the Madrid bomber to be an American Muslim named Brandon Mayfield 
(Dror et al., 2006; Kassin et al., 2013). This was done using a comparison of a latent fingerprint 
with that of the suspect (Dror et al., 2006; Kassin et al., 2013). Although the erroneous positive 
identification was supported by a number of experts working with the FBI, Spanish authorities 
identified the real culprit through their own investigation, relying on comparisons using the same 
latent print. This raised some alarming questions concerning the effects of contextual bias on 
forensic examinations and examiners, and subsequent judicial outcomes (Dror et al., 2006; 
Kassin et al., 2013). Publicised wrongful convictions have also occurred in cases of motivational 
bias, which bears many similarities, but also some key differences to contextual bias. 
Motivational bias refers to instances where a forensic examination may be influenced by 
motivational factors. These may include social and cultural factors, pressures from police or other 
sources, and forensic examiners’ misconceptions about their role within the legal process (Page 
et al., 2012; Wells et al., 2013). The case of Fred Zain has been used to highlight the flaws of 




presentation of evidence (Giannelli, 2010; Wells et al., 2013). When investigating misconduct at 
the West Virginia state crime laboratory, the American Society of Crime Laboratory 
Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board (ASCLD/LA) revealed that in circumstances where 
evidence had been deemed inconclusive by other scientists, Fred Zain, who had been described 
by colleagues as “very pro-prosecution”, would analyse the same evidence and present findings 
that conclusively tied the sample to the suspect (Giannelli, 2010; Wells et al., 2013). In another 
well documented case, a forensic expert named Joyce Gilchrist was found to have “repeatedly 
overstated test results, withheld evidence, and provided critical evidence for the prosecution” 
(Giannelli, 2010, p.61). Further investigations into Gilchrist found that she had in several 
instances knowingly presented evidence that implicated suspects, which she knew to be false and 
misleading in light of contrary evidence that had been withheld from the defence (Giannelli, 
2010). Gilchrist’s indiscretions were found to have consistently benefitted the prosecution 
(Fuhrman, 2003; Giannelli, 2010). The impact of motivational biases, such as the subtle influence 
of role effects on forensic expert decision making in cases of ambiguous or inconclusive 
evidence, are clear. Increasingly complex methods and the use of technology have been 
introduced in an attempt to identify causes and reduce incidents of bias.  
One controversial introduction to forensic science has been anthropometry. 
Anthropometry is generally described as the comparative study of sizes and proportions of the 
human body, in forensic science predominantly focusing on facial proportions and measurements 
(Stavrianos et al., 2012; Stephan & Henneberg, 2006). The premise of anthropometry is that bone 
structure remains unchanged from a certain age, and that the high degree of variability and 
diversity of dimensions found from any one person to another ensures that anthropometry’s 
accuracy and reliability is comparable to DNA and fingerprint comparisons (Kleinberg, 2008; 
Stephan & Henneberg, 2006). A number of recent studies examined and scrutinised methods and 
practical outcomes of anthropometric comparison.  
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Stephan and Henneberg (2006) investigated the effectiveness of anthropometric 
techniques in response to the failure of such techniques in a forensic setting relating to the 
identification of what turned out to be a victim of a serial killer in the 1990s. Results of the study 
indicated that participants were capable of accurately noting resemblances between facial 
approximations and target faces. However, success rates of target identification were found to be 
low, with participants who had first completed the resemblance task performing worse than 
participants who only completed the target identification task (Stephan & Henneberg, 2006). This 
finding reflects outcomes of a breadth of research on facial approximation, including the use of 
anthropometric techniques, suggesting that whilst visual observations and comparisons may 
serve to approximate a target individual’s resemblance, human perception, even when aided by 
anthropometric tools, is not objective and accurate enough to reliably identify a target individual 
from a line-up, or via comparison using still or moving images (Jenkins & Burton, 2008; Peacock 
et al., 2004; Stavrianos et al., 2012). Similarly, whilst the introduction of technologies has been 
hailed as a significant milestone in legitimising forensic science, research has suggested that the 
interaction between such technologies and experts who employ them leaves notable room for 
error (Dror & Mnookin, 2010; Peacock et al., 2004). Forensic confirmation bias may influence 
outcomes of anthropometric techniques due to the significant degrees of human judgment that 
are still required (Dror & Mnookin, 2010; Peacock et al., 2004). In order to ameliorate the impact 
of such cognitive bias, studies such as Kassin et al. (2013) have proposed a number of 
recommendations regarding forensic analyses and comparisons. 
In order to reduce bias in forensic crime laboratories Kassin et al. (2013) recommended 
key changes to forensic procedures. One proposed change was that forensic scientists work in a 
linear fashion, disseminating and analysing forensic evidence before comparing it against target 
samples (Kassin et al., 2013). Kassin et al. (2013) suggested that forensic examiners’ access to 




acknowledged the occasional need for extraneous information, such as the surface from which a 
fingerprint was pulled. A third party would in such instances serve as a provisional source of 
information relevant only to the analysis of forensic evidence. Kassin et al. (2013) also 
recommended caution regarding the use of technologies, as the emphasis on quantity of 
comparisons increases chances of false positive outcomes. Finally, Kassin et al. (2013) 
recommended that training in basic psychology, and education on the potential effects of 
cognitive biases should be a core component of law enforcement and forensic expert training. 
Edmond et al. (2016) sought to expand on this, outlining a comprehensive set of duties and 
responsibilities held by forensic and other expert witnesses.  
Echoing findings of the NAS (2009) and PCAST (2016) reports, Edmond et al. (2016, 
p. 2) scrutinised factors which commonly interfere with dissemination of forensic evidence 
during legal proceedings, and focused on the importance of key aspects of evidence, including 
“validation, reliability, uncertainty, error rates, proficiency, and other human factors”. Edmond 
et al. (2016) recommended forensic experts use mainstream scientific methods and norms to 
address many shortcomings commonly associated with forensic analyses (Dror et al., 2006; NAS, 
2009; PCAST, 2016; Wells et al., 2013). Edmond et al. (2016) also proposed a number of 
procedural rules, including more stringent admissibility requirements, and a renewed focus on 
disclosure, transparency, impartiality and epistemic modesty on the part of forensic expert 
witnesses presenting evidence in court. Edmond et al. (2016) acknowledged the effects of 
cognitive bias, yet argued that proposed changes, if adopted, may address concerns related to the 
effects of cognitive bias on forensic sciences procedures. The PCAST (2016) report, and current 
literature highlighting the ongoing introduction of weak or compromised forensic evidence into 
courtrooms dismiss such unfounded claims (Gatowski et al., 2001; Howes & Kemp, 2017; 
Kovera & McAuliff, 2000).  
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It is clear that cognitive bias has been recognised as a notable source of error in forensic 
laboratories. Specifically, contextual and motivational biases have been shown to influence 
forensic experts (Dror et al., 2006; Kassin et al., 2013; Page et al., 2012; Wells et al., 2013). 
Although studies have explored possibilities for reducing the impact of cognitive bias relating to 
the provision of forensic science for criminal proceedings, other research has demonstrated the 
degree to which cognitive biases, in spite of attempts to mitigate or circumvent them, have 
continued to affect forensic evidence admitted to courts (Howes, 2015; Kassin et al., 2013; 
McAuliff et al., 2009; NAS, 2009; PCAST, 2016).  
1.2 Issues of Forensic Science and Bias in the Courts 
Research conducted by Wells et al. (2013) and Kassin et al. (2013) indicates that 
contextual biases are widespread, and likely inseparable from forensic science. The introduction 
of technologies, and socio-cultural developments, have led to an increasing overlap between law 
enforcement, forensic science, and the courts (Kassin et al., 2013; Wells et al., 2013). Although 
Kassin et al. (2013) proposed a number of changes to crime laboratory procedures to reduce the 
effects of contextual bias in forensic labs, Wells et al. (2013) highlight that contextual bias 
exacerbate other criticisms directed at forensic science, including concerns relating to the 
overstating of findings, at times questionable scientific basis for forensic methods and analyses, 
and the lack of accurate statistical error rates. In light of this, the effects of cognitive bias in 
courtrooms and the role of jurors in accurately administering justice have been under-examined, 
highlighting a critical knowledge gap concerning the role of bias in a broader legal context.  
1.2.1 Cognitive Bias and the Courtroom 
The issue of cognitive bias in courts is complex. The effects of cognitive bias on evidence 
analyses and comparisons may influence courtroom outcomes, as biased evidence and expert 




lines of investigation that ultimately result in charges being laid may also be tainted, as a falsely 
identified fingerprint may coerce an eyewitness into strengthening or otherwise giving false 
testimony (Kassin et al., 2013). Consequently, judges and juries may be presented with 
intentionally or unintentionally unreliable evidence and witness testimony. 
Research has indicated that jurors overestimate their knowledge of forensic techniques, 
and greatly rely on the often subjective opinions of expert witnesses (McQuiston-Surret & Saks, 
2009). This presents a significant dilemma for legal bodies and decision makers who aim to 
uphold the principles of fairness, accuracy, and objectivity associated with the law. Although 
reducing cognitive bias in forensic settings represents an important step in reducing bias 
throughout the legal process, an increasing emphasis has been placed on the role of judges and 
jurors with regard to unbiased and objective judicial outcomes.  
In a criminal trial, the jury’s role is to determine whether it has been proven that the 
accused is guilty “beyond reasonable doubt” on the basis of evidence, testimony, and rules set 
out by the legal framework (McAuliff et al., 2009; Ohtsubo et al., 2004; Pozzulo et al., 2010). It 
is inherently presumed that jurors evaluate pieces of evidence presented in court objectively, and 
independently of one another, unless otherwise stated (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Magnussen et 
al., 2014; McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009). Contrary to this, a growing emphasis on 
progressively complex forensic methods, reliance on experts to assess evidence for the supposed 
benefit of jurors, and presumptions regarding accuracy, validity, and reliability of forensic 
evidence have increasingly contributed to erroneous convictions (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; 
Dror et al., 2006; Giannelli, 2010; Kassin et al., 2013; McQuiston-Surret & Saks, 2009; Pozzulo 
et al., 2010). The idea that jurors may not be capable of discharging their duty to remain impartial 
and objective fact finders in the face of forensic evidence has, in light of this research, gained 
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significant traction. Judges have been assigned the role of gatekeepers in determining whether 
particular forensic evidence should be admitted into the court. 
1.3 The Role of Supplementary Materials in the Courtroom 
As a result of a number of publicised U.S. Supreme Court rulings concerning the 
admissibility of expert evidence, judges have been entrusted with the critical role of determining 
whether expert evidence is to be admitted on the basis of relevance and reliability (McAuliff et 
al., 2009; Woody, 2016). Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) 
particularly stood out in this regard, as it proposed that “even if judges admitted unreliable expert 
evidence in a trial, the procedural safeguards of cross-examination, opposing expert testimony, 
and judicial instruction on the standard of proof would help jurors identify flaws that exist in the 
evidence” (Kovera & Levett, 2015, p. 287; Risinger et al., 2002). Questions surrounding the 
validity and reliability of forensic evidence have led to the re-examination of how judges across 
different Commonwealth jurisdictions assess whether expert evidence should be presented to a 
jury (Freckleton et al., 2016).  
Freckelton et al. (2016) conducted a comprehensive review of literature investigating 
factors influencing how judges evaluated expert evidence and testimony. Examining practices in 
six countries, Freckelton et al. (2016) found reasons for the admissibility of expert evidence to 
vary by country and expert witness domain. Clarity of explanation and experience as an expert 
were generally deemed to be of highest importance, while peer-review of evidence and the 
expert’s educational qualifications were found to be of low importance to judges determining 
whether evidence should be presented before a jury (Freckelton et al., 2016). Judges were also 
surveyed on their views regarding the most significant issues with expert evidence, with those 
surveyed most commonly citing expert bias and complex technical and expert language to be 




expert evidence and testimony in conjunction with recognition of expert bias as a serious concern 
highlights serious flaws related to the use of juries in court cases involving complex evidence 
(Freckelton et al., 2016; Kassin et al., 2013; McAuliff et al., 2009). Further research has also 
indicated that though judges may be more reliable in their evaluations of evidence than jurors, 
they are still ill-equipped to reliably evaluate the relevance and reliability of expert evidence 
(Gatowski et al., 2001; Kovera & McAuliff, 2000; McAuliff et al., 2009). It is therefore 
unsurprising to find that unreliable expert and forensic evidence has continued to make it into 
courtrooms (Kassin et al., 2013; McAuliff et al., 2009). A number of approaches have been 
proposed to counteract unreliable juror interpretation of forensic evidence (Found & Edmond, 
2012; McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009; Simmonsen, 2012). One such approach has been the use 
of jury instructions.  
1.3.1 Jury Instructions 
Jury instructions, generally presented by the presiding judge, were partly introduced in 
an attempt to address juror’s ability to accurately interpret increasingly complex information, 
legal jargon, and evidence encountered during modern criminal trials (Howes, 2015; Howes & 
Kemp, 2017; Magnussen et al., 2014; Simmonsen, 2012). Early studies indicated that jury 
instructions were initially too complex, and led to jurors frequently failing to comply with 
instructions, instead opting to rely on personal biases relating to characteristics of defendants, 
victims, and witnesses (Halverson et al., 1997; Shaw & Skolnick, 1995). Jury instructions have 
also been employed to educate jurors on the idea of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, without 
much success (Dhami, 2008; Magnussen et al., 2014). Research has enabled legal bodies to adjust 
the timing, form, and content of juror instructions to more effectively accommodate lay jurors 
(Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Edmond, 2015; Simmonsen, 2012). Recent studies have however 
indicated that modern jury instructions do not adequately cover concepts, causes, and effects of 
cognitive biases, or questionable aspects of forensic methods (Howes & Kemp, 2017; Magnussen 
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et al., 2014; Simmonsen, 2012). An alternative approach that has garnered attention is the use of 
written forensic reports to aid jurors in discerning potential sources of bias (Found & Edmond, 
2012; Smith et al., 2011). 
1.3.2 Forensic Reports 
Forensic reports are commonly introduced alongside courtroom presentations of forensic 
evidence to supplement and enhance the quality and clarity of information provided to jurors 
(Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Found & Edmond, 2012; NAS, 2009). Such written form and 
expression of forensic evidence has been the subject of much discussion across legal, scientific, 
and psychological communities (Found & Edmond, 2012; Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Kassin et 
al., 2013; NAS, 2009). The lack of standardisation concerning the expression of comparative 
forensic evidence, also referred to as pattern evidence, is an issue that has recently been raised 
(Found & Edmond, 2012; Howes & Kemp, 2017; NAS, 2009; PCAST, 2016). Found and 
Edmond (2012) observed that while methodological trends and similarities are found across a 
range of forensic disciplines, the same is not apparent in the presentation of forensic and pattern 
evidence. Furthermore, forensic reports generally differ from scientific and research reports 
written for the purposes of publication, in both style and format. Stringent publication guidelines 
and expectations enable academic peers and authorities to assess whether research, claims about 
findings (including the use of appropriate methodologies), and conclusions, are accurate and 
justified at a sufficiently high standard for publication (Found & Edmond, 2012). Thus Found 
and Edmond (2012) proposed a more standardised format akin to that of research papers prepared 
for publication to enable parties involved in the judicial process to more easily assess the 
relevance and quality of evidence, and discern sources of potential bias. However, the proposed 
format has raised further questions concerning the recognition of bias in forensic methods used 




1.3.2.1 The Found and Edmond (2012) Forensic Report Format 
Found and Edmond (2012) offered their report format as one that improves clarity when 
evaluating forensic evidence by enabling readers to better distinguish between relevant and non-
relevant information. No validation of Found and Edmond’s (2012) proposed forensic report 
format has been conducted. The biggest concern in considering the implementation of Found and 
Edmond’s (2012) report style, other than the lack of supporting evidence, relates to the authors’ 
presumptions concerning their audiences’ ability to recognise bias.  
Firstly, Found and Edmond (2012) presume that parties likely to read the report will 
sufficiently understand the scientific methods and processes laid out in the forensic report. 
Research has suggested this to be untrue, and that individual differences, including education and 
professional experience, are more likely to predict the ability to accurately interpret forensic 
information (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Goodman-Delahunty & Hewson, 2010; McAuliff et al., 
2009). Found and Edmond (2012) also presume that their audience has the ability to recognise 
bias, and examines evidence systematically. However, such beliefs are not only unsupported, but 
contradicted by earlier literature (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; 
McAuliff et al., 2009; McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009). The crux of the issue lies with the well 
documented role of contextual and motivational bias on the validity of forensic methods and 
evidence.  
Research on recognition of cognitive bias has been extensive. In a study conducted by 
Pronin et al. (2002), participants unanimously believed themselves to be less susceptible to bias 
than the average population. This suggests that people overestimate their ability to recognise and 
overcome their own biases. It was also found that knowledge of biases did not prevent 
participants from being affected by bias, nor helped participants recognise that they had 
committed cognitive errors as a result of bias (Pronin et al., 2002). This phenomenon, 
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characterised by a person reporting more prevalent thinking biases in others than in themselves, 
has come to be known as the bias blind spot (Pronin et al., 2002). Ehrlinger et al. (2005) proposed 
that the bias blind spot occurs due to the use of introspection when evaluating bias in oneself, 
and the consulting of abstract theories of bias when assessing bias in others. Authors argued that 
introspection is unlikely to yield judgements of bias in oneself, ironically due to one’s own biases. 
Across two experiments Ehrlinger et al. (2005) found support for previous findings indicating 
that people tend to see more bias in others than themselves, and that this was related to different 
strategies used to ascertain whether a judgement is biased (Pronin et al., 2002; 2004). Studies 
into the impact of cognitive ability on the perception of bias also found that greater cognitive 
ability rendered participants more vulnerable to committing errors as a result of cognitive bias. 
In two experiments conducted by West et al. (2012), 482 undergraduate students were presented 
with descriptions of several biases, followed by a number of classic problems which tested for 
cognitive bias. The findings across the two studies suggested that higher cognitive ability, as 
indicated by higher SAT scores, did not attenuate the cognitive blind spot, but rather increased 
the likelihood of committing cognitive bias (West et al., 2012). Collectively, these findings 
indicate that intelligence does not protect against erroneous thinking. They also indicate a need 
for a practical solution to address the shortcoming of Found and Edmond’s (2012) assumption 
that readers of their report will be rational decision makers. 
1.4 Improving Juror Information Processing and Decision Making: The Challenges 
Pozzulo et al. (2010) asked jury-eligible participants to rate the credibility of a victim and 
defendant, whose gender and age were manipulated. Findings indicated that manipulating any of 
the variables influenced juror decision making, and that male and female jurors responded 
differently to changes in victim and defendant characteristics (Pozzulo et al., 2010). In a study 
looking at the effects of forensic evidence presentation, McQuiston-Surret and Saks (2009) 




officials, with one of two written summaries of a murder case. One case presented an expert’s 
explicit conclusions concerning the source of a forensic sample, in contrast to a more objective 
analysis in the second case (McQuiston-Surret & Saks, 2009). Results showed that judges were 
more likely to associate the evidence with the defendant when presented with objective rather 
than subjective interpretations, while jurors more often gave a guilty verdict when the expert 
explicitly linked the evidence to the suspect, regardless of reported limitations of the forensic 
evidence (McQuiston-Surret & Saks, 2009). An individual’s perception of biases in themselves 
and others is central to the discrepancy between jurors’ evaluation of forensic evidence, and 
potentially contradictory behavioural outcomes (Ehrlinger et al., 2005; Lieberman, 2002; 
McQuiston-Surret & Saks, 2009). Despite the introduction of supplementary materials such as 
juror instructions and forensic reports to reduce bias, little research has been conducted on the 
interaction between juror decision making, supplementary materials, and forensic biases 
(Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Simmonsen, 2012). 
Simmonsen (2012) reviewed research concerning the effects of juror instructions on 
decision making, as well as studies on the effects of presumed knowledge of forensic procedures, 
and of how memory works with regard to eyewitness testimony, on juror behaviour. According 
to the literature, jurors overestimate their own knowledge and understanding of evidence and 
cognitive bias (Clark et al., 2011; Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Edmond, 2015; McAuliff et al., 
2009; Simmonsen, 2012). Juror instructions were also found not to supplement or correct jurors’ 
perceptions of forensic procedures and cognitive factors influencing eyewitness testimony and 
forensic investigations (Clark et al., 2011; Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Edmond, 2015; McAuliff 
et al., 2009; Simmonsen, 2012). Furthermore, literature suggests that eyewitness testimony and 
pattern evidence such as facial image comparisons, which predominantly rely on cognitive 
judgments, are often admitted to courts on the basis of jurors’ presumed ability to accurately 
conduct cognitive appraisals of forensic pattern evidence such as image comparisons (Clark et 
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al., 2011; Kneller et al., 2001; Simmonsen, 2012). Such findings further indicate that jurors’ 
decision making is influenced by a significant number of factors, and that the use of 
supplementary materials may not be sufficient to address jurors’ inability to discern and 
accurately consider bias in their decision making. Studies that have been conducted on the subject 
of supplementary materials and juror decision making have also raised concerns with alarming 
implications (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Edmond et al., 2013; Simmonsen, 2012; Smith et al., 
2011). 
Smith et al. (2011) conducted two studies to investigate whether jurors could correctly 
distinguish forensic evidence of varying strengths with and without case information and context. 
Participants could differentiate between strong and weak forensic evidence on the basis of 
investigative relevance, and the mobility of the sample (Smith et al., 2011). Investigative 
relevance referred to the relevance of forensic methods used given particular evidence, and 
mobility referred to how easily a forensic sample could be innocently transferred from one place 
to another, therefore rendering more mobile samples weaker (Smith et al., 2011). Participants 
succeeded in differentiating between strong and weak forensic evidence on the basis of these two 
variables when no context was provided. When supplementary information including case 
information and a trial summary were provided, participants rated weak and moderate forensic 
evidence significantly more highly. This supports other research indicating that jurors’ 
evaluations of forensic evidence are affected not entirely objectively, as would be ideal. Instead, 
influences include heuristics related to the context in which the evidence is presented, and prior 
personal views and preconceptions about forensic evidence, and elements of the trial in question 
(Hope et al., 2004; Kleider et al., 2012; Lieberman, 2002). Smith et al. (2011) posit that jurors’ 
ability to more reliably evaluate and rate strength of forensic evidence without context, the effects 
of context such as a criminal trial in which such evidence is generally presented are cause for 




evidence’s strength did not result in higher numbers of guilty verdicts, suggesting that 
unaccounted for factors may yet have had a greater effect on jurors’ decision making (McAuliff 
& Kovera, 2008; McAuliff et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2011). These findings present a strong 
counterargument to Found and Edmond (2012), aided by the lack of research on the interaction 
between forensic reports and juror decision making (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Simmonsen, 
2012). One prominent issue that may account for the lack of relevant research on the subject is 
the challenge of accurately capturing jurors’ detection of bias, and the effects of such detection 
on juror decision making (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Edmond, 2015).  
A common and widely accepted feature of research into courtroom procedure, including 
judge and juror behaviour, is the use of trial transcripts (Andrews, n.d.; Wiener et al., 2011). Trial 
transcripts have been used in studies examining a diverse range of constructs, including the 
interaction between victim as well as defendant characteristics and juror decision making 
(Pozzulo et al., 2010), the effects of testimonial presentation on jurors’ interpretation of 
information (McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009), the impact of expectancy effects on jurors’ 
perception (Hart, 1995), and jurors’ ability to recognise technical errors and cognitive bias 
associated with forensic evidence (McAuliff et al., 2009). Forgoing the use of a lengthy auditory 
and visual presentation resembling actual court proceedings reduces external validity; however, 
the use of trial transcripts is more financially viable, and ensures that participants retain more 
information than over the course of a lengthy mock trial (Andrews, n.d.; Wiener et al., 2011). 
Although testing participants individually does not replicate jury deliberations, research on group 
dynamics has indicated that juror biases and factors influencing decision making are exacerbated 
by group interaction in cases where a unanimous ruling is required. This suggests that testing of 
individual mock jurors allows for comparison to juror behaviour influenced by group interaction 
(Kerr & Tindale, 2004; Ohtsubo et al., 2004). It is evident that trial transcripts are an appropriate 
tool for investigating juror behaviour; however, few studies have attempted to look at jurors’ 
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perception of cognitive and forensic biases associated with forensic evidence presented during a 
trial (McAuliff et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2011). Studies that have done so have also differed in 
their use of information processing and decision-making models (McAuliff et al., 2009; Smith et 
al., 2011). The most widely known of these is the story model (Pennington & Hastie, 1991, 1992, 
1993). 
1.5 Models of Juror Information Processing 
1.5.1 The Story Model 
The story model of decision making is an explanation-based model developed by 
Pennington and Hastie (1991, 1992, 1993). It dictates that the juror is “a sense-making 
information processor who strives to create a meaningful summary of the evidence available that 
explains what happened in the events depicted through witnesses, exhibits, and arguments at 
trial” (Pennington & Hastie, 1991, p. 519). Pennington & Hastie (1991) proposed that the 
cognitive process of constructing a story was central to juror information processing and decision 
making regarding verdict. Jurors use trial evidence, real world knowledge and experience of 
similar events, and an understanding of story structure and continuity to construct a narrative 
over the course of a trial (Pennington & Hastie, 1991). Further information results in narrative 
development, with jurors assessing quality, relevance, and consistency of evidence and 
information before it contributes to the jurors’ “story” (Pennington & Hastie, 1991). Though well 
established and employed in the form of checklists, flow charts, and other materials, researchers 
have struggled to concretely demonstrate jurors’ information processing in accordance with the 
story model (Pennington & Hastie, 1992; Smith et al., 2011; Wiener et al., 2002).  
Pennington and Hastie (1992) tasked 414 participants with reading a stimulus case, and 
then completing a short questionnaire to report their verdicts and confidence in forensic evidence. 




it in the order presented to them. It was found that participants were far more likely to commit to 
a verdict when evidence was presented using story items in sequence, particularly in the low 
credibility condition, and that the order in which evidence presented had a significant effect on 
mock jurors’ memory of evidence presented (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). These findings 
suggested that perceived strength of the evidence in favour of one verdict over another was a 
function of how readily a juror could develop a story, which depended on the sequence and types 
of evidence used (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). Though the story model unquestionably 
contributed to the development of research into juror information processing and decision 
making, more recent research has shied away from using the story model, in part due to its 
incomplete approach to complexities associated with information processing (Spottswood, 2014; 
Smith et al., 2011; Wiener et al., 2002). More recent adaptions of the Story Model have been 
proposed. One of these is Devine’s (2012) Integrative Multi-Level Theory model. 
1.5.2 The Integrative Multi-Level Theory Model 
Devine (2012) proposes a model of juror information processing and decision making 
which integrates theories and ideas from several notable bodies of juror decision making 
literature. Central to this multi-level theory is Pennington and Hastie’s (1991) Story Model. 
Devine (2012) seeks to build on the Story Model, incorporating cognitive psychology findings 
on the effects of individual differences, extraneous information, and jurors’ use of mental models 
to evaluate alternative narrative threads and inform decision making in court. To this end, juror 
characteristics represent a separate level of the model, encompassing facets of individual 
differences between jurors, and how these interact with characteristics of other trial participants, 
including the defendant, attorneys, and judges (Devine, 2012). Furthermore, Devine (2012) 
proposes that the constructs of legal system trust and defendant demeanour are distinguishable 
and measurable aspects of juror behaviour, contributing to jurors’ ongoing story construction in 
accordance with the overarching Story Model (Pennington & Hastie, 1991). The Integrative 
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Multi-Level Theory Model of juror information processing and decision making also attempts to 
account for literature on how legal professionals and jurors evaluate the strength and credibility 
of evidence, and the concept of charge seriousness (Devine, 2012). Yet the theory’s dependence 
on the Story Model means that it suffers from the model’s shortcomings, undoubtedly 
contributing to the fact that it has thus far not been used in published juror decision making 
research. An alternate explanation for jurors’ information processing and decision making, first 
introduced into the legal domain in the 1970s and 80s, is Bayes’ theorem (Faigman & Baglioni 
Jr., 1988; Finkelstein & Fairley, 1970; Goodman, 1992). 
1.5.3 Bayes’ Theorem  
In response to a growing use of statistics and probabilities as legal evidence, legal 
scholars proposed the use of Bayes’ theorem to help explain probabilistic evidence (Faigman & 
Baglioni Jr., 1988). Bayes’ theorem stems from mathematics, and describes a process for 
estimating the probability of an event occurring based on knowledge of particular conditions. 
Researchers sought to determine if application of Bayes’ theorem to clarify probabilistic 
evidence and to quantify nonstatistical evidence would aid jurors in their decision making, with 
mixed results (Faigman & Baglioni Jr., 1988; Finkelstein & Fairley, 1970). Goodman (1992) 
sought to evaluate mock jurors’ comprehension and assessment of probabilistic evidence by 
determining whether mock jurors would convert statistical evidence into a probability estimate 
of the defendant’s guilt. Findings indicated that mock jurors did not reason in a Bayesian fashion, 
and under- or misused statistical and scientific evidence (Goodman, 1992). Investigating the 
application of Bayes’ theorem in juror decision making has provided notable insights into the 
effectiveness of different forms of evidence Faigman & Baglioni Jr., 1988; Finkelstein & Fairley, 
1970; Goodman, 1992). However, the theorem lacks a sufficiently comprehensive construct to 
explain the underlying cognitive processes involved in jurors’ information processing and 




offered an alternative, more cognition-based approach to juror behaviour, many elements of 
which have stayed relevant and gained traction despite developments in cognitive psychology, 
and juror decision making research (McAuliff et al., 2009; Todorov et al., 2002). 
1.5.4 The Heuristic-Systematic Model 
Chaiken (1980, 1987) proposed a dual-processing model involving concurrent systematic 
and heuristic information processing. Systematic reasoning refers to the use of “highly effortful 
cognitive activity aimed at the careful analysis of a persuasive message’s content”, with emphasis 
on rationality and logical accuracy (McAuliff et al., 2009, p. 248). In contrast, heuristic reasoning 
is “the use of mental shortcuts or decision-rules to evaluate a persuasive message”, involving 
environmental and context-specific cues relative to values held by the receiver of a message when 
determining the accuracy and value of that message (McAuliff et al., 2009, p. 248). A number of 
authors have suggested that the use of one system of information processing over another is 
dependent on a number of factors, not least of which are referred to as the three general principles 
of knowledge use and activity (Higgins, 1996; Todorov et al., 2002).  
Todorov et al. (2002) argued that systematic and heuristic modes of processing are similar 
yet distinct. Using systematic processing, individuals scrutinise information provided with 
relevance to the task or query at hand, with emphasis on the strength of persuasion of an argument 
or information relative to an individual’s understanding and cognitive elaboration, while 
accounting for available cognitive resources (Todorov et al., 2002). In contrast, heuristic 
processing refers to the use of environmental cues and preconceived notions and generalisations, 
requiring fewer cognitive resources. Todorov et al. (2002) propose that the use of systematic and 
heuristic processing, and what heuristics are used, is strongly tied to the three general principles 
of knowledge use that are availability, accessibility, and applicability (Higgins, 1996; Todorov, 
2000).  
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Availability refers to the storage of a relevant and applicable set of knowledges in 
memory, which may refer to specific knowledges which enable systematic processing of 
information, or heuristics including biases and preconceptions with regard to the message or the 
source of the message to be processed (Todorov et al., 2002). Accessibility refers to the 
requirement for a set of knowledges not only to be available but also accessible in order to be 
employed (Higgins, 1996; Todorov et al., 2002). Awareness of a set of knowledges such as the 
existence of empirical evidence to support forensic science may not be sufficient to provide the 
tools for systematic processing, yet lends itself to using heuristics. Environmental and cognitive 
factors such as the persuasive nature of an argument and the circumstances in which they are 
presented, as well as the level of cognitive ability, alertness, and attention of the message receiver 
may influence an individual’s ability to recall specific and cognitively taxing information for use 
in systematic rather than heuristic information processing (Todorov et al., 2002). Applicability 
refers to how appropriate the receiver of the message deems the knowledge accessed, if available 
to them, to the outcome of the task or query associated with that message. A juror may have, and 
access knowledge of certain scientific procedures but not deem them sufficiently relevant to the 
forensic evidence presented during a trial, instead seeking out another systematic set of 
knowledges if available, accessible, and applicable. This may require further cognitive resources, 
or favour a less demanding heuristic tool via the same process of elimination (Higgins, 1996; 
Todorov et al., 2002). Chaiken (1980, 1987) suggested that while both systematic and heuristic 
modes are concurrently active, one is favoured over the other as a result of a number of 
environmental and cognitive factors most prominently related to motivation.  
Information processing is often linked to motivation and cognitive ability (Lieberman, 
2002; McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; See et al., 2009; Todorov et al., 2002; Van der Maas et al., 
2011). The Heuristic-Systematic Model functions within that framework, proposing that people 




cognitive resources (Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; See et al., 2009; Todorov et 
al., 2002; Van der Maas et al., 2011). One of the most critical and relevant findings associated 
with the Heuristic-Systematic Model of information processing relates to what elements of a 
message are more persuasive when using a particular mode of reasoning. Chaiken (1980, 1987) 
found that individuals using systematic processing focus on distinguishing strong and weak 
rational arguments, while remaining mostly unaffected by factors not relevant to the message 
content. In contrast, people processing information heuristically were found to be swayed 
significantly more by irrelevant information, and cues such as appeal of the message source, 
while neglecting to differentiate between strong and weak rational arguments contained within 
the message (Chaiken, 1980, 1987; Lieberman, 2002). A number of factors have been found to 
influence motivation and the use of cognitive resources when interpreting information.  
Personal relevance, need for cognition, task importance, accountability for one’s views, 
and message content have all been found to strongly influence motivation of a message receiver 
(Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; McAuliff et al., 2009; See et al., 2009; Todorov 
et al., 2002; Van der Maas et al., 2011). Time pressures, mode of communication, prior 
knowledge, experience, expertise, message repetition, and distraction have been identified as 
components that impact the element of cognitive resources in relation to message comprehension 
(Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; McAuliff et al., 2009). Although recent research 
using the Heuristic-Systematic Model suggests that the model is still relevant in contemporary 
research contexts, models have emerged adopting aspects of the Heuristic-Systematic Model in 
conjunction with components from other theories. Epstein’s (1994) Cognitive Experiential Self-
Theory shares a number of constructs and ideas with the Heuristic-Systematic Model, with some 
notable differences.  
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1.5.5 Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory 
Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory asserts that individuals process information in two 
partially independent systems, those being rational and experiential (emotional) modes (Epstein, 
1994, 2003; Epstein & Pacini, 1999). The theory has much in common with Heuristic-Systematic 
Model, as it proposes that experiential processing is strongly related to heuristic decision making, 
with emphasis on efficient and largely effortless processing prone to a range of biases, in contrast 
to rational information processing, entailing effortful and deliberate analytical processing mostly 
free of affect, and related biases (Epstein, 2003; Lieberman, 2002). In contrast to Heuristic-
Systematic Model however, Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory posits that “behaviour varies 
along a continuum and is influenced by the relative contributions of these two systems” 
(Donovan & Epstein, 1997; Lieberman, 2002, p. 2527). A number of studies have investigated 
Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory and found empirical support for the occurrence and 
applicability of the rational-experiential distinction in people’s information processing and 
subsequent behaviour across a range of social contexts (Brown & Bond, 2015; Dunlop et al., 
2010; Epstein, 2003).  
Some studies have found that Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory may serve to predict a 
person’s interpretation of feedback based on the rational-experiential dichotomy, and other 
studies have indicated that motivation may prompt the use of rational information processing 
over relying on heuristics, and that the use of more rational processing leads to more accurate 
judgments (Brown & Bond, 2015; Dunlop et al., 2010; Epstein, 2003; Hample & Richards, 2014; 
Kemmelmeier, 2010; Lieberman, 2002). Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory has also been a 
focus of the legal system, particularly in the United States, where research by scientific and legal 
bodies on investigations of juror behaviour and decision making has become a lucrative business 
(LeGrande & Mierau, 2003; Strier 2001). The literature has suggested that plaintiffs 




based on the idea that greater empathy and sympathy in jurors favours the victim of a court 
proceeding (Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2011; Lieberman, 2002; Wiener et al., 2006). Bright 
and Goodman-Delahunty (2011) explored the effects of manipulating jurors to process 
information rationally or emotionally, exposing them to either gruesome or non-gruesome 
evidence, on their states of emotional arousal, their sympathy for the plaintiff, their anger at the 
defendant, and their ratings of negligence and liability. Findings indicated that those exposed to 
gruesome images were more emotionally arouse and rated the defendant significantly more 
negligent. Authors concluded that the use of emotionally arousing evidence may therefore 
strengthen a plaintiff’s weak case in accordance with previous literature on the subject (Bright & 
Goodman-Delahunty, 2011; Lieberman, 2002; Wiener et al., 2006). Lieberman (2002) argues 
that extralegal factors can therefore not be ignored within the context of Cognitive Experiential 
Self-Theory.   
1.5.6 The Role of Extralegal Factors 
Extralegal factors refer to factors and heuristic cues specific to a court case that may 
strongly influence jurors’ decision making (Hart, 1995; Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Lieberman, 
2002; Pozzulo et al., 2010). The most common of these include features of the victim or the 
defendant such as race, age, gender, attractiveness, and similarity to jurors, all of which have 
been shown to influence jurors, particularly in the case of attractiveness, as attractive defendants 
have repeatedly been found to receive more lenient treatment than unattractive ones (Hart, 1995; 
Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Lieberman, 2002; Pozzulo et al., 2010). Lieberman (2002) 
hypothesised that extralegal factors such as defendant attractiveness would have a more 
prominent effect in jurors processing trial testimony in an experiential mode, and significantly 
less of an impact on jurors using a rational mode. To show this, Lieberman (2002) tasked 93 
participants with reading a trial transcript and evaluating a number of exhibits such as a 
photograph of the accident scene related to the trial, and a photograph of the defendant, before 
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completing a form asking participants to record their opinions concerning the defendant’s 
liability, negligence, confidence in their verdict and amount of damages to be awarded. 
Participants were then tasked with rating the defendant on a number of scales including 
attractiveness, perceived intelligence, and similarity to the juror, and asked to answer several 
questions to determine the processing mode used (Lieberman, 2002). Findings indicated that 
jurors awarded overall greater damages to the plaintiff when the defendant was unattractive, and 
that amongst jurors, those who had been coerced into using experiential information processing 
were more likely to award greater damages than those using rational processing (Lieberman, 
2002). The difference between rational and experiential mode participants was not significant, 
raising some concerns regarding the hypothesis that jurors using different forms of processing 
draw drastically different conclusions. Other studies investigating the potential applications for 
Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory in and outside of the legal sphere support the notion that the 
use of Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory to examine and potentially influence juror information 
processing to enable better decision making has merit (Epstein, 2003; Hample & Richards, 2014; 
Kemmelmeier, 2010; Lieberman, 2002). One such study, reviewed below, explored interactions 
between jurors’ emotional and rational processing, recognition of bias, and decision making, 
(McAuliff et al., 2009). 
McAuliff et al. (2009) sought to determine whether potential jurors, in the form of 248 
jury-eligible members of the community, could detect flaws in experimental procedure, including 
missing control groups, and experimenter bias, which would dramatically reduce validity of 
evidence associated with it. Results suggested that potential jurors were not likely to recognise 
factors which would reduce or otherwise invalidate an experimental design associated with 
relevant forensic evidence (McAuliff et al., 2009). Instead, jurors’ verdicts were found to be 
positively correlated with perceived expert evidence quality, and plaintiff credibility, suggesting 




evidence, had a significant effect on the trial’s outcome (McAuliff et al., 2009). To capture 
participants’ forensic confidence ratings, McAuliff et al. (2009) employed a measure of self-
perceived expert evidence quality, made up of thirteen 5-point Likert scale questions with 
answers ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. Using this, McAuliff et al. (2009) 
found a positive correlation between ratings of expert evidence quality and plaintiff credibility, 
and hypothesised that this was more prominent in jurors who failed to identify flaws in the 
forensic evidence, suggesting a link between heuristic and systematic processing, jurors’ 
evaluations of forensic evidence, and verdict outcomes. McAuliff et al.’s (2009) study and recent 
research employing similar methods have illustrated the validity of a dual processing approach 
in interpreting juror information processing and decision making in future research (Epstein, 
20003; Evans, 2008; Krauss et al., 2004; Lieberman, 2002). 
1.6 Summary 
Forensic science plays a key role in contemporary legal practice, and has an increasingly 
pronounced and well-documented effect on judicial outcomes in Australian and other common 
law jurisdictions (Edmond, 2015; Howes & Kemp, 2017; Kassin et al., 2013; NAS, 2009; 
PCAST, 2016). This is in spite of research demonstrating that the reliability of forensic science 
and forensic evidence testimony is generally overestimated (Dror et al., 2006; Edmond et al., 
2016; Edmond et al., 2013; Giannelli, 2010; Kassin et al., 2013; Wells et al., 2013). Some have 
taken note of this. Investigations culminating in the NAS (2009) report on forensic science, and 
the PCAST (2016) review of forensic evidence in criminal courts have been scathing of how 
poorly the forensic science industry has been controlled and regulated despite its rapid growth 
and impact. Investigators have also been highly critical of how ineffective the implementation of 
proposed changes and measures to procedures have been in reducing incidents of poor forensic 
analyses, and presentations of weak or unreliable forensic evidence in court (Edmond et al., 2016; 
NAS, 2009; PCAST, 2016; Wells et al., 2013). Judges have not been found to reliably fulfil the 
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role of gatekeepers, and flawed forensic evidence and testimony is in many instances presented 
to a group of jurors whose interpretation of that evidence will inform life changing decisions 
(Gatowski et al., 2001; Kovera & McAuliff, 2000; McAuliff et al., 2009). Therein lies the 
problem.  
The NAS (2009) report and PCAST (2016) review of forensic science stress the plethora 
of concerns regarding the reliability and validity of forensic evidence due to the unregulated 
nature of certification, little to no standardisation across the forensic science industry, and a lack 
of standardised measures and tools that are commonplace, and indeed expected in the general 
sciences. Yet these publications fail to address jurors’ critical role in interpreting and identifying 
forensic evidence and testimony of varying strength and reliability. The aim of improving the 
quality of forensic science introduced in court room hinges on the idea that jurors will be able to 
reliably and appropriately interpret forensic evidence, and as a result be able to make accurate 
judgements and render strong verdicts (Edmond, 2015; McAuliff et al., 2009; McQuiston-Surrett 
& Saks, 2009; PCAST, 2016). This is not supported by current research. 
The literature on juror decision making proposes that juror decision making is complex, 
yet predominantly influenced by jurors’ perceptions of defendant, victim, witness, and expert 
credibility and characteristics, as well as judges’ opinions (Hart, 1995; McQuiston-Surret & Saks, 
2009; Pozzulo et al., 2008). Research has also demonstrated that jury instructions and written 
forensic reports are too complex, and therefore of little consequence to juror decision making 
(Simmonsen, 2012). Despite research suggesting that simpler jury instructions reduce the role of 
jurors’ non-verbal expectations on jurors’ verdicts, increasingly complex and comprehensive 
jury instructions are used in today’s courtrooms (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Simmonsen, 2012). 
It has also been shown that jurors not only overestimate their grasp of forensic methods, but also 




part of forensic science (Kneller et al., 2001, 2008; McQuiston-Surret & Saks, 2009; Pozzulo et 
al., 2008). Such findings raise serious doubts regarding the perceived value of Found and 
Edmond’s (2012) report format. There remains a need for further research into the interaction 
between juror decision making, forensic evidence, and bias (Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff & 
Kovera, 2008; McAuliff et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2011). 
This research will aim to investigate whether mock jurors, with the aid of a supplementary 
material in the form of the Found and Edmond (2012) proposed forensic report, will be able to 
more effectively discern potential forensic bias than if not provided with such material. A further 
aim is to establish if such recognition will influence jurors’ decision making outcomes. Juror 
information processing within a dual information processing context will also be investigated, in 
order to contribute to the growing body of literature on how jurors make decisions (Daftary-
Kapur et al., 2010; Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2011). This research 
will seek to demonstrate whether information processing style may be reliably manipulated, and 
if manipulating mock jurors to process information either emotionally or rationally will affect 
jurors’ ability to recognise flawed forensic evidence, as well as their willingness to act on that 
recognition (Lieberman, 2002; Wiener et al., 2006). Finally, this research will explore the effects 
of cognitive effort on jurors’ information processing strategies, to determine if greater cognitive 
effort and fatigue are more likely to result in the use of emotional and heuristic processing of 
information, and influence decision making. This research should significantly contribute to an 
underdeveloped body of research pertaining to juror information processing and decision making 
in the face of forensic evidence. Findings may also come to provide valuable information for 
legal scholars and practitioners who seek to better understand processes involved in juror 
information processing and decision making. It is hoped that this research will ultimately 
contribute to ongoing efforts to bolster jurors’ comprehension of increasingly complex evidence, 
and ability to distinguish between strong and weak forensic evidence in a courtroom setting. Such 
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efforts, and the research on which these efforts are based, are critical to improving not only juror 


















































Chapter 2.  
Study 1. Forensic Evidence and Juror Decision Making: Can Jurors Recognise 
Bias in Forensic Reports? 
2.1 Abstract 
Forensic and cognitive bias can influence jurors, and undermine validity of forensic experts and 
the evidence they present. Found and Edmond (2012) proposed that restructuring forensic reports 
would allow jurors to more readily recognise forensic bias, and better scrutinise forensic evidence 
presented in court, to make more accurate decisions. The aim of this study was to evaluate the 
effects of Found and Edmond’s (2012) forensic report format on jurors’ decision making. One 
hundred and twenty jury eligible participants read a trial transcript of a criminal proceeding; 
followed by a supplementary forensic report, based on the experimental condition they had been 
assigned. Participants then completed a questionnaire which asked for a verdict, the degree of 
guilt, and questions assessing participants’ confidence in the forensic examiner and evidence. 
Participants failed to identify bias, and forensic reports did not show a significant effect on their 
decision making. In addition, participants’ verdict and degree of guilt scores were correlated with 
forensic expert confidence. Given failure to recognise forensic and cognitive bias, and excessive 
reliance on forensic expertise, reliability of juror decision making is called into question. 
Implications and possible avenues for future research into the potential role of forensic reports 
on jurors’ decision making are discussed.  









Forensic science is characterised by the use of scientific methods to collect and analyse 
evidence for the purposes of aiding investigative and judicial branches of the law (Edmond, 2015; 
McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009). It has become a critical component of the contemporary 
evidence-based legal process, with jurors more likely to encounter science-based evidence than 
ever before (Edmond et al., 2013; Giannelli, 2010; Goodman-Delahunty & Hewson, 2010). This 
is in spite of well-documented and increasingly publicised shortcomings of forensic evidence, 
some of which have led to wrongful convictions (Dror et al., 2006; NAS, 2009; PCAST, 2016).  
In 2004, Brandon Mayfield was erroneously identified as the mastermind behind several 
coordinated train bombings in Madrid (Dror et al., 2006). Forensic experts working for the FBI 
identified Mayfield using a set of latent fingerprints (Dror et al., 2006). These were later used by 
Spanish authorities to identify the real culprit (Dror et al., 2006). This and other cases of 
erroneous identifications have highlighted the contextually-laden environment within which 
examiners collect and analyse evidence (Dror et al., 2006; Giannelli, 2007; Giannelli, 2010; 
Wells et al., 2013). This raises the issue of how cognitive biases and contextual effects factor into 
forensic analyses. 
Forensic scientists practice within a range of socio-cultural, economic, and political 
contexts, all of which impact examiners’ judgments in handling, testing and presenting forensic 
evidence (Kassin et al., 2013; Page et al., 2012; Saks et al., 2003). The prevalence of contextual 
influences and biases throughout the provision of law enforcement and legal services has become 
more visible in light of a renewed global focus on terrorism prevention (Dror et al., 2006; 
Giannelli, 2010; Peacock et al., 2004). Technological advancements have also contributed to the 
rise of forensic science, yet have not reduced the frequency or impact of human error (Dror & 
Mnookin, 2010). Training in psychology to reduce the effects of human error within forensic 
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laboratories has been proposed, but not yet been adopted by many forensic laboratories and law 
enforcement agencies (Costanzo, 2013; Giannelli, 2007; NAS, 2009; PCAST, 2016; Saks et al., 
2003). Further changes to address issues of cognitive bias in forensic laboratories have been 
proposed. 
Kassin et al. (2013) argue that forensic analyses be conducted in a linear fashion, to avoid 
biasing effects of comparing forensic evidence against target samples before samples collected 
from a crime scene are entirely analysed and documented independent of extraneous information 
or suggestion. However, Kassin et al. (2013) also note the potential value of extraneous 
information, such as the surface from which a sample was collected, suggesting a third party 
serve as a provisional source of information relevant potentially relevant to the analysis of 
forensic evidence. Training in psychology, and education on the potential effects of cognitive 
biases as a core component of law enforcement and forensic expert training has also been 
increasingly recommended (Costanzo, 2013; Kassin et al., 2013). Contextual and motivational 
biases have been acknowledged as a source of error in forensic science, and forensic laboratories 
(Dror et al., 2006; Kassin et al., 2013; NAS, 2009; PCAST, 2016). The ever-expanding body of 
literature on the subject has ensured that changes to mitigate the causes and effects of cognitive 
bias in labs are introduced (Dror et al., 2006; Kassin et al., 2013; Saks et al., 2003). Yet some 
flawed forensic evidence continues to be introduced into courtrooms (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; 
Dror et al., 2006; McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; McAuliff et al., 2009; PCAST, 2016). This is a 
notable issue in light of the limited scope of current research looking at the impact of flawed 
forensic science and evidence on judges and jurors (McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009; NAS, 






2.3 Cognitive Bias in the Courtroom 
The vulnerable position of judges and jurors within the judicial process greatly 
contributes to the effects of forensic and cognitive bias on verdict outcomes (Found & Edmond, 
2012; Kovera & McAuliff, 2000; McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; McAuliff et al., 2009). Judges have 
been assigned a gatekeeping role, and are expected to determine admissibility of forensic 
evidence based on its accuracy and reliability (Gatwoski et al., 2001; McAuliff et al., 2009). 
Many judges are however ill-equipped for such a role, resulting in the introduction of weak or 
invalid forensic evidence into trials (Gatowski et al., 2001; Kovera & McAuliff, 2000). This 
presents a problem as the responsibility to distinguish strong from weak evidence consequently 
falls on jurors not prepared for such a task.   
A jury’s role in a criminal trial is to determine whether it has been proven through 
testimony, forensic evidence, and in the context of the law, that a defendant is guilty beyond 
reasonable doubt (McAuliff et al., 2009; Ohtsubo et al., 2004; Pozzulo et al., 2010). It is presumed 
that jurors consider all evidence objectively to reach the most rational conclusion. Yet research 
shows that jurors are prone to irrational decision making (Magnussen et al., 2014; McAuliff et 
al., 2009; McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009; Tran et al., 2011). Mock jurors are influenced by 
extraneous information such as demographic characteristics of the victim and the defendant, and 
descriptions of the crime and crime scene (Kleider et al., 2012; Lieberman, 2002). Jurors also 
overestimate their comprehension of forensic evidence, and have shown an inability to recognise 
flaws in forensic procedure when present (Goodman-Delahunty & Hewson, 2010; McAuliff & 
Kovera, 2008; McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009). In attempting to mitigate these factors, 
supplementary materials have been designed and employed in a number of studies looking to 
reduce the effects of jurors’ own biases, and to improve understanding of forensic evidence 
(Found & Edmond, 2012; Halverson et al., 1997; Simmonsen, 2012). 
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2.4 The Role of Supplementary Materials 
Jury instructions, generally presented by the presiding judge, inform jurors on the 
subjects of legal jargon, forensic evidence, and jurors’ responsibilities (Halverson et al., 1997; 
Shaw & Skolnick, 1995; Simmonsen, 2012). The use of jury instructions has become standard 
in many western legal systems (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Simmonsen, 2012). However, jury 
instructions were found to be inadequate at addressing cognitive and forensic bias (Daftary-
Kapur et al., 2010; Halverson et al., 1997; Simmonsen, 2012). Daftary-Kapur et al. (2010) found 
that jurors’ comprehension of jury instructions is reported to generally be very low, and that 
instructions fail to address the effects of cognitive and forensic biases. In response to the 
ineffectiveness of jury instructions at reducing forensic bias, alternative approaches to clarifying 
information, such as forensic reports, have been developed. 
 Forensic reports are introduced alongside forensic evidence with the aim of enhancing 
the quality and clarity of information provided to jurors (Found & Edmond, 2012). However, 
studies have found that forensic reports do not improve jurors’ understanding of the evidence, as 
they are not simple enough for a lay person to comprehend (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Found 
& Edmond, 2012). Howes and Kemp (2017) expanded upon this, arguing that low scientific 
literacy in the western world has greatly contributed to concerns about jurors’ interpretation of 
verbal and written expressions of forensic evidence. According to Howes and Kemp (2017), a 
great deal of contention relating to language used in reports to express findings stems from 
attempts to communicate scientifically accurate information to non-scientists without 
compromising objectivity. Such communication issues are particularly likely in the presentation 
of pattern-comparison evidence, where forensic experts have been found to frequently overstate 
the strength of findings (Howes & Kemp, 2017; NAS, 2009; PCAST, 2016). A number of 
changes to the written communication of such evidence have been proposed (Howes, 2015; 




Howes and Kemp (2017) proposed that scientific literacy be more comprehensively 
taught and integrated across a range of disciplines and academic domains that traditionally may 
not have included courses exploring effective science communication. Howes and Kemp (2017) 
also stress the importance of clarity and transparency when presenting information in written 
form, as previously noted in the NAS (2009) and PCAST (2016) reports. Howes (2015) 
categorised common causes for, and sources of miscommunication present in the written 
presentation of information and evidence, including the level of lexical density, and issues 
concerning the communication of uncertainty. Howes (2015) provides a guide for how to prepare 
written reports appropriate for a range of likely audiences, generally emphasising the need for 
less complexity in communicating information, without sacrificing depth. Found and Edmond 
(2012) also proposed that simplifying and reformatting forensic reports may enable lay jurors to 
more accurately interpret and evaluate the strength and reliability of complex forensic evidence 
(Found & Edmond, 2012; Kassin et al., 2013).  
2.4.1 The Found and Edmond (2012) Forensic Report  
Found and Edmond (2012) observed that while methodological trends can be found 
across forensic disciplines, the same is untrue for the presentation of forensic evidence, including 
through forensic reports. Furthermore, forensic reports are rarely altered in preparation for 
presentation to jurors. In contrast, scientific practical reports produced for the purposes of 
publication in academic journals have been largely standardised, and structured in order to enable 
readers and peer reviewers to effectively disseminate, interpret, and validate the contents of such 
reports. Found and Edmond (2012) proposed a format for forensic reports to improve structure, 
content quality, and clarity, and enable a standardised format across forensic disciplines. 
Proposed changes to forensic reports would enable jurors to more effectively discern relevant 
from non-relevant information, identify potential sources of cognitive and forensic bias, and draw 
more objective and accurate conclusions (Found & Edmond, 2012). No research has been 
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conducted to validate claims made by Howes (2015), Howes and Kemp (2017), or Found and 
Edmond (2012), and studies on human cognition as well as juror behaviour do not support Found 
and Edmond’s (2012) conclusions. 
Found and Edmond (2012) assume that jurors are rational decision makers, and that the 
complexity of information provided during a trial is the primary obstacle in enabling jurors to 
make better decisions. Yet research indicating that forensic experts can be influenced by 
cognitive bias suggests that even those knowledgeable in forensic disciplines are easily biased, 
emphasising the vulnerable position of jurors (Dror et al., 2006; Giannelli, 2010; Wells et al., 
2013). One notable example of this is jurors’ inability to recognise their own biases, known 
commonly as the bias blind spot (Ehrlinger et al., 2005; McAuliff et al., 2009; Pronin et al., 
2002). 
The bias blind spot is characterised by a person’s inability to recognise their own biases, 
and studies have indicated that jurors in particular are often susceptible to the bias blind spot 
(Ehrlinger et al., 2005; McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; McAuliff et al., 2009; Pronin et al., 2002). 
Jurors’ decision making may be compromised as they discount the possibility of personal bias 
when evaluating evidence, and what effect this may have on verdict outcomes. West et al. (2012) 
found that cognitive ability and problem-solving approaches did not attenuate the bias blind spot. 
Puzzulo et al. (2010) found that victim and defendant gender, age, and appearance can have just 
as significant an effect on juror decision making as forensic evidence, highlighting the 
multifaceted issue of cognitive bias in juror decision making.  
Studies have proposed that increasing empirical evidence and supplementary materials is 
sufficient to curb cognitive bias effects (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010). Others have argued that 
supplementary materials have little to no effect, and that qualitative evidence has a significantly 




et al., 1997; McAuliff et al., 2009; Simmonsen, 2012). Information processing strategy has also 
been linked to the interpreter’s motivation and ability to generally comprehend a message 
(Chaiken et al., 1989; Cacioppo et al., 1996; McAuliff et al., 2009). McAuliff et al. (2009) 
proposed that factors such as stress, emotional involvement, education, and motivation predict 
jurors’ use of logic in evaluating evidence, and that clarity and simplicity of information reduces 
the effects of cognitive biases; however, research in support of this is scarce. A study to 
investigate the effects of Found and Edmond’s (2012) report format on jurors’ ability to recognise 
flaws in forensic evidence has not yet been conducted. Therefore this study aimed to evaluate the 
application of Found and Edmond’s (2012) report format to improve jurors’ recognition of 
flawed forensic evidence, and whether recognising flawed evidence would influence verdict 
outcomes.  
2.5 Summary 
Forensic science is a common component of many criminal trials (McQuiston-Surrett & 
Saks, 2009). Yet cognitive and contextual biases in forensic experts have been well documented, 
leaving the responsibility of determining reliability to judges and jurors (Giannelli, 2010; Wells 
et al., 2013). Can jurors in fact recognise such biases in forensic evidence to inform decision 
making? This has been the subject of research over a number of years (Found & Edmond, 2012; 
Magnussen et al., 2014; McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009; Wilson & Dunn, 2004). Specifically, 
mock jurors were found to be influenced by manipulation of the defendant’s and victim’s gender, 
age, and supposed crime (Pozzulo et al., 2008; Pozzulo et al., 2010). Research has also indicated 
that jurors overestimate their understanding of forensic evidence, and rely on explicit associations 
between evidence and defendants by forensic experts or judges (Howes & Kemp, 2017; McAuliff 
et al., 2009; McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009; Simmonsen, 2012).  McAuliff et al. (2009) found 
that mock jurors were unlikely to recognise flaws in experimental design and forensic evidence, 
and that recognition of such flaws did not significantly influence their verdicts. Found and 
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Edmond (2012) proposed that several changes to the presentation of forensic reports could 
improve juror comprehension, and decision making. These claims have not been substantiated, 
and are questionable in light of previous findings concerning juror decision making and cognitive 
bias (McAuliff et al., 2009; Pozzulo et al., 2010; West et al., 2012). This study sought to 
determine if Found and Edmond’s (2012) claims could be empirically validated. Results could 
potentially provide a concrete foundation for future research looking to identify cognitive 
processes guiding juror information processing and decision making outcomes.   
To do this, a trial stimulus partly derived from Goodman-Delahunty and Hewson (2010) 
(Appendix A) was developed. According to Bieneck (2009), trial stimuli, sometimes referred to 
as vignettes, have become particularly relevant in the conducting and applying of social cognitive 
research and its outcomes to the legal system, citing the ability to systematically manipulate 
elements of a vignette or trial transcript as a significant advantage over other methods for jury 
simulation research. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. Those in the 
‘trial transcript only’ condition read the trial transcript without supplementary materials. Those 
in the ‘biased report’ condition read the trial transcript, and were then provided with a forensic 
report using Found and Edmond’s (2012) report format (Appendix B), the content strongly 
indicating that the forensic expert had likely been biased. Participants in the ‘unbiased report’ 
condition read the trial transcript, and were then provided with a report using Found and 
Edmond’s (2012) report format, the report not indicating that the expert had been biased. 
Participants were tasked with rendering a verdict, and provided a likelihood of guilt estimate on 
a scale from 0 to 100. The use of likelihood of guilt estimates is common in juror decision making 
literature, and has been effective in offering an alternative way of interpreting differences in juror 
behaviour (Dhami, 2008; McAuliff et al., 2009). All participants then completed the Forensic 




The Forensic Confidence Scale was derived from a measure of self-perceived expert 
evidence quality employed in McAuliff et al. (2009),  used to evaluate mock jurors’ perceptions 
of forensic evidence quality and credibility. McAuliff et al. (2009) found a positive correlation 
between forensic evidence and mock jurors’ verdicts. The use of the Forensic Confidence Scale 
should provide further clarity on whether Found and Edmond’s (2012) forensic report would 
have an effect on jurors’ forensic confidence, ability to detect forensic bias, and verdict. 
The first hypothesis was that forensic confidence scores would be positively correlated 
with verdict, and likelihood of guilt (McAuliff et al., 2009; McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009). It 
was also hypothesised that participants supplied with a forensic report would record greater 
confidence in the forensic evidence, even when the forensic report indicated that the expert had 
been biased (Smith et al., 2011). The third hypothesis was that participants who received a 
supplementary forensic report, regardless of content, would, as a result of greater confidence in 
the forensic evidence, be more likely to find the defendant guilty, and that there would not be a 
significant difference between participants receiving reports indicating bias or a lack of bias 
(McAuliff et al., 2009; McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009; Smith et al., 2011). 
2.6 Method 
2.6.1 Participants 
One hundred and thirty participants (51 male, 79 female) were recruited via the 
University of Adelaide’s Sona systems Research Participation System (RPS), and online 
advertising. Written informed consent was obtained immediately prior to participation in the 
study. Participants were excluded if not between the ages of 17 and 80, not an Australian citizen, 
or had a law degree, to address jury eligibility. This study was approved by the University of 
Adelaide’s School of Psychology Human Research Ethics Sub Committee (code number: 13/86).  
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2.6.2 Measures 
2.6.2.1 Stimulus Materials 
2.6.2.1.1 Trial Transcript. Participants were presented with a seven-page summary of 
a simulated criminal case (Appendix A) in which the state alleges that the defendant 
intentionally attacked and caused the death of someone known to them, in a public place. The 
transcript was partly derived from Goodman-Delahunty and Hewson (2010). Certain facts were 
modified to prevent the possibility that participants may recognise the case from prior exposure 
through research or other means. The type of forensic evidence was also modified to reflect the 
research aims of investigating jurors’ perception of questionable forensic evidence. The 
transcript consisted of opening statements, summaries of five cross-examined witness 
testimonies, two of which were eyewitness testimony, an introduction to pattern evidence and 
image comparison by a forensic expert, cross-examination of the forensic expert, and final 
judge’s remarks.  
The eyewitness testimony used in this trial transcript revealed, under cross-examination, 
that eyewitnesses maintained a high degree of uncertainty. This ensured that the forensic 
evidence, a still image from CCTV footage recovered from a camera located close to the incident, 
was the critical factor in establishing the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
examination of the evidence was preceded by information on pattern evidence examination by 
the forensic expert, outlining some strengths and shortcomings of the image comparison 
procedure, as well as technical aspects of image comparison, and how the analysis had come to 
conclude that the image matched the suspect. This was followed by a cross-examination, during 
which the forensic expert admitted that image comparison was not fool-proof, and that she was 




The cross-examination of the forensic expert was followed by two defence witness 
summaries, one of the defendant, and one of the defendant’s fiancée. Both admitted under cross-
examination to have forgotten minor details regarding their exact whereabouts and passage of 
time relative to the victim’s proposed murder. The trial transcript was concluded by the judge’s 
closing statements, and basic judicial instructions. 
2.6.2.2 Found and Edmond (2012) Format Forensic Report 
Some of the participants were also presented with a forensic report, using a South 
Australian forensic report template as recommended by Forensic Science South Australia 
(FSSA) (Appendix B). The forensic report template was modified to adopt Found and Edmond’s 
(2012) proposed report format. As outlined by Found and Edmond (2012), the structure of the 
forensic report was as follows: 
 Title 
 Executive Summary 
 List of exhibits submitted (CCTV footage) 
 Statement as to origin of evidence 
 Statement of chain of custody of exhibit 
 Statement of domain irrelevant information the examiner was provided with 
 Statement as to qualifications of examiner 





2.6.2.2.1 Forensic Report Manipulation 
2.6.2.2.1.1 Section - Information that the examiner was provided with: 
The unbiased forensic report indicated that the forensic examiner was provided with 
details concerning the forensic sample, specifically the time, date, location, and source of the 
evidence. The forensic report containing bias provided the same information, as well as stating 
that the forensic expert was informed that a suspect was already in custody, and that there had 
been an eyewitness. 
2.6.2.2.1.2 Section - Conclusions: 
Both forensic reports contained an identical summary of the forensic evidence, how it 
was processed, and conclusions drawn about the comparison, and the effects of moderate to low 
image quality with regard to conclusions drawn and further interpretations of the forensic 
evidence. The biased forensic report also states that the forensic expert was aware of details 
relating to the case not directly relevant to the analysis, and that a biasing effect could not be 
discounted. 
2.6.2.3 Participant Questionnaire 
Participants were tasked with completing a four-page questionnaire (Appendix D). The 
questionnaire was partly derived from McAuliff et al. (2009) and Goodman-Delahunty and 
Hewson (2010). The questionnaire consisted of several sections. The trial question section 
contained one question asking jurors to present a verdict, and a question requesting participants 
to rate likelihood of guilt on a scale from 0 to 100.  
2.6.2.3.1 Forensic Confidence Scale. Participants then completed the 13-item Forensic 
Confidence Scale. The scale measures jurors’ confidence in the forensic expert and evidence. 
Participants were asked to respond to questions using 5-point Likert scales, with answers 




research was based on good scientific principles’ and ‘The Expert did not use valid methods of 
image identification comparison’. Two of the items were negatively worded for the purposes 
of manipulation checks.  
The general knowledge section asked participants a number of questions relating to 
perceived prior knowledge of forensic evidence, as well as testing whether mock jurors could 
recall information relating to pattern evidence comparison presented in the trial transcript. One 
question related to participants’ understanding of statistics. The questionnaire concluded with a 
demographic section, and asked participants to report whether they spoke English as their first 
language, or had past jury duty experience.  
2.6.3 Design  
An experimental between-groups design was employed for the purposes of this study. 
Study group was the independent variable with three levels, those being group A (transcript 
without forensic report), group B (transcript and forensic report suggesting bias), and group C 
(transcript and forensic report not suggesting bias). Dependent variables were verdict, as well as 
reliance and confidence in forensic evidence as determined by the questionnaire, using 5-point 
Likert scales. 
2.6.4 Procedure 
Participants were first tasked with reading the trial stimulus, with two competing eye 
witness testimonies, and forensic evidence presented by an appropriate expert witness. 
Participants in the ‘trial stimulus only’ condition received the trial stimulus without 
supplementary materials. Participants in the ‘biased report’ condition read the trial stimulus, 
followed by a forensic report indicating the expert had been biased. Participants in the ‘unbiased 
report’ group read the trial stimulus, and then read a forensic report not indicating that the expert 
had been biased. Participants then completed the Forensic Confidence Scale (McAuliff et al., 
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2009). Data from questionnaires were recorded in a Microsoft Excel file in preparation for 
analysis.   
2.6.5 Data Screening 
Data for 130 participants were entered into SPSS Version 20 and screened for normality. 
Data from 10 participants who were not Australian citizens, therefore not meeting the conditions 
of inclusion, were removed. The final data set, after removal of incomplete data and errors, 
consisted of 120 participants. 
2.7 Results 
2.7.1 Manipulation Checks 
Participant age group was non-normally distributed, with skewness of 1.42 (SE = 0.22) 
due to the sample primarily consisting of undergraduate psychology students recruited from the 
University of Adelaide. Females greatly outnumbered male participants, as is common in studies 
involving voluntary participation (Lobato et al., 2014). No statistically significant differences in 
reported motivation or prior knowledge of forensic methods were found within or between 
participant groups and conditions. See Table 1 for participant characteristics. 
2.7.1.1 Forensic Confidence 
An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted to determine whether participants in 
different conditions differed in their reported forensic confidence. It was not significant, 


















2.7.1.2 Expert Bias 
One question on the Forensic Confidence Scale asked participants to estimate the 
likelihood of the forensic expert to have been unbiased and objective. An ANOVA was 
conducted to determine if participants in different conditions would differ in their estimation. It 
was significant, F(2,117) = 3.3, p = .04, η2 = .05.  
Participants who read the trial transcript and then received a forensic report indicating 
bias recorded a lower likelihood of the expert being unbiased and 
objective (M = 0.05, SD = 1.00, 95% CI [-0.27, 0.37]) than participants who received no forensic 
report (M = 0.63, SD = 1.00, 95% CI [0.30, 0.95]) and participants who received a report not 
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2.7.1.3 Expert Study’s Validity 
Another question on the Forensic Confidence Scale asked participants to rate the expert 
study’s validity. An ANOVA was conducted to determine if participants in different conditions 
would differ in their ratings. It was significant, F(2,117) = 3.6, p = .03, η2 = .06.  
Those who read the trial transcript but did not receive a forensic report were more likely 
to report a lower estimation of the expert study’s validity (M = 0.55, SD = 0.88, 
95% CI [0.27, 0.83]) than participants who received a forensic report indicating bias (M = 0.9, 
SD = 0.93, 95% CI [0.60, 1.20]), or one containing no bias (M = 1.03, SD = 0.62, 
95% CI [0.83, 1.22]). 
One of the main questions raised in this study was whether jurors’ decision making would 
differ if provided with a Found and Edmond (2012) style forensic report.  
2.7.2 Verdict 
A Chi Square Test was conducted to determine whether participants assigned to different 
conditions would differ in their verdicts. Participant condition had a significant effect on verdict, 
χ²(2, 120) = 6.07, p < .05 (two-tailed). 
Participants who did not receive a forensic report were more likely to give verdicts of not 
guilty (N = 27) than participants who received a forensic report containing bias (N = 18) or a 
forensic report containing no bias (N = 17). Post hoc tests however showed no significant 
differences between verdicts of any two participant conditions. Whether a participant received a 
forensic report, and what the forensic report entailed, had some effect on juror decision making; 




2.7.3 Likelihood of Guilt 
An ANOVA was also conducted to determine whether participants assigned to different 
conditions would report different likelihoods of guilt. Participant condition did not have a 
significant effect on likelihood of guilt, F(2,117) = 1.8, p = .169, η2 = .03. 
2.7.4 Forensic Confidence 
A third ANOVA was conducted to determine whether participant condition would affect 
forensic confidence scores. The ANOVA was not significant, F(2,117) = 1.0, p = .377, η2 = .02.   
2.7.5 Detection of Forensic Bias 
A Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) was conducted to examine whether 
participants in different conditions would differ in their responses across items on the Forensic 
Confidence Scale. Participant condition had a significant main effect on whether jurors believed 
that the expert’s research was based on good scientific principles, F(2,117) = 3.08, p = .05, η2 = 
.05. It also had a significant main effect on whether jurors believed the expert to be unbiased and 
objective, F(2,117) = 3.3, p = .04, η2 = .05, and on whether they believed the expert’s study to be 
scientifically valid, F(2,117) = 3.62, p = < .05, η2 = .06.  
LSD Post hoc comparisons revealed that participants who did not receive a forensic report 
recorded a significantly lower confidence in the idea that the expert’s research was based on good 
scientific principles (M = 0.90, SD = 0.74, 95% CI [0.66, 1.14]) than participants who received a 
forensic report without bias (M = 1.28, SD = 0.55, 95% CI [1.10, 1.45]). The findings suggest 
that participants who received a forensic report, regardless of content, believed that the forensic 
expert’s study was more reliable than participants who didn’t receive a forensic report after the 
transcript. 
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An LSD Post hoc comparison of jurors’ estimation of the expert’s bias and objectivity 
showed that participants receiving a forensic report indicating bias recorded a significantly lower 
likelihood of the expert being unbiased and objective (M = 0.05, SD = 1.00, 95% CI [-0.27, 0.37]) 
than participants who received no forensic report (M = 0.63, SD = 1.00, 95% CI [0.30, 0.95]) or 
participants who received a report not indicating bias (M = 0.4, SD = 1.01, 95% CI [0.08, 0.72]). 
This suggests that the use of the forensic report may have allowed jurors to accurately discern 
bias.  
LSD Post hoc tests also indicated that participants who did not receive a forensic report 
recorded a significantly lower confidence in the expert study’s scientific validity (M = 0.55, 
SD = 0.88, 95% CI [0.27, 0.83]) compared to those with a forensic report containing no bias 
(M = 1.03, SD = 0.62, 95% CI [0.83, 1.22]).  
2.8 Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to examine the effects of supplementary forensic reports 
in the format proposed by Found and Edmond (2012) on jurors’ evaluations of forensic evidence, 
and by extension, verdict. Verdicts differed significantly across experimental conditions, with 
jurors provided with a supplementary forensic report, regardless of content, more likely to find 
the defendant guilty than participants who received no report. One explanation for this is that the 
forensic report may have prompted greater confidence in the forensic evidence, while participants 
without a report may not have attempted to understand and interpret forensic science ‘jargon’.  
Likelihood of guilt was directly linked to jurors’ confidence in the forensic evidence. 
Jurors’ confidence in the forensic evidence was only significantly correlated with verdict when 





Although participants in different conditions differed in their forensic confidence scores, 
differences were not statistically significant. This may have been due to low participant numbers 
reducing the power of comparisons. A post hoc power analysis found an observed power of 0.22, 
indicating a high probability of a Type II error (Cohen, 1992). A larger sample size may have 
resulted in statistically significant differences between participants in different conditions. 
Though forensic confidence did not significantly differ, results indicated a significant difference 
between participants’ reported confidence in the expert study’s validity.  
Participants reported a significantly lower confidence in the validity of the forensic 
expert’s study when given a forensic report indicating bias than one indicating no bias, or no 
forensic report. These findings suggest that forensic reports may have enabled jurors to recognise 
bias, without sufficiently acting on it. Research into the role of forensic reports on juror decision 
making is quite limited; however, some of the present study’s findings are consistent with past 
research outcomes relating to juror decision making (McAuliff et al., 2009; McQuiston-Surrett 
& Saks, 2009).  
McQuiston-Surrett and Saks (2009) found that judges and jurors were more prone to 
rating likelihood of guilt higher when confidence in expert testimony was high, though higher 
likelihood of guilt did not directly translate to more guilty verdicts. In addition, McQuiston-
Surrett and Saks (2009) found that jurors rated their understanding, and the complexity of 
forensic evidence higher than judges, highlighting one of the vulnerabilities related to the use of 
forensic evidence in court rooms. McQuiston-Surrett and Saks (2009) also discovered that judges 
and jurors lent more credence to qualitative evidence than quantitative and statistical evidence, 
suggesting that the greater complexity associated with quantitative evidence, may inhibit 
accuracy of jurors’ decision making.  
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McAuliff et al. (2009) examined jurors’ ability to detect flaws in scientific procedure and 
experimenter bias related at trial. McAuliff et al. (2009) employed Cacioppo and Petty (1982)’s 
Need for Cognition Scale to assess whether jurors did or did not enjoy effortful cognitive 
endeavours, to gauge jurors’ likely use of heuristic or rational processing. It was found that most 
jurors recognised one threat to internal validity, but not others, and variations in construct validity 
did not impact jurors’ verdict or confidence in the expert witness or forensic evidence. McAuliff 
et al. (2009) concluded that internal validity threats such as experimenter bias and confounds 
were too complex for lay jurors to interpret rationally. McAuliff et al. (2009) argued that heuristic 
reasoning plays a crucial part and far more prominent role in most jurors’ decision making than 
rational reasoning. McQuiston-Surrett and Saks’ (2009) and McAuliff et al.’s (2009) findings 
support the idea that jurors rely on broader arguments and qualitative statements rather than 
statistical and scientific analyses. Jurors may therefore benefit from supplementary material such 
as simplified forensic reports to account for diverse jurors’ decision making strategies. Further 
research is crucial if these are to be developed and adopted in real courtrooms.  
2.9 Limitations of the Study and Considerations for Future Research 
A number of factors not accounted for may have influenced this study’s findings, and 
limit generalisability of results. Jurors were presented with a written transcript, rather than 
participating in a re-enactment of the mock trial, and did not participate in group deliberations as 
would generally occur. Participants may have been less motivated than if they had been part of a 
real court case, where more auditory and visual stimuli could have influenced participants’ 
decision making. The sacrifice of external validity for internal validity does not extend to 
participants’ individual rendering of a verdict, as research has indicated that pre- and post-
deliberation verdicts rarely differ (Kerr & Tindale, 2004; McAuliff et al., 2009; Ohtsubo et al., 
2004). Participants were recruited via the University of Adelaide, likely to have resulted in a 




participants likely had a greater ability to identify flawed research methods, and may have been 
more critical than an actual lay juror sample. There has been some debate regarding the 
generalizability of jury simulation research using student samples (Bornstein et al., 2017). 
However, a recent review of literature found guilty verdicts, culpability ratings, and damage 
awards not to differ between student and non-student samples, indicating that student samples 
are appropriate for jury simulation research involving mock jurors (Bornstein et al., 2017). 
Participants across conditions were also presented with different quantities of evidence, as some 
were shown forensic evidence repeatedly due to receiving a forensic report. This may have 
contributed to participants’ overestimation of the evidence’s strength and importance regardless 
of content. The use of a forensic report not using Found and Edmond’s (2012) suggested format 
was excluded, limiting conclusions drawn concerning the report format used in this study relative 
to other forensic reports. The relevance of this shortcoming is however mitigated by the fact that 
forensic reports are not standardised. Comparisons between the Found and Edmond (2012) style 
forensic report and report formats employed by different agencies would likely yield drastically 
different results, re-emphasising one of the issues associated with inconsistent forensic report 
formats (Found & Edmond, 2012; Howes & Kemp, 2017). The study did not employ a direct 
measure of whether jurors recognised bias, aside from one Likert scale question. A greater 
number of measures concerning bias, including jurors’ perception of their own biases, is 
recommended for any future studies modelled on this one. Differences in content between the 
biased and unbiased forensic reports were minor, and potentially too subtle for lay jurors to pick 
up on. These concerns are however mitigated by findings suggesting that the forensic report had 
a notable effect on jurors’ detection of bias. 
Despite these limitations, the findings of this study contribute to the growing body of 
literature concerning forensic bias and juror decision making. The present study’s findings are 
consistent with the results of past research indicating that jurors’ perceptions of forensic evidence 
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and forensic expert testimony are positively correlated with verdict and degree of guilt 
(McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009; McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; McAuliff et al., 2009). This study 
has illustrated that supplementary forensic reports do not appear to significantly influence juror 
decision making, though findings point to a positive correlation between the use of forensic 
reports, and jurors’ recognition of forensic bias in experts (Found & Edmond, 2012; Howes & 
Kemp, 2017). Research has largely neglected the role of supplementary materials such as jury 
instructions and forensic reports, as the few studies investigating the effects of such materials on 
juror decision making have found their impact to be negligible (McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; Shaw 
& Skolnick, 1995; Simmonsen, 2012). This has led to research stagnating rather than exploring 
further possible avenues concerning the enhancement of jurors’ understanding of forensic 
evidence using supplementary materials. The findings of this study suggest that further 
investigation into the use of supplementary materials to educate jurors on forensic and other 
biases may be invaluable to improving the Australian judicial system (Howes, 2015; Howes & 




































Chapter 3.  
Study 2. The Effects of Emotional and Rational Information Processing on 
Juror Decision Making 
3.1 Abstract 
Contrary to popular belief, forensic experts are prone to committing errors. As a result weak or 
flawed forensic evidence is often introduced and presented in courts. The role of jurors in 
separating good from bad forensic evidence is therefore critical. It has been proposed that jurors 
process information emotionally or rationally, and that this may influence decision making. 
Information provoking emotional responses has also been found to inhibit rational processing, 
and therefore accuracy. Found and Edmond (2012) proposed that using simplified forensic 
reports would allow readers, including jurors, to better evaluate forensic evidence, and recognise 
forensic bias, even when evidence prompts emotional arousal. The aim of this study was to 
evaluate Found and Edmond’s (2012) forensic report format on jurors’ decision making relative 
to their use of emotional or rational information processing. One hundred and sixty-two 
participants read a trial transcript and a forensic report based on the experimental condition they 
had been assigned. Some processed information emotionally, and some rationally. Participants 
reported verdict, degree of guilt, and forensic confidence. Emotional manipulation did not have 
a significant effect on verdict, or forensic confidence. The forensic report also failed to influence 
participants’ recognition of forensic bias. Participants’ verdict and degree of guilt scores were 
correlated with forensic expert confidence, highlighting the issue of jurors’ reliance on heuristics 
when evaluating forensic evidence. Implications and avenues for future research are discussed.   







Forensic and cognitive biases influence forensic experts, judges, jurors, and verdict 
outcomes. Research into how biases affect juror decision making have offered mixed results. 
Some researchers have linked juror information processing to jurors’ cognitive capacity and 
intelligence (Kleider et al., 2012; McAuliff & Kovera, 2008). Others have proposed that jurors’ 
emotions can dramatically affect behaviour, particularly when evidence is provocative, or 
presented in a provocative manner (Lieberman, 2002; Wiener et al., 2006). Yet others have 
suggested that jurors overestimate the strength of forensic evidence, their understanding of 
forensic evidence, and their own general scientific knowledge, affecting the reliability of juror 
decision making (Goodman-Delahunty & Hewson, 2010; McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; 
McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009). Despite these findings and some proposed countermeasures, 
assisting jurors to make more reliable decisions has not been a high priority in legal circles 
(Edmond, 2015; McAuliff et al., 2009). This is in part due to a lack of consensus on what 
theoretical model should be used to explain the intricacies of juror information processing and 
decision making.  
3.3 Models of Juror Information Processing and Decision Making 
A number of theoretical models of information processing for use in juror decision 
making research have been proposed. Some of these are well established, despite the lack of 
evidence to support underlying presuppositions (Epstein, 2003; Evans, 2008; 
McAuliff et al., 2009; Pennington & Hastie, 1992). One such theory is the frequently cited story 
model.  
3.3.1 The Story Model 
Developed by Pennington and Hastie (1991, 1992, 1993), the story model dictates that 
the juror is “a sense-making information processor who strives to create a meaningful summary 
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of the evidence available that explains what happened in the events depicted through witnesses, 
exhibits, and arguments at trial” (Pennington & Hastie, 1991, p. 519). To illustrate this, 
Pennington and Hastie (1992) tasked 414 participants with reading a stimulus case, and reporting 
their verdicts and confidence in the forensic evidence. Some participants were also required to 
recall as much of the evidence as they could, and record it in order of presentation. Pennington 
and Hastie (1992) found that participants were significantly more likely to commit to a verdict 
when evidence was presented using a story items sequence, and that the order in which evidence 
was presented had a significant effect on mock jurors’ memory of evidence presented. These 
findings suggested that perceived strength of the evidence in favour of one verdict over another 
represented a function of how sufficiently a juror could develop a story, which in turn depended 
on the sequence and types of evidence used (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). The story model is 
often presented in the form of checklists, flow charts, and similar visual representations, and 
although widely adopted, has not been consistently supported by research (Olson-Fulero & 
Fulero, 1997; Spottswood, 2014). Due to this, some researchers have looked to other models of 
information processing to explain juror behaviour. One of these is Chaiken’s (1980) Heuristic-
Systematic Model. 
3.3.2 The Heuristic-Systematic Model 
Chaiken (1980, 1987) proposed a dual-process model involving concurrent systematic 
and heuristic information processing. Systematic reasoning refers to the use of “highly effortful 
cognitive activity aimed at the careful and logical analysis of a persuasive message’s content”, 
(McAuliff et al., 2009, p. 248). Heuristic reasoning refers to “the use of mental shortcuts or 
decision-rules to evaluate a persuasive message”, involving the use of environmental and 
context-specific cues tied to values held by the receiver of a message (McAuliff et al., 2009, p. 
248). Research has also found that individuals using systematic processing better distinguish 




message content (Kemmelmeier, 2010; Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff et al., 2009). Conversely 
heuristic processing leaves individuals susceptible to the influence of irrelevant information, and 
cues, such as appeal of the message source, where individuals neglect to differentiate between 
strong and weak rational arguments (Kemmelmeier, 2010; Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff et al., 
2009). Dual information processing has been linked to motivation and cognitive ability 
(Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; See et al., 2009; Todorov et al., 2002; Van der 
Maas et al., 2011).  
The Heuristic-Systematic Model proposes that people engage in either systematic or 
heuristic processing of information depending on motivation, and cognitive resources (Chaiken, 
1980, 1987; McAuliff et al., 2009). Personal relevance, need for cognition, task importance, 
accountability for one’s views, and message content were found to influence motivation of a 
message receiver, whereas time pressures, mode of communication, prior knowledge, 
experience, expertise, message repetition, and distraction were identified as components that 
impact the element of cognitive resources in relation to message comprehension (McAuliff & 
Kovera, 2008; McAuliff et al., 2009; Van der Maas et al., 2011). Research suggests that the 
Heuristic-Systematic Model is relevant in contemporary research contexts, yet some doubts 
remain concerning its applicability relating to investigations of juror decision making (McAuliff 
et al., 2009; See et al., 2009). Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory is a more recent adaption of 
the Heuristic-Systematic Model, attempting to consolidate the dichotomous nature of the 
Heuristic-Systematic Model by proposing the existence of a continuum of behaviour and decision 
making, thereby accounting for some of the supposed shortcoming of the Heuristic-Systematic 




3.3.3 Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory 
Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory asserts that individuals process information in two 
partially independent systems, those being rational and experiential (emotional) modes (Epstein, 
1994, 2003; Epstein & Pacini, 1999; Lieberman, 2002). Experiential processing is strongly 
related to heuristic decision making, emphasising efficient and mostly effortless processing 
subject to biases, whereas rational information processing entails effortful and deliberate 
analytical processing mostly free of affect, and biases (Epstein, 1994, 2003; Epstein & Pacini, 
1999; Lieberman, 2002). Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory assumes that “behaviour varies 
along a continuum and is influenced by the relative contributions of these two systems” 
(Donovan & Epstein, 1997; Lieberman, 2002, p. 2527). Research on Cognitive Experiential Self-
Theory has found some empirical support for the occurrence and applicability of the rational-
experiential dichotomy in people’s information processing and behaviour across a range of social 
contexts (Epstein, 2003; Hample & Richards, 2014; Kemmelmeier, 2010; Lieberman, 2002).  
Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory has been found to predict a person’s interpretation of 
feedback, highlighting the role of motivation in prompting rational rather than heuristic 
information processing (Epstein, 2003; Kemmelmeier, 2010; Lieberman, 2002). A number of 
studies have demonstrated the effects of motivating participants to process information either 
emotionally or rationally, with and without their knowledge, on the basis of Cognitive 
Experiential Self-Theory (Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff et al., 2009; Wiener et al., 2006). The 
strength of Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory as a theoretical basis for research into bias and 
decision making is highlighted by such dual processing literature examining juror behaviour. 
One tool commonly used to supplement or support findings from dual processing research is the 
Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo et al., 1983, 1996; McAuliff et al., 




3.3.3.1 The Need for Cognition 
The need for cognition refers to the tendency for an individual “to engage in and enjoy 
thinking” (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982, p.116). The Need for Cognition Scale has been frequently 
used in decision making research based on dual processing models of information processing 
(Cacioppo et al., 1983, 1996; Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff et al., 2009; Shestowsky & Horowitz, 
2004). McAuliff et al. (2009) employed the Need for Cognition Scale to see whether jurors 
believed themselves to be using systematic or heuristic decision making strategies, and what 
jurors actually did. McAuliff et al. (2009) found that many participants reported using systematic 
reasoning, yet participants predominantly employed heuristic strategies, using broad concepts 
and primarily qualitative evidence to make decisions about a defendant’s guilt and validity of 
forensic expert and evidence. The Need for Cognition Scale is therefore appropriate for 
evaluating jurors’ use of different information processing and decision making strategies in the 
context of forensic bias (McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; McAuliff et al., 2009; See et al., 2009; 
Shestowsky & Horowitz, 2004). 
The effects of forensic bias on juror decision making have not been adequately addressed 
(Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Edmond, 2015; McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009). Forensic 
evidence has been found to be less reliable than generally perceived (Dror et al., 2006; NAS, 
2009). Judges have unofficially been assigned the role of gatekeepers in keeping ‘junk’ science 
and flawed forensic evidence out of courts, but generally lack the specialised knowledge required 
to do so (Gatowski et al., 2001; Kovera & McAuliff, 2000). As a result some unreliable forensic 
evidence has made it into courts (Howes, 2015; Howes & Kemp, 2017; McAuliff et al., 2009; 
NAS, 2009; PCAST, 2016). The negative consequences of flawed forensic evidence have been 
well-documented, as exemplified by the Madrid Bomber case and other publicised incidents 
(Dror et al., 2006; Giannelli, 2007; Kassin et al., 2013). A number of explanations have been 
proposed in efforts to understand jurors’ overestimation of flawed forensic evidence. 
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3.4 Juror Reasoning and the Role of Bias 
Jurors’ ability to accurately reason has been linked to a number of factors, including need 
for cognition, prior knowledge, motivation, and personal biases (McAuliff et al., 2009; 
Shestowsky & Horowitz, 2004; West et al., 2012). Jurors overestimate their ability to 
comprehend the validity and reliability of forensic evidence (Goodman-Delahunty & Hewson, 
2010; McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009). Studies have shown that jurors’ emotional responses to 
evidence or other factors of a trial can have a significant effect on jurors’ information processing 
and decision making (Kleider et al., 2012; Lieberman, 2002; Wiener et al., 2006).  
Wiener et al. (2006) found that jurors who reported stronger emotional reactions to the 
content of a sexual harassment case were more likely to rely on heuristics and extra-legal factors 
in reaching a verdict. Emotionally arousing evidence has also been linked to greater damages 
awarded for severely injured plaintiffs (Lieberman, 2002). Edwards and Bryan (1997) found that 
emotionally evocative evidence had a significantly greater effect on verdict outcomes when ruled 
inadmissible. Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory accounts for these behavioural outcomes by 
proposing that inducing emotional information processing, for example through emotionally 
evocative evidence, prompts jurors to rely on heuristics (Epstein, 2003; Lieberman, 2002). As a 
result jurors fail to recognise flawed forensic evidence, instead assigning greater value and 
relevance to highly detailed forensic evidence, despite not being able to comprehend it 
(Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff et al., 2009; Wiener et al., 2006). This suggests that inducing 
rational information processing would allow jurors to more effectively recognise flawed forensic 
evidence, and take its flaws into account when determining a verdict (Lieberman, 2002). Some 






3.4.1 The Purpose of Supplementary Materials 
Jury instructions are one form of supplementary materials used to educate jurors on legal 
terms, forensic evidence, and jurors’ roles and responsibilities (Halverson et al., 1997; Shaw & 
Skolnick, 1995; Simmonsen, 2012). However, Daftary-Kapur et al. (2010) found that jurors’ 
understanding of jury instructions is low. It has also been found that instructions fail to change 
juror behaviour resulting from effects of biases (Halverson et al., 1997; Simmonsen, 2012). A 
more targeted form of supplementary material is the forensic report. 
Forensic reports are sometimes introduced alongside forensic evidence to improve clarity 
of information provided to jurors (Found & Edmond, 2012). However, forensic reports do not 
necessarily improve jurors’ understanding of evidence, as they are no replacement for specialised 
knowledge (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Found & Edmond, 2012; Howes & Kemp, 2017). Found 
and Edmond (2012) proposed that simplifying forensic reports may enable lay jurors to more 
effectively evaluate complex forensic evidence, and recognise flaws (Found & Edmond, 2012; 
Kassin et al., 2013).  
3.4.1.1 The Found and Edmond (2012) Forensic Report Format 
Found and Edmond (2012) proposed a format for forensic reports which would improve 
content quality and clarity in order to improve juror comprehension of evidence, and jurors’ 
ability to recognise flaws. Proposed changes would also help jurors identify potential sources of 
cognitive and forensic bias, and draw more objective and accurate conclusions without needing 
to resort to heuristics (Found & Edmond, 2012). In accordance with Cognitive Experiential Self-
Theory, jurors provided with a forensic report using the Found and Edmond (2012) format should 
require less cognitive effort in evaluating the forensic evidence, and therefore be less likely to 
resort to heuristic over systematic information processing (Lieberman, 2002). The use of rational 
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information processing of evidence via the Found and Edmond (2012) forensic report should also 
help mitigate the effects of emotionally arousing evidence on juror decision making.  
3.5 Summary 
Forensic science now plays a greater role in criminal proceedings than ever before 
(McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009). However, a growing body of research has brought many 
concerns regarding the reliability and validity of forensic evidence to light (Giannelli, 2010; 
NAS, 2009; PCAST, 2016; Wells et al., 2013). This has not stopped flawed forensic evidence 
from making it into court rooms (Found & Edmond, 2012; Magnussen et al., 2014; McQuiston-
Surrett & Saks, 2009; NAS, 2009; PCAST, 2016; Wilson & Dunn, 2004). Jurors’ ability to 
identify flawed forensic evidence once presented in court has been called into question, and their 
susceptibility to extralegal factors may undermine unbiased decision making (Pozzulo et al., 
2008; Pozzulo et al., 2010). Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory accounts for these errors in 
jurors’ judgment and decision making by attributing them to jurors’ use of emotional and 
heuristic over rational information processing (Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff et al., 2009). Found 
and Edmond (2012) have proposed changes to the presentation of forensic reports to improve 
juror comprehension, and decision making. The simpler forensic report should deter jurors from 
emotional and heuristic evaluations of forensic evidence, and encourage rational processing 
(Found & Edmond, 2012; Lieberman, 2002). This should in turn improve reliability and accuracy 
of juror decision making, even when the evidence itself is emotionally arousing. Found and 
Edmond’s (2012) claims have not been substantiated. This thesis’ first study found that mock 
jurors were more likely to recognise a forensic expert’s bias, yet reported a higher confidence in 
the forensic evidence when provided with a Found and Edmond (2012) style forensic report. The 
mixed findings cast some doubt over Found and Edmond’s (2012) claims. This study sought to 
investigate if jurors could be prompted to process information rationally or emotionally, and 




verdict. A further aim was to determine whether such manipulation could be counteracted 
through the use of Found and Edmond’s (2012) proposed forensic report format. 
To do this, a trial stimulus was developed, partly derived from Lieberman (2002) 
(Appendix E). Bieneck (2009) found trial stimuli, or vignettes, to be particularly relevant in social 
cognitive research related to the legal system, noting the ability to manipulate a vignette or trial 
transcript for the purposes of specific research outcomes as a significant advantage over other 
methods for jury simulation research.  While the Lieberman (2002) trial stimulus concerns a civil 
case, elements generally attributed to criminal cases were introduced to satisfy conditions for 
guilt judgements and likelihood of guilt assessments. Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of four conditions. Those in the ‘emotionally arousing and unbiased report’ condition received 
emotionally arousing jury instructions (Appendix F), read the trial transcript accompanied by 
emotionally stimulating forensic evidence (Appendix G), and were then provided with a Found 
and Edmond (2012) format forensic report (Appendix H) indicating that the forensic expert had 
been unbiased and objective. Those in the ‘emotionally arousing and biased report’ condition 
received the same instructions, read the transcript, were provided with the same evidence, and 
then read a Found and Edmond (2012) forensic report indicating that the expert had been biased. 
Participants in the ‘rational and unbiased report’ condition received jury instructions prompting 
rational information processing (Appendix I), then read the trial transcript, accompanied by 
evidence further prompting rational processing (Appendix J). They then received the Found and 
Edmond (2012) forensic report indicating that the expert had been unbiased and objective. 
Finally, participants in the ‘rational and biased report’ condition received the same instructions, 
transcript, and evidence, but received the Found and Edmond (2012) forensic report indicating 
that the expert had been biased.  
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Participants then rendered a verdict, and provided a likelihood of guilt estimate on a scale 
from 0 to 100. Likelihood of guilt estimates are commonly used in juror decision making 
research, and offer an alternative interpretation of differences in jurors (Dhami, 2008; McAuliff 
et al., 2009). Participants also recorded the amount of damages they chose to be awarded to the 
victim in the case. Although not a standard practice in criminal trials, mock jurors’ reporting of 
damages awarded has been used to demonstrate the effects of emotional arousal on juror decision 
making (Lieberman, 2002). All participants completed the Forensic Confidence Scale adapted 
from McAuliff et al. (2009).The scale has been used to capture jurors’ confidence in forensic 
evidence and the expert by whom it was presented (McAuliff et al., 2009). McAuliff et al. (2009) 
found that greater confidence in forensic evidence correlated with more guilty verdicts in mock 
jurors.  
Participants also completed the Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). 
McAuliff et al. (2009) used the Need for Cognition Scale to determine if participants had a 
predisposition to using heuristic or rational information processing. The Need for Cognition 
Scale allows for the accounting of participants’ need for cognition as an individual difference 
factor that might otherwise obscure findings. To a similar end, participants reported which of 
several science-based subjects they had completed at the secondary or tertiary level of education. 
It has been suggested that education in the sciences has a tangible effect on jurors’ evaluations 
of forensic evidence (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Goodman-Delahunty & Hewson, 2010). 
Therefore a record of such an education in conjunction with need for cognition scores offers a 
more complete picture than the need for cognition alone.   
It was hypothesised that forensic confidence scores would be positively correlated with 
verdict, and likelihood of guilt. It was also hypothesised that participants who received 




had been biased, would report a greater confidence than participants who received the forensic 
report indicating bias, but received instructions and evidence prompting rational processing. 
Finally it was hypothesised that participants receiving different instructions and evidence, but the 
same forensic report indicating that the expert was unbiased and objective, would not 
significantly differ in their forensic confidence scores, likelihood of guilt estimates, and verdicts.  
3.6 Method 
3.6.1 Participants 
Two hundred and eighty-two participants were recruited from the University of Adelaide, 
and online advertising. A notable number of participants (N = 98) only partially completed the 
trial stimulus, suggesting that stimulus length and complexity may have been an issue. Remaining 
participants were excluded if not between the ages of 17 and 80, not an Australian citizen, or had 
a law degree, to address jury eligibility. The final sample consisted of 162 participants (64 male, 
98 female). This study was approved by the University of Adelaide’s School of Psychology 
Human Research Ethics Sub Committee (code number: 14/72).  
3.6.2 Measures 
3.6.2.1 Jury Instructions 
Participants were provided with a brief paragraph containing instructions regarding 
information presented in the trial transcript. Not all participants received the same instructions. 
Lieberman (2002) manipulated the content of jury instructions to encourage either emotional or 
rational processing modes in participants. The manipulation method was emulated for this study.   
3.6.2.1.1 Emotional Jury Instructions. Participants provided with emotional jury 
instructions were informed that evidence and information provided would be graphic and vivid, 
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and potentially somewhat upsetting. The purpose of these instructions was to evoke an 
emotional response, and prompt predominantly emotional or heuristic information processing.  
3.6.2.1.2 Rational Jury Instructions. Participants provided with rational jury 
instructions were informed that evidence and information provided would require them to 
mathematically calculate monetary damages, that this would require addition and 
multiplication, and to take note of numerical values in the transcript. The purpose of these 
instructions was to prompt predominantly rational information processing.  
3.6.2.2 Trial Transcript 
Participants were presented with a nine-page summary of a simulated criminal case 
(Appendix E) in which it was alleged that the defendant drove recklessly, losing control of his 
vehicle, causing a collision between two vehicles resulting in the death of the other driver. Eye- 
and character witnesses were not reliable, and biased. This ensured that the forensic evidence 
was the critical factor in establishing the defendant’s guilt. The examination of the evidence was 
preceded by information on accident reconstruction, outlining strengths and shortcomings of 
various procedures, as well as technical aspects of the process, and implications regarding the 
law. This was followed by a cross-examination, during which the forensic expert admitted that 
they could only ascertain that the defendant’s vehicle was the cause of the accident, and not why, 
with any certainty. The forensic expert also admitted that they were aware of details concerning 
the investigation. The cross-examination of the forensic expert was followed by the prosecution’s 
claims for compensation, with detailed justifications for each claim. The trial transcript was 
concluded by the judge’s closing statements, and basic judicial instructions. 
3.6.2.3 Found and Edmond (2012) Format Forensic Report 
Participants were presented with a forensic report, using a South Australian forensic 




modified to adopt Found and Edmond’s (2012) proposed report format. As outlined by Found 
and Edmond (2012), the structure of the forensic report was as follows: 
 Title 
 Executive Summary 
 List of exhibits submitted (CCTV footage) 
 Statement as to origin of evidence 
 Statement of chain of custody of exhibit 
 Statement of domain irrelevant information the examiner was provided with 
 Statement as to qualifications of examiner 




3.6.2.3.1 Forensic Report Manipulation 
3.6.2.3.1.1 Section - Information that the examiner was provided with: 
The unbiased forensic report indicated that the forensic examiner was provided with 
contextual information concerning the auto accident. The forensic expert was also provided with 
the relevant accident and police report. The forensic report indicating bias provided the same 
information, as well as stating that the forensic expert was informed that a suspect was already 
in custody, and that there had been an eyewitness. 
3.6.2.3.1.2 Section - Conclusions: 
Both forensic reports contained an identical summary of the forensic evidence, how it 
was processed, and conclusions drawn about the comparison. The biased forensic report also 
93 
stated that the forensic expert was aware of details relating to the case not relevant to the analysis, 
including criminal and medical histories of the parties involved in the accident, and that the 
defendant had previously lost his license after a motor vehicle accident.   
3.6.2.4 Forensic Evidence 
After reading the entire transcript, participants were provided with several exhibits of 
forensic evidence. Not all participants received the same exhibits of forensic evidence. 
3.6.2.4.1 Emotional Forensic Evidence. Participants who received emotional jury 
instructions prior to the trial transcript were provided with three exhibits of forensic evidence. 
The first exhibit presented skid marks from the accident site, as well as a still image of two car 
wrecks shortly after the occurrence of the accident. The second exhibit was a motor vehicle 
accident report completed by the relevant parties. The report was primarily neutral, though 
emotional and evocative language was used. The third exhibit was an alleged damages report 
containing all claims of expenses by the prosecution. The purpose of the exhibits, particularly 
the images, was to provide further information while reinforcing participants’ emotional or 
heuristic information processing. 
3.6.2.4.2 Rational Forensic Evidence. Participants who received rational jury 
instructions prior to the trial transcript were also provided with three exhibits of forensic 
evidence. The first exhibit showed a still image of a 3D reconstruction of the vehicles involved 
in the accident at the time of the impact. The image was not photo-realistic. It was accompanied 
by the image of skid marks from the accident site. The second exhibit was the alleged damages 
report also provided to participants who received the emotional forensic evidence. The rational 
version of the exhibit was missing several numeric values, requiring participants to rely on 
notes and calculations to determine original and final values of financial claims of expenses. 




to the report provided to participants receiving the emotional forensic evidence, though without 
evocative and emotional words and phrases. The purpose of the exhibits was to provide further 
information while reinforcing participants’ rational or systematic information processing. 
3.6.2.5 Participant Questionnaire 
Participants were tasked with completing a questionnaire (Appendix K) partly derived 
from Goodman-Delahunty and Hewson (2010), Lieberman (2002), and McAuliff et al. (2009), 
consisting of several sections. The trial question section asked jurors to select a verdict, and 
provide a likelihood of guilt estimate ranging from 0 to 100.  
3.6.2.5.1 Forensic Confidence Scale. Participants then completed the Forensic 
Confidence Scale adapted from McAuliff et al. (2009). The scale is comprised of thirteen 5-
point Likert scale questions, with answers ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. 
Two of the items were negatively worded for the purposes of manipulation checks. Examples 
of items include ‘the expert’s research was based on good scientific principles’ and ‘the expert 
did not use valid methods of image identification comparison’ (McAuliff et al., 2009). 
The final section asked participants to complete a number of questions relating to 
perceived prior knowledge of forensic evidence, as well as testing whether mock jurors could 
recall information relating to pattern evidence presented in the trial transcript. They were also 
tasked with reporting their level of emotional involvement with the study, and level of mental 
effort required. Participants were then tasked with completing the Need for Cognition Scale 
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). 
3.6.2.5.2 Need for Cognition Scale. The Need for Cognition Scale is derived from 
Cacioppo and Petty (1982). It has been extensively tested and validated with regard to 
identifying peoples’ need for cognition (McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; McAuliff et al., 2009; See 
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et al., 2009; Shestowsky & Horowitz, 2004). It consists of eighteen 5-point Likert scale 
questions asking participants to identify how they felt with regard to various cognitive 
demands, with answers ranging from Not at all like me to Very like me. Half the items were 
negatively worded. Examples of items include ‘I would prefer complex to simple problems’ 
and ‘the idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me’ (Cacioppo & 
Petty, 1982). 
Scores ranged from 72 to -72, with a lower score indicating a lower need for cognition. 
Participants who scored between -72 and -15 points (bottom 25%) were deemed to have a low 
need for cognition. Participants who scored between -14 and 14 points were deemed to have 
some need for cognition, and participants scoring between 16 and 43 points were deemed to have 
a moderate need for cognition. Participants scoring higher than 43 (top 25%) were deemed to 
have a high need for cognition.  
3.6.3 Design  
An experimental between-groups design was employed for the purposes of this study. 
Study group was the independent variable with four levels, those being emotional processing and 
unbiased report group, emotional processing and biased report group, rational processing and 
unbiased report group, and rational processing and biased report group. Dependent variables 
were verdict, likelihood of guilt, forensic confidence, and need for cognition. 
3.6.4 Procedure 
Participants were recruited to participate in the study using the Qualtrics online survey 
software. Before the transcript, participants were required to complete demographic questions, 
to ensure participant eligibility. These included questions concerning which of four secondary 
school level science-related subjects (math, physics, chemistry, biology) they had completed, and 




completed. Participants were then either presented with emotional or rational jury instructions. 
The trial transcript that followed included testimonies from medical specialists, eyewitnesses, 
and acquaintances of the victim and the accused. Testimonies were followed by a section on 
accident reconstruction, including the forensic science behind accident reconstruction, and the 
law. The transcript concluded with a cross examination of the forensic expert, and final remarks 
by the judge. Participants were then either presented with emotional or rational forensic evidence. 
Some participants received a forensic report indicating that forensic expert was biased, and some 
received a report indicating that the expert had been unbiased and objective. Participants then 
completed the study questionnaire, including the Forensic Confidence Scale and Need for 
Cognition Scale. Data was consequently recorded in a Microsoft ExcelTM file in preparation for 
analysis.  
3.6.5 Data Screening 
Data for 282 participants was entered into SPSS Version 20 and screened for normality. 
Data of 120 participants was either incomplete or indicated that a participant did not meet the 
conditions required to be included. The final data set, after removal of incomplete data and errors, 
and exclusion of participants who did not meet appropriate conditions, consisted of 162 (64 male, 
98 female) participants. 
3.7 Results 
3.7.1 Manipulation Checks 
Age groups were non-normally distributed, with a skewness of 2.82 (SE = 0.19), as 
expected of a participant group predominantly made up of university students. As generally 
found in behavioural research, more participants were female (Lobato et al., 2014). See Table 1 
for participant characteristics.  
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3.7.1.1 Need for Cognition 
Need for cognition scores were evenly distributed (M = 20.2, SD = 16.3). A Oneway 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted to determine whether participants’ need for 
cognition scores differed across study conditions. There were no significant differences in need 
for cognition scores across study conditions, F(3,158) = .313, p = .816, η2 < .01. 
 Table 1.  Participant Characteristics 
 
 
3.7.1.2 Emotional Involvement 
A Oneway ANOVA was conducted to determine if study condition had an effect on self-
reported emotional involvement with the study. It was not significant, 
F(3,158) = .156, p = .93, η2 < .01.     
3.7.1.3 Mental Effort 
A Oneway ANOVA was conducted to determine if study condition had an effect on self-
reported mental effort required to complete the study. It was also not significant, 















Age        18-24 
                25-34 
                35-44 
                45-54 
                55-64 





































Gender  Male 


















Verdict   Guilty 


















Total Participants 48 34 36 44 162 
 
 




3.7.1.4 Damages Awarded 
Damages awarded were evenly distributed. A Oneway ANOVA was conducted to 
determine if verdict had an effect on damages awarded. It was significant, F(1,160) = 9.91, 
p < .005, η2 = .06. As expected, participants who found the defendant guilty awarded a higher 
percentage of the total possible damages awarded (M = 48.4, SD = 34.7, 95% CI [41.7, 55.2]) 
than participants finding the defendant not guilty (M = 30.8, SD = 27.1, 95% CI [23.6, 37.9]).  
3.7.1.4.1 Study Condition. A Oneway ANOVA was conducted to determine whether 
there was a correlation between damages awarded, and whether participants were provided 
with emotionally arousing or rationally prompting jury instructions and forensic evidence, and 
biased or unbiased forensic report. It was not significant, F(3,158) = .207, p = .89, η2 < .01. 
3.7.2 Verdict 
A Oneway ANOVA was conducted to determine whether participants who differed in 
their verdicts would differ in their reported likelihood of guilt estimate. Verdict had a significant 
effect on likelihood of guilt, F(1,160) = 60.8, p > .001, η2 = .28. 
Participants who judged the defendant to be guilty reported a higher likelihood of guilt 
(M = 74.1, SD = 18.2, 95% CI [70.5, 77.6]) than participants who had judged the defendant to 
not be guilty (M = 45.6, SD = 28.1, 95% CI [38.2, 53.0]).  
It was also hypothesised that there would be a significant correlation between verdict and 
forensic confidence. A Oneway ANOVA was conducted to determine whether participants who 
differed in their forensic confidence differed in their verdicts. Forensic confidence had a 
significant effect on verdict, F(28,133) = 1.59, p = .044, η2 = .25. 
Participants who deemed the defendant guilty reported a greater confidence in the 
forensic evidence (M = 9.4, SD = 5.3, 95% CI [8.34, 10.39]) than participants who deemed the 
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defendant not guilty (M = 6.3, SD = 5.0, 95% CI [5.03, 7.65]), suggesting that the perceived 
strength of the forensic evidence plays a prominent role in jurors’ decision making outcomes 
when central to the trial. 
3.7.3 Forensic Confidence 
3.7.3.1 Instruction and Evidence Type 
A Oneway ANOVA was conducted to determine whether jury instruction and evidence 
type would have an effect on forensic confidence scores. Jury instruction and forensic evidence 
type had a significant effect on forensic confidence scores, F(1,160) = 4.334, p = .039, η2 = .03. 
Contrary to expectations, participants who received emotionally arousing jury 
instructions and evidence reported lower forensic confidence scores (M = 7.4, SD = 5.2, 
95% CI [6.21, 8.56]) than those who received instructions and evidence prompting rational 
processing (M = 9.1, SD = 5.4, 95% CI [7.95, 9.11]). 
3.7.3.2 Found and Edmond (2012) Forensic Report 
Another Oneway ANOVA was conducted to determine if forensic report content would 
have an effect on forensic confidence. It was not significant, F(1,160) = 1.731, p = .19, η2 = .01. 
3.7.3.3 Instruction and Evidence Type and Found and Edmond (2012) Forensic 
Report 
A third Oneway ANOVA was conducted to determine whether study condition would 





3.7.4.1 Secondary Education 
A Oneway ANOVA was conducted to determine if the number of science-related 
subjects undertaken in high school had a significant effect on forensic confidence ratings. It was 
significant, F(4,157) = 3.06, p = .019, η2 = .07. 
Participants who had completed all four of the science-related high school subjects 
(M = 6.4, SD = 5.5, 95% CI [4.86, 7.93]) listed in the survey reported significantly lower forensic 
confidence ratings than participants who had completed none (M = 10.4, SD = 6.0, 95% CI [4.45, 
15.5]), two (M = 9.9, SD = 4.5%, 95% CI [8.37, 11.3]) or three (M = 9.2, SD = 5.4, 95% CI [7.50, 
10.80]) of the subjects.  
3.7.4.2 Tertiary Education 
A Oneway ANOVA was conducted to determine if the number of tertiary subjects 
undertaken had a significant effect on forensic confidence ratings. It was not significant, 
F(5,156) = 1.38, p = .235, η2 = .04. 
3.8 Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to see if manipulating mock jurors’ information 
processing would affect their forensic confidence, and verdicts. The study also sought to 
determine if the use of a Found and Edmond (2012) style forensic report would have an effect 
on recognition of bias and forensic confidence, and if mock jurors’ interpretation of the forensic 
report’s content would differ based on whether they were prompted to process information 
emotionally or rationally.  
As expected, juror verdicts were significantly correlated with likelihood of guilt 
estimates. Jurors’ verdicts also significantly correlated with self-reported confidence in the 
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forensic evidence presented during the trial. As in previous research, mock jurors reporting a 
greater confidence in the forensic evidence were more likely to find the defendant guilty 
(McAuliff et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2011). The second hypothesis was that the type of jury 
instructions and forensic evidence would influence jurors’ information processing, and forensic 
confidence.   
3.9 Can Jury Instructions and Evidence Type Manipulate Information Processing? 
Findings regarding the effects of jury instruction and evidence type on juror behaviour 
were mixed. Jury instruction and evidence type were found to have a significant effect on 
reported forensic confidence. However, these were in the opposite direction to expectations. 
Participants prompted to process information rationally, and who viewed rational forensic 
evidence, reported a higher confidence in the forensic evidence. One explanation for this may be 
that the prompting of rational processing, and presenting of quantitative evidence does not 
prompt rational evaluation of evidence, but enforces the use of heuristics in favour of forensic 
evidence. This explanation also accounts for previous findings that supplementary materials such 
as forensic reports increase mock jurors’ confidence in forensic evidence, even when those 
reports contain information indicating that the evidence was likely corrupted or biased (McAuliff 
et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2011). However forensic report content alone was not found to 
significantly affect jurors’ verdicts or forensic confidence, casting further doubt over the practical 
application of the Found and Edmond (2012) forensic report format to improve juror information 
processing and decision making. Several other findings raise questions concerning the 
manipulation of jurors’ information processing. 
Study condition was not significantly correlated with jurors’ self-reported emotional 
involvement in the trial. Participants across all conditions generally reported to have been 




evidence designed to be emotionally arousing were not sufficiently affected to report a higher 
emotional involvement. Lieberman (2002) found that emotionally aroused participants awarded 
greater amounts in damages. The finding that participants provided with emotionally arousing 
instructions and evidence did not award greater damages therefore supports the idea that mock 
jurors were not sufficiently emotionally involved. Jurors’ self-reported mental effort required to 
complete the study presents a similar issue. 
Study condition was not found to correlate with self-reported mental effort. Participants 
across all conditions generally reported neither disagreeing nor agreeing with the notion that 
completion of the study required high mental effort. However, as participants read near identical 
amounts of information it is not surprising that participants prompted to process information 
rationally would not necessarily report greater mental effort than those provided with emotionally 
arousing instructions and evidence. Nonetheless it is unclear how much of the differences in 
forensic confidence scores of participants provided with different instruction and evidence types 
can be attributed to manipulation of jurors’ information processing, and how much to other 
factors. One such factor is education.  
3.10 Education and Juror Decision Making 
Education has been a prominent subject with regard to improving juror information 
processing and decision making (Edmond, 2015; Hope et al., 2004; McAuliff et al., 2009; 
Simmonsen, 2012). Research on directly educating jurors has led to changes relating to the use 
of supplementary materials such as jury instructions, written information provided alongside 
forensic and other evidence, and changes to the presentation of evidence in court (Found and 
Edmond, 2012; Goodman-Delahunty & Hewson, 2010; Simmonsen, 2012). Yet the use of such 
materials has been shown to have little to no effect on jurors’ information processing, bias 
recognition, understanding of evidence, and decision making (Goodman-Delahunty & Hewson, 
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2010; McAuliff et al., 2009; Park & Feigenson, 2013). Little research has been conducted on the 
effects of jurors’ schooling and education on their information processing, decision making, and 
ability to recognise biases and flawed forensic evidence (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; McAuliff et 
al., 2009). 
Participants reported whether they had completed any of four science-based subjects at 
the secondary level. The more subjects they had participated in, the lower mock jurors’ forensic 
confidence, though only participants that completed all four subjects reported a significantly 
lower forensic confidence score. The finding supports the idea that prior relevant science-based 
knowledge and experience improve jurors’ comprehension of forensic evidence, and recognition 
of flawed science (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Goodman-Delahunty & Hewson, 2010). The same 
analysis was conducted for science-subjects at the tertiary level. No significant effects were 
found, though this was no doubt due to the participant sample being predominantly first year 
psychology students. Within the Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory framework, relevant 
education contributes to personal relevance, motivation, and difficulty, supporting the idea that 
appropriate science-based knowledge and experience improves the likelihood of rational 
processing (Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff et al., 2009). Given the correlation between science-
based subjects completed in high school and participants’ forensic confidence, investigating the 
effects of science-based knowledge and experience at the tertiary level on mock jurors’ 
comprehension of evidence and recognition of flawed science has merit (Daftary-Kapur et al., 
2010; Goodman-Delahunty & Hewson, 2010).       
These findings have a number of implications relevant to future research on juror 
behaviour, and the use of supplementary materials in court. The finding of a correlation between 
forensic confidence and verdict, mirrored across juror decision making research, highlights the 




et al., 2009; McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009; Smith et al., 2011). Supplementary materials have 
shown to be lacking in this regard, and therefore need to be re-examined, and redesigned to 
directly address juror comprehension of specific forensic evidence, and concepts such as guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt (Found & Edmond, 2012; Simmonsen, 2012; Reynolds, 2013). 
Furthermore, jurors’ evaluation of forensic evidence has been shown to be biased by 
supplementary materials and the courtroom context (Simmonsen, 2012; Smith et al., 2011). This 
indicates that further research is needed into the effectiveness of different supplementary 
materials, and how those materials can be used to mitigate rather than exacerbate the use of 
heuristics, and effects of biases.   
This study’s finding that secondary education and forensic confidence were correlated 
points to an avenue of research that has thus far been underexplored in the context of juror 
information processing and decision making. Some researchers’ efforts to educate mock jurors 
on specifics relating to their trial have been unsuccessful in improving juror decision making 
outcomes, and greater intelligence has not been found to improve mock jurors’ recognition of 
bias (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Ehrlinger et al., 2005; Halverson et al., 1997; Simmonsen, 2012; 
West et al., 2012). The benefits of a science-based education have been well documented 
(DeBoer, 2000; Goldman & Smith, 2011; McDermott & Hand, 2015). Findings indicate that 
research into a potential link between formal science-based education and juror evaluation of 
forensic evidence has merit.  
Inconsistencies across past juror decision making research highlight the need to identify 
models and scales that most completely explain juror information processing and behavioural 
outcomes. To that end this study provides further support for the use of Cognitive Experiential 
Self-Theory in explaining juror behaviour while accounting for effects of individual differences, 
and the interaction of emotional and rational information processing (McAuliff et al., 2009; 
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Wiener et al., 2006). The model is being increasingly adopted by researchers in the field of juror 
decision making, and future studies based on Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory will further aid 
to solidify the model as the most comprehensive approach to understanding juror information 
processing and decision making outcomes (Epstein, 2003; Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff et al., 
2009). 
3.11 Limitations of the Study and Considerations for Future Research 
A number of shortcomings limit the generalisability of this study’s findings. The final 
participant pool was predominantly made up of university students, likely to have a better grasp 
of scientific concepts and critical analysis than a more general participant sample. However, 
students have been found to be comparable to non-student samples for the purposes of jury 
simulation research (Bornstein et al., 2017). A notable 120 prospective participants dropped out 
before completion of the study. This was likely due to the study’s length. Although the transcript 
was comparable in length to those in other juror decision making studies (Goodman-Delahunty 
& Hewson, 2010; Lieberman, 2002), additional forensic evidence, a lengthy questionnaire, and 
the use of several scales resulted in a study longer than the length of time many participants were 
willing to commit. The study was conducted online, further contributing to the likelihood of 
participants being distracted and losing interest before completion. This may also have 
contributed to the lack of statistical significance in analyses of the effects of instruction and 
evidence type on self-reported mental effort and emotional involvement, and highlights the 
importance of succinct research designs, particularly when conducted online. Though the 
findings suggested that jurors may be manipulated to process information more rationally, a lack 
of baseline measures of processing style preference limits the conclusions drawn from the study’s 
results. Future investigations into the effects of emotional and rational information processing, 
juror decision making, and forensic bias would therefore benefit from incorporating a baseline 




1999). The Rational-Experiential Inventory has been used to identify individual differences in 
information processing and behavioural tendencies, allowing researchers to determine if an 
individual is more prone to processing information and making decisions using rational or 
experiential processing modes (Björklund & Bäckström, 2008; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). In future 
research the Rational-Experiential Inventory could allow researchers to capture participants’ 
baseline information processing tendencies, and help provide a clearer picture of how attempted 
manipulation of processing styles might affect juror decision making outcomes.  
In spite of these limitations, this study’s findings build on currently scarce literature 
concerning the effects of different information processing strategies when encountering 
emotionally arousing evidence, and different supplementary materials. The findings echo those 
of past research, suggesting that verdict is linked to confidence in forensic evidence, and that 
mock jurors can be manipulated into overestimating the quality of forensic evidence by 
promoting the use of heuristic over rational information processing. This study’s findings have 
also shown that a potential link between science-based formal education and juror decision 
making merits further investigation. 
The critical role of interactions between emotional and rational information processing 
in juror decision making are increasingly evident (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Edmond, 2015; 
Lecci & Myers, 2009; Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2011). Current 
supplementary materials are ineffective in improving jurors’ comprehension of forensic 
evidence, and recognition of flaws and bias, in some cases have the opposite effect (Daftary-
Kapur et al., 2010; Simmonsen, 2012; Smith et al., 2011). To address this, further research is 
required into how supplementary materials may be adapted to improve juror understanding and 
recognition of flawed evidence. A broader look at science-based education may also provide 
another avenue of exploration in the ongoing quest to improve the reliability and validity of 
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Chapter 4.  
Study 3. Effects of Cognitive Load on Juror Decision Making in the Presence 
of Forensic Bias 
4.1 Abstract 
Forensic and cognitive bias can influence and undermine validity of forensic experts and the 
evidence they present. This is a problem given the increasing use of forensic evidence presented 
to jurors likely ill-equipped to evaluate it. Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory provides a concrete 
framework for understanding juror information processing and decision making. According to 
Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory, jurors’ reliance on heuristics and cognitive biases, such as 
overestimation of forensic experts’ reliability when evaluating information and making 
decisions, is related to whether they process information rationally, or heuristically. Rational 
processing results in more accurate decision making outcomes. One factor contributing to 
whether jurors use rational or emotional processing is cognitive load. Higher cognitive loads 
increase the likelihood of heuristic over rational processing and decision making. The aim of this 
study was to investigate whether cognitive load could account for jurors’ failure to recognise or 
act on flawed forensic evidence. Results indicated that jurors did not differ across low, moderate, 
and high cognitive load conditions, but that gender and forensic bias affected verdict outcomes. 
Implications of findings are discussed. 










Scientific methods used to collect and analyse material evidence to be presented in court 
are generally referred to as forensic science. Advances in the forensic sciences over the last two 
decades have led to its increasingly important role in criminal cases (Edmond, 2015; McQuiston-
Surrett & Saks, 2009; PCAST, 2016). Recent indications that forensic science is far less reliable 
than generally perceived have not stifled the well-documented impact of forensic evidence on 
trial outcomes (Dror et al., 2006; NAS, 2009; PCAST, 2016). Literature has also found that 
despite judges’ lack of specialised knowledge of forensic sciences, they have inadvertently been 
assigned a gatekeeper role regarding admissibility of forensic evidence based on its reliability 
and validity (Gatwoski et al., 2001; McAuliff et al., 2009; PCAST, 2016). However, this has 
been shown to be insufficient in keeping unreliable and flawed forensic evidence out of courts 
(Gatowski et al., 2001; Kovera & McAuliff, 2000; NAS, 2009; PCAST, 2016). This has raised 
questions concerning the role of jurors in separating reliable from unreliable forensic evidence. 
4.3 How Do People Reason? A Dual Processing Approach 
Cognitive psychology literature has shown that judgement and decision making are 
complex. Lay people generally overestimate their ability to reason and solve simple and complex 
problems (Evans, 2008; Toplak et al., 2014). The ability to accurately reason is also affected by 
factors such as stress, emotional involvement, education, and motivation (Hilbert, 2012; Toplak 
et al., 2014). A number of recent studies have investigated lay persons’ scientific reasoning ability 
in relation to forensic evidence. Participants struggled to accurately comprehend forensic expert 
testimony, failed to recognise methodological issues such as missing control groups and sample 
bias, and greatly overestimated their comprehension of forensic evidence (Goodman-Delahunty 
& Hewson, 2010; McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009). Other studies 
have indicated that jurors are able to recognise flaws in forensic evidence, but that such 
recognition does not greatly lower jurors’ estimations of forensic evidence when determining a 




verdict (Edmond, 2015; McAuliff et al., 2009). Since the 1970s a number of models have been 
developed to explain decision making in jurors. The Story Model has been a popular model of 
juror behaviour due in part to its simplicity (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). However dual 
processing models of information processing provide a more current and comprehensive 
theoretical framework for understanding the cognitive processes contributing to findings of 
current juror decision making literature (Epstein, 2003; Evans, 2008; McAuliff et al., 2009). 
4.3.1 Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory 
Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory is derived from Chaiken’s (1980, 1987) Heuristic-
Systematic Model (Epstein, 2003). The theory has previously been used in juror decision making 
research to highlight the effect of cognitive biases on decision making (Lieberman, 2002; 
McAuliff et al., 2009). It proposes that individuals process information in one of two modes: a 
conscious rational mode, involving highly effortful cognitive activity and logical processing of 
information, and an unconscious experiential (emotional) mode, involving fewer cognitive 
resources, and a higher reliance on mental shortcuts and heuristic processing (Epstein, 2003; 
Lieberman, 2002).  
According to Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory, the two most important factors to 
influence the use of rational or experiential processing are an individual’s level of motivation and 
ability (Epstein, 2003; McAuliff et al., 2009). Personal relevance, personal beliefs, and one’s 
desire to engage in cognitively engaging tasks have been linked to one’s motivation to process 
information rationally or experientially. Factors associated with one’s ability to process 
information rationally rather than experientially include complexity of the information, one’s 
cognitive capacity, attention, and prior knowledge (Epstein, 2003; McAuliff et al., 2009). Lower 
motivation or ability result in an individual more likely to engage in experiential processing when 




McAuliff et al., 2009). One subject that encompasses several factors linked to information 
processing ability is cognitive load. 
4.3.1.1 Cognitive Load 
Cognitive load refers to the amount of cognitive effort exerted relative to one’s cognitive 
capacity. The more challenging a mental task, the greater the cognitive load on an individual 
(Kleider et al., 2012; Levinson, 2007; Sweller, 1994). It has been shown that lay people burdened 
with a greater cognitive load are more prone to making errors in reasoning tasks (Levinson, 2007; 
Sweller, 1994). High cognitive load has also been linked to a greater likelihood of biased decision 
making, and the use of heuristics (Kleider et al., 2012; Levinson, 2007). Studies have looked at 
the effects of cognitive load on juror decision making and racial bias. Mock jurors who completed 
cognitively taxing tasks before rendering verdicts were more likely to find black defendants and 
not white defendants guilty when accused of the same crime (Kleider et al., 2012; Levinson, 
2007). Kleider et al. (2012) argued that the substantial restriction on cognitive resources due to 
high cognitive loads suppressed mock jurors’ ability to dismiss racial prejudices and stereotypes. 
The indirect effects of cognitive load imposed by jury directions and expert evidence have also 
been examined. 
4.3.1.1.1 Cognitive Load in the Courtroom  
McKimmie et al. (2013) conducted a series of studies demonstrating a link between 
extralegal factors and cognitive load, finding that mock jurors committed greater cognitive 
resources to encoding features of a female defendant incongruent with offender stereotypes, with 
jurors less able to recall expert witness testimony when presented with a counter-stereotypical 
(female) rather than a stereotypical (male) defendant. Ede and Goodman-Delahunty (2013) 
examined the effects of different instructional elements on mock jurors’ cognitive load and how 
these related to verdicts. Findings indicated that instructional elements had an effect on cognitive 




load, and that mock jurors rendering a guilty verdict experienced greater cognitive load. 
However, instructional element did not predict verdict choice, highlighting a knowledge gap in 
the literature on the link between cognitive load and juror decision making that merits further 
investigation (Ede & Goodman-Delahunty, 2013). Though the effects of cognitive load on jurors’ 
processing of forensic evidence have not been directly investigated, the role of biases in juror 
decision making have been explored. 
4.4 Juror Biases and Forensic Evidence 
Aspects of a trial not relevant to the jurors’ task of objectively evaluating evidence and 
rendering a verdict can bias jurors’ decision making. Age, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, and 
attractiveness of the defendant and victim have been shown to influence verdicts (Kleider et al., 
2012; Lieberman, 2002). The nature and description of the crime, crime scenes, and evidence 
can also influence juror decision making, often favouring the prosecution (Lieberman, 2002; 
McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009). The effects of such extralegal factors highlight how personal 
motivations influence juror behaviour (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Lieberman, 2002). These 
effects were found to be more pronounced when jurors were burdened by a greater cognitive 
load, highlighting the link between rational and emotional information processing (Kleider et al., 
2012; Levinson, 2007). Literature on the effects of biases on jurors’ interpretation of potentially 
flawed forensic evidence has raised concerns. Tools have been developed to help assess the 
likelihood of jurors misinterpreting evidence due to bias.  
4.4.1 The Forensic Evidence Evaluation Bias Scale 
Pre-trial bias has become a growing challenge given the need for impartial juries to sit on 
criminal proceedings (Hope et al., 2004). This has presented a further challenge given jurors’ use 
of heuristics in evaluating forensic evidence (Edmond, 2015; Lieberman, 2002). Smith and Bull 




scale has been used to reliably determine jurors’ pre-trial attitudes toward forensic evidence, and 
predict the perceived strength of forensic evidence presented at trial. Smith and Bull (2012) found 
that mock jurors who reported higher pre-trial confidence in forensic evidence were more likely 
to find a defendant guilty due to overestimating the reliability of weak forensic evidence. The 
Forensic Evidence Evaluation Bias Scale was found to significantly, though only low to 
moderately, correlate with the well-established Juror Bias Scale (Kassin & Wristsman, 1983), 
which is commonly used to evaluate jurors’ pre-trial bias as a result of individual differences. A 
more recently developed tool concerned with capturing jurors’ confidence in forensic evidence 
presented at trial is the Forensic Confidence Scale (McAuliff et al., 2009).  
4.4.2 The Forensic Confidence Scale 
The Forensic Confidence Scale was developed by McAuliff et al. (2009). The scale was 
used to evaluate mock jurors’ perceptions of forensic evidence quality and credibility. McAuliff 
et al. (2009) found forensic evidence ratings to be positively correlated with mock jurors’ 
verdicts. The Forensic Confidence Scale was also used to show that most jurors failed to 
recognise flaws in forensic evidence, with authors suggesting a link between cognitive effort and 
recognition of flawed forensic evidence (McAuliff et al., 2009). The use of the Forensic 
Confidence Scale in conjunction with the Forensic Evidence Evaluation Bias Scale theoretically 
allows for a relationship between pre-trial forensic bias and jurors’ perceptions of forensic 
evidence, if any, to be reliably captured. As suggested by McAuliff et al. (2009), the use of the 
Forensic Confidence Scale may also aid in confirming a relationship between cognitive load, 
jurors’ perceptions of forensic evidence, and verdict outcomes. 
4.5 Summary 
The reliability of forensic evidence has recently come under scrutiny. Lay persons’ 
perceptions of forensic evidence are, in light of this, unusually positive (Goodman-Delahunty & 




Hewson, 2010; McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009). According to 
Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory, this is likely due to jurors’ use of heuristics in evaluating 
forensic evidence at trial (Epstein, 2003; Lieberman, 2002). The use of heuristics and biases such 
as prejudices related to demographic characteristics of defendant or victim have been linked to 
cognitive load (Kleider et al., 2012; Levinson, 2007). This study sought to find a similar link 
between cognitive load, forensic bias, and overestimation of flawed forensic evidence. 
To test this, a trial stimulus partly derived from a sample transcript available via the 
Courts Administration Authority of South Australia (n.d.) was designed. Participants were 
randomly assigned to low, moderate, or high cognitive load conditions. Those in the high load 
condition were tasked with reviewing every component of the testimony and all evidence at the 
conclusion of each of four testimonies, whereas those in the moderate load condition only 
reviewed the most recent evidence and testimony, and those in the low load condition did not 
review testimony. The trial stimulus was designed to favour the defence with clearly biased 
witnesses, and highly questionable forensic evidence due to a seemingly biased forensic expert. 
The study also sought to replicate the purported effects of cognitive load on extralegal factors, in 
this case, the effect of participant gender on verdict, by using a trial stimulus in which the male 
defendant was accused of stalking his ex-girlfriend.  
To enhance gender effects, the forensic expert and lawyer for the prosecution were also 
made female. McKimmie et al. (2004) investigated the influence of expert witness gender on the 
perceived impact of their testimony, findings indicating that an expert witness was less persuasive 
when gender was not consistent with the stereotypical gender associated with a particular case 
domain. Neal (2014) reviewed a comprehensive body of literature on women’s participation in 
the legal system as expert witnesses. Male expert witnesses were found to have an advantage of 




exacerbate gender differences in favour of males. Such findings have come to notably influence 
trial strategy, particularly in the United States (Freckelton et al., 2016; McKimmie et al., 2004; 
Neal, 2014).  
Participants were tasked with rendering a verdict, but also provided a likelihood of guilt 
estimate on a scale from 0 to 100. The use of likelihood of guilt estimates is widespread in juror 
decision making literature, and has for some researchers offered a more insightful indicator of 
changes in juror behaviour (Dhami, 2008; McAuliff et al., 2009).  
It was hypothesised that cognitive load would be linked to jurors’ reported confidence in 
forensic evidence, and that jurors forced to process more information, thereby accumulating a 
greater cognitive load, would overestimate the strength of flawed forensic evidence. It was also 
hypothesised that jurors with a higher cognitive load would be more likely to render guilty 
verdicts than jurors with a lower cognitive load, due to their greater confidence in the flawed 
forensic evidence. It was further hypothesised that participants in the moderate and high load 
conditions would also report greater likelihood of guilt estimates. Finally, it was hypothesised 
that female participants would be more likely to find the defendant guilty than their male 
counterparts, and that female participants in the moderate and high cognitive load conditions 
were more likely to find the defendant guilty than females in the low load condition.  
However, to accurately determine the effects of cognitive load on juror behaviour, it 
seemed important to determine whether the proposed manipulation was effective in imposing 
differing levels of cognitive load on participants.  Though self-report is a common measure of 
cognitive load, an investigation into how reliably cognitive load can be manipulated in mock 
jurors would present an invaluable contribution to the limited literature on jurors’ cognitive load 
and decision making (Kleider et al., 2012; Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; 
McAuliff et al., 2009).  




To do this, the transcript derived from the Courts Administration Authority of South 
Australia (n.d.) was employed, with participants randomly assigned to study conditions as 
intended for the main study. Participants were, prior to reading the trial transcript, presented with 
a number of words selected from the Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW) word list 
(Bradley & Lang, 1999; Clevinger, 2014) to memorise. The memorisation task is a source of 
cognitive load, and also serves to assess if study length, rather than cognitive load, is the cause 
of a decline in jurors’ information processing. Participants were then tasked with reading the 
transcript, with those in moderate and high cognitive load conditions prompted to review some 
or all testimony at regular intervals. After each block of testimony, and review, all participants 
completed multiple choice questions, and were asked to list the words displayed prior to the 
transcript. At the conclusion of the transcript, participants were also asked to report mental effort. 
The design was derived from Clevinger (2014), in which it was used to demonstrate that higher 
cognitive load negatively affected accuracy on reading comprehension tasks. Reading 
comprehension may not always play an important role in the court room, or relate to jurors’ 
ability to accurately process information and make decisions during a real trial. However, the 
written nature of mock trials predominantly used in juror behaviour research points to reading 
comprehension as a reliable indicator of attention, and for the purposes of this study, jurors’ 








4.6 Experiment 1 
4.6.1 Method 
4.6.2 Participants 
Two hundred participants were recruited using online advertising, and the University of 
Adelaide’s RPS. Informed consent was obtained immediately prior to participation in the study. 
Participants were excluded if not between the ages of 18 and 80, not an Australian citizen, or had 
a law degree, to address jury eligibility. The final sample consisted of 192 participants (42 male, 
149 female). This study was approved by the University of Adelaide’s School of Psychology 
Human Research Ethics Sub Committee (code number: 17/02).     
4.6.3 Dependent Measures 
4.6.3.1 Stimulus Materials  
4.6.3.1.1 Word Memorisation Task. After completing demographic questions, all 
participants were shown five bi-syllabic, low arousal, neutral words from the ANEW word list 
(Bradley & Lang, 1999; Clevinger, 2014). These were shown one at a time, for a duration of 
five seconds. Participants were asked not to write these words down, but instead attempt to 
memorise them as best as they could. At four instances throughout the trial transcript, 
participants were asked to recall as many of these words as they could recall, in no particular 
order. Clevinger (2014) employed this method to demonstrate the effects of cognitive load on 
accuracy in reading comprehension tasks. 
4.6.3.1.2 Trial Transcript. Participants were presented with an 11-page summary of a 
simulated criminal case (Appendix M) in which it was alleged that the defendant unlawfully 
stalked his ex-girlfriend over a 12-month period. The transcript was partly derived from a 
sample transcript available via the Courts Administration Authority of South Australia (n.d.) 
(Appendix N). Significant portions of the transcript were modified so that participants would 




be unlikely to recognise the original transcript if they had previously come across it, and to 
ensure that the transcript suited the study’s purpose.  
The witness testimonies used in this trial transcript revealed, under cross-examination, 
that witnesses maintained a high degree of unreliability, and bias. This ensured that the forensic 
evidence, in the case of the simulated trial being pattern evidence in the form of CCTV footage 
and image comparison performed by a forensic expert using a range of forensic techniques, was 
an important factor establishing the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
examination of the forensic evidence was preceded by information on forensic CCTV footage 
and image comparison by the forensic expert, outlining some strengths and shortcomings of the 
various procedures, as well as technical aspects of the process, implications regarding the law, 
and how the analysis had come to conclude that the defendant had appeared to be stalking the 
victim at her property. This was followed by a cross-examination, during which the forensic 
expert admitted that there was some uncertainty regarding the conclusions drawn by the expert, 
and that the forensic expert also was aware of details concerning the investigation. The expert 
was purposefully made out to appear biased in her analyses and evaluations of the forensic 
evidence, and made a number of assumptions and claims that suggested the expert was in favour 
of finding the defendant guilty. The trial transcript was concluded by the judge’s closing 
statements, and basic judicial instructions. 
The trial simulation consisted of three testimonies, followed by the forensic expert’s 
testimony. After each testimony, participants in the moderate cognitive load condition were 
presented with the testimony they had just read, for the purposes of reviewing the testimony a 
second time. Participants in the high cognitive load condition were instead required to review all 
evidence and testimony presented up to that point in the trial. Participants in the low load 




completed several multiple-choice questions concerning the information they had just read, 
before being tasked with listing as many words as they could recall of those shown to them prior 
to the trial transcript presentation.   
4.6.3.1.3 Questionnaire. Participants were tasked with completing a brief questionnaire 
at the conclusion of the trial. The first section contained one question asking jurors to present 
a verdict by selecting guilty or not guilty. The second section of the questionnaire asked 
participants to report their levels of motivation, their emotional involvement, and finally the 
mental effort required to complete the study, using 5-point Likert scales. 
4.6.4 Design  
An experimental between-groups design was employed for the purposes of this study. 
Study condition was the independent variable with three levels, those being low cognitive load 
(trial stimulus without review of testimony), moderate cognitive load (trial stimulus material with 
review of most recent testimony), and high cognitive load (trial stimulus material and review of 
all evidence presented up to that point). Dependent variables were level of accuracy on multiple 
choice questions, word recall scores, and self-reported mental effort.  
4.6.5 Procedure 
The methods employed in recruiting participants for this study included online 
advertising, word of mouth and flyer distribution at the University of Adelaide, North Terrace 
campus, and the University of Adelaide’s RPS. Qualtrics online survey software was employed 
for the purpose of hosting the experiment online. Participants who followed the appropriate link 
to the study were presented with participant information, and an instruction page, tasking them 
with reading a trial transcript, following instructions throughout, and then completing a final 
questionnaire. Before the transcript, participants were required to complete demographic 
questions, ensuring participant eligibility.  




After completion of demographic questions, participants were shown five words to 
memorise, one at a time, for the purposes of the word memory task, before proceeding with the 
reading of the mock trial in the form of an 11-page transcript.  
  The trial stimulus included testimonies from the victim, a friend of the victim, and the 
accused. Those testimonies were followed by a section on CCTV footage and image 
reconstruction, including the forensic science behind image reconstruction, and the relationship 
of such forensic evidence with the law. A forensic expert then presented CCTV footage and 
image reconstruction relevant to the case. The trial transcript concluded with a cross-examination 
of the forensic expert, lawyers’ closing statements, and final remarks by the judge. Participants 
in the moderate load condition were, after each testimony, provided with the testimony they had 
just read, and prompted to review it. Participants in high cognitive load condition were, after each 
testimony, provided with all of the testimony that had been presented so far, and prompted to 
review it, while those in the low cognitive load condition were not asked to review testimony. 
All participants then answered a set of multiple choice questions about the transcript’s content, 
and listed as many of the words shown at the beginning of the experiment as they could recall, 
in no particular order 
At the conclusion of the trial, a brief questionnaire with two sections was completed by 
all participants. The first section required participants to provide a final verdict of guilty or not 
guilty. The second section prompted participants to indicate their motivation to complete the 
study, their emotional involvement, and the mental effort required to complete the study.  
4.6.6 Data Screening 
 Data for 192 participants was entered into SPSS Version 20 and screened for normality 
and skewness. Data from 11 participants was incomplete, and consequently removed. The final 




distributed, with skewness of 4.17 (SE = 0.18) as participants included a large cohort of first year 
psychology students. More females than males participated in the study, as is common for studies 
involving voluntary participation (Lobato et al., 2014). 
4.7 Results 
4.7.1 Word Memorisation Task 
A Oneway ANOVA was conducted to determine if study condition had an effect on 
participants’ word memorisation scores after the first testimony. It was not significant, 
F(2,178) = .034, p = .967, η2 < .01. A Oneway ANOVA was also conducted to determine if study 
condition had an effect on participants’ word memorisation scores after the final testimony. It 
was again not significant, F(2,178) = .766, p = .466, η2 = .08.  
Results indicate that the variation in length of reading tasks across conditions did not have 
an effect on participants’ ability to recall information they were asked to memorise.  
4.7.2 Reading Comprehension Task 
A Oneway ANOVA was conducted to determine if study condition had an effect on 
participants’ reading comprehension scores after the first testimony. It was not significant, 
F(2,178) = .328, p = .721, η2 < .01. A Oneway ANOVA was also conducted to determine if study 
condition had an effect on participants’ word memorisation scores after the final testimony. It 
was significant, F(2,178) = 12.048, p < .001, η2 = .12. A final Oneway ANOVA was conducted 
to determine if study condition had an effect on participants’ total reading comprehension scores. 
It was significant, F(2,178) = 5.447, p = .005, η2 = .05. 
LSD Post hoc comparisons revealed that participants in the low cognitive load condition 
performed significantly better on the reading comprehension task after the final testimony 
(M = 2.50, SD = 0.9, 95% CI [2.26, 2.72]) than those in the moderate (M = 2.1, SD = 0.6, 




95% CI [1.95, 2.29]) and high cognitive load conditions (M = 1.8, SD = 0.8, 95% CI [1.61, 2.00]). 
The difference between the moderate and high cognitive load conditions was also significant. 
Further LSD Post hoc comparisons indicated that participants in the low cognitive load condition 
recorded significantly better total reading comprehension scores (M = 10.1, SD = 2.1, 
95% CI [9.55, 10.64]) than those in the high cognitive load condition (M = 9.0, SD = 1.85, 
95% CI [8.52, 9.47]). Participants in the moderate cognitive load condition (M = 9.8, SD = 1.7, 
95% CI [9.36, 10.23]) also performed significantly better than those in the high cognitive load 
condition. Differences between participants in low and moderate conditions were not significant.  
 Results indicate that there were no significant differences in memory across conditions, 
despite varying study lengths. Participants in moderate and high cognitive load conditions 
performed significantly worse on the reading comprehension task, indicating that information 
processing ability was successfully manipulated. Findings therefore support the study’s cognitive 
load manipulation for purposes of the main experiment. 
4.8 Experiment 2 
4.8.1 Method 
4.8.2 Participants 
Two hundred and sixty-three participants were recruited via flyers, online advertising, 
word of mouth, and the University of Adelaide’s RPS. Participants provided informed consent 
prior to participation in the study. As in Experiment 1, participants were excluded if not jury 
eligible in South Australia. Two hundred and fifty-one participants (74 male, 177 female) made 
up the final participant sample. This study received ethics approval from the University of 





4.8.3 Dependent Measures 
4.8.3.1 Forensic Evidence Evaluation Bias Scale 
Participants were tasked with completing the Forensic Evidence Evaluation Bias Scale 
(Smith & Bull, 2012). The scale has been used to show differences in jurors’ pre-trial perception 
of the strength and reliability of forensic science and evidence. Participants were asked to respond 
to questions using 5-point Likert scales, with answers ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly 
Agree. Possible scores ranged from -20 to 20, with a positive score indicating pre-trial bias in 
favour of forensic science. The shortened 10-item version of the scale employed in this study 
was selected on the basis of Smith and Bull’s (2012) validation of the scale (Appendix L). 
4.8.3.2 Stimulus Materials 
4.8.3.2.1 Trial Transcript. Participants were presented with the 11-page summary of a 
simulated criminal case (Appendix M), partly derived from a sample transcript available via 
the Courts Administration Authority of South Australia (n.d.) (Appendix N), and used in 
Experiment 1. 
The witness testimonies offered the same information as those used in Experiment 1. 
Witnesses were made out to be overtly biased and unreliable, through their use of uncertain 
statements and the revelation of contradictions under cross-examination. This was done to 
emphasise the importance of the forensic evidence and testimony presented after eye- and 
character witness testimonies. All aspects of the forensic evidence and testimony were retained 
from experiment 1. The trial transcript was concluded by the judge’s closing statements, and 
basic judicial instructions. 
The trial simulation consisted of three testimonies, followed by the forensic expert’s 
testimony. After each testimony, participants in the moderate cognitive load condition were 
presented with the testimony they had just read, for the purposes of reviewing the testimony a 




second time. They were then asked to provide a preliminary verdict based on the evidence up 
until that point, by selecting guilty or not guilty, and an estimation of the defendant’s guilt on a 
scale ranging from 0 to 100 (See Appendix O). Participants in the high cognitive load condition 
were instead presented with all of the evidence and testimony presented up to that point in the 
trial, for review, before being tasked with providing a preliminary verdict and estimation of guilt, 
after each testimony. Participants in the low load condition were not required to review any 
information, or provide preliminary verdicts, and instead read through the trial simulation from 
start to finish without interruption.  
4.8.3.2.2 Questionnaire. Participants were tasked with completing a questionnaire 
originally partly derived from Goodman-Delahunty and Hewson (2010), Lieberman (2002), 
and McAuliff et al. (2009). It consisted of three sections.  
The first section contained one question requiring participants to present a verdict by 
selecting guilty or not guilty, and a question requesting rate their certainty of the suspect’s guilt 
using a scale ranging from 0 to 100.  
4.8.3.2.2.1 Forensic Confidence Scale. Participants completed the Forensic Confidence 
Scale adapted from McAuliff et al. (2009) (Appendix C). The 13 questions on the scale related 
to participants’ opinions concerning the forensic evidence, and the examiner who presented it. 
Participants were asked to respond to questions using 5-point Likert scales, with answers 
ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. One of the questions was not factored into 
the forensic confidence analysis as it asked participants to rate the usefulness of witness 
testimony other than forensic evidence in reaching their verdict. Possible scores ranged from -
24 to 24, with a higher score indicating a greater confidence in the forensic expert, and the 
forensic science and evidence presented during the trial, and a negative score indicating a lack 




followed by an open-ended question that asked participants to report any aspects that they may 
have considered to be a cause for, or consequence of bias, and how this may have affected their 
verdict.  
The third and final section of the questionnaire asked participants to report their levels of 
motivation, their emotional involvement, and finally the mental effort required to complete the 
study, using 5-point Likert scales. 
4.8.4 Design  
An experimental between-groups design was employed for the purposes of this study. 
Study condition was the independent variable with three levels, those being low cognitive load 
(trial stimulus without review of testimony), moderate cognitive load (trial stimulus material with 
review of most recent testimony), and high cognitive load (trial stimulus material and review of 
all evidence presented up to that point). Dependent variables were verdict, degree of guilt, and 
confidence in forensic evidence as determined by the Forensic Confidence Scale. Pre-trial bias 
as recorded via the Forensic Evidence Evaluation Bias Scale was treated as a covariate. 
4.8.5 Procedure 
Participants, recruited via flyers, online advertising, word of mouth, and the University 
of Adelaide’s RPS, were provided a link to the study designed using the Qualtrics online survey 
software. Participants read basic participant information, and an instruction page, before being 
tasked with completing demographic questions, ensuring participant eligibility. All participants 
were then presented and tasked with completing the 10-item version of the Forensic Evidence 
Evaluation Bias Scale (Smith & Bull, 2012).  
Participants then read the 11-page trial transcript. The trial stimulus included three 
witness testimonies, followed by a section on CCTV footage and image reconstruction, including 
the relationship of such forensic evidence with the law. A forensic expert then presented CCTV 




footage and image reconstruction relevant to the case. The trial transcript concluded with a cross-
examination of the forensic expert, lawyers’ closing statements, and final remarks by the judge. 
Participants in the moderate load condition were, after each block of testimony, provided with 
the testimony they had just read, and prompted to review it, before rendering a preliminary 
verdict of guilty or not guilty, and an estimation of the defendant’s guilt on a scale ranging from 
0 to 100. Participants in the high cognitive load condition were, after each block of testimony, 
provided with all of the testimony that had been presented so far, and prompted to review it, 
before also rendering a preliminary verdict, and estimation of the defendant’s guilt.  
A questionnaire with three sections was then completed by all participants. The first 
section required participants to provide a final verdict of guilty or not guilty, and a final 
estimation of guilt using a scale ranging from 0 to 100. The second section contained the Forensic 
Confidence Scale, comprised of 13 Likert-scale questions with reference to participants’ 
confidence in the forensic evidence and examiner, followed by the open-ended, voluntary 
question asking participants to list sources of bias they may have come across during the trial. 
The last section prompted participants to indicate their motivation to complete the study, their 
emotional involvement, and the mental effort required to complete the study.  
4.8.6 Data Screening 
The data from 263 participants was entered into SPSS Version 20 and screened for 
normality Data from 12 participants was either incomplete or indicated that a participant did not 
meet the conditions required to be included, such as Australian citizenship. The final data set, 
after removal of incomplete data and errors, and exclusion of participants who did not meet 







4.9.1 Manipulation Checks 
Age groups had a positive skew of 2.16 (SE = 0.15) due to recruitment at the University 
of Adelaide campus. Participants were predominantly female, as is common in research 
involving voluntary participation (Lobato et al., 2014). See Table 1 for participant characteristics. 











4.9.1.1 Study Condition 
A Oneway ANOVA was conducted to determine if study condition had an effect on 
participants’ self-reported mental effort. Participants across study conditions differed in their 
reported level of mental effort, F(2,248) = 29.726, p < .001, η2 = .19. Post hoc tests revealed that 
participants in the low cognitive load condition reported lower mental effort (M = 2.69, SD = 0.7, 
95% CI [2.54, 2.84]) than those in the moderate load condition (M = 3.25, SD = 1.0, 95% CI 
[3.03, 3.47]), and high load condition (M = 3.68, SD = 0.7, 95% CI [3.53, 3.84]). Differences 
between participants in the moderate and high load conditions were not statistically significant. 
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4.9.1.2 Study Completion Time 
Before examining the effect of study condition on study completion time, outliers were 
removed to account for inaccurate study completion time readings due to participants not 
completing the study in one sitting, and inaccurate or incomplete data.  
A Oneway ANOVA was then conducted to determine if study condition had an effect on 
participants’ study completion time. The ANOVA was significant, F(2,208) = 3.580, p = .03, 
η2 = .03.  
As expected, participants in the low cognitive load condition spent fewer minutes 
completing the study (M = 32.4, SD = 13.7, 95% CI [29.13, 35.60]) than those in the moderate 
load condition (M = 39.5, SD = 20.4, 95% CI [34.75, 44.14]), and those in the high load condition 
(M = 39.2, SD = 18.7, 95% CI [34.53, 43.80]); however there was a very small effect size. Time 
to complete the study did not significantly differ between participants in the moderate and high 
cognitive load conditions. 
4.9.1.3 Pre-Trial Forensic Bias  
The mean pre-trial forensic evaluation bias score was -4 (SD = 4.68), indicating that 
participants were sceptical of forensic science. A Oneway ANOVA was conducted to determine 
whether participants assigned to different conditions differed in their pre-trial bias. It was not 
significant, F(2,248) = 0.548, p = 0.579, η2 < .01. 
4.9.2 Verdict 
4.9.2.1 Study Condition 
A Chi Square Test was conducted to determine if there was a relationship between study 
condition and verdict. There was no significant relationship between study condition and verdict, 





A Chi Square Test found that there was a significant relationship between gender and 
verdict, χ²(1, 251) = 5.9, p = .015 (two-sided). Gender had a small to moderate effect on verdict. 
Only 47.3% of male participants found the defendant guilty, in contrast to 63.8% of female 
participants.  
4.9.2.3 Forensic Confidence  
A Oneway ANOVA was conducted to determine whether participants who differed in 
their forensic confidence would differ in their verdicts. Forensic confidence had a significant 
main effect on verdict, F(1,249) = 51.587, p < .001, η2 = .17. Participants who found the 
defendant guilty reported a greater confidence in the forensic evidence (M = 5.4, SD = 5.5, 
95% CI [4.53, 6.33]) than participants who found the defendant not guilty (M = 0.35, SD = 5.5, 
95% CI [-0.72, 1.42]).  
4.9.3 Likelihood of Guilt   
Participants reported a mean likelihood of guilt of 62.3% (SD = 25.2, 95% CI [59.15, 
65.42]). Given the statistically significant difference in verdicts between males and females, it 
was expected that likelihood of guilt would reflect a similar contrast. A Two Way ANOVA was 
conducted to determine if gender and study condition had an effect on likelihood of guilt 
estimates. Gender did not have a main effect on likelihood of guilt estimates, F(1,245) = 0.025, 
p = 0.87, η2 < .01. Study condition also did not have a main effect on likelihood of guilt estimates, 
F(2,245) = 0.498, p = 0.61, η2 < .01. Finally gender by study condition did not interact to produce 
an effect on likelihood of guilt estimates, F(2,245) = 0.540, p = 0.58, η2 < .01. 
To more accurately determine if cognitive load had an effect likelihood of guilt estimates, 
an ANCOVA was conducted to determine the effect of study condition on likelihood of guilt 




estimates with mental effort as a covariate. The ANCOVA was not significant, F(2,247) = 0.486, 
p = 0.615, η2 < .01. 
4.9.3.1 Forensic Confidence and Likelihood of Guilt 
A linear regression was conducted to determine whether forensic confidence could 
predict likelihood of guilt estimates. It was significant, F(1,249) = 85.71, p < 0.001, R2 = .256. 




      
 
 












Figure 1. Scatterplot illustrating the linear relationship between Juror Likelihood of guilt estimates and 





To evaluate whether cognitive load had an effect on jurors’ forensic confidence, a 
Oneway ANOVA was conducted to determine the effect of study condition on forensic 
confidence. The ANOVA was not significant, F(2,248) = 0.889, p = 0.41. η2 < .01. 
4.9.4 Recognition of Bias 
Participants were asked to report what aspects of the trial they found to have been biased, 
if any. This question was voluntary, and only 154 of 251 participants reported what they felt may 
have been affected or otherwise been a source of bias. Those responses were sorted into one of 
four categories: only eye- and character witnesses were biased, only the forensic expert was 
biased, that everyone was biased, or that everyone was biased but that the forensic expert’s skill 
and experience should and would enable the expert to overcome that bias in their analysis. 
Categories were developed by identifying key terms referencing parties involved in the 
presentation of evidence at trial. These included the expert, eye- and character witnesses, no-one, 
everyone, or that the expert/everyone was biased, but the expert was reliable.   
A Chi Square Test was conducted to determine if there was a relationship between self-
reported recognition of bias and verdict. There was a significant relationship between self-
reported recognition of bias and verdict, χ²(3, 149) = 21.86, p < .001 (two-sided). A higher 
proportion of participants who found the defendant guilty reported that the forensic expert was 
biased but could overcome their bias (25.3%) compared to participants who found the defendant 
not guilty (1.4%). In contrast, a higher proportion of participants who found the defendant not 
guilty reported that all witnesses and the forensic expert had been biased (51.4%) than those who 
found the defendant guilty (26.6%).  
 
 





The aim of the present study was to determine if cognitive load would influence jurors’ 
behaviour, and if manipulation of cognitive load could modify jurors’ recognition of flawed 
forensic evidence, and therefore improve decision making outcomes. The study also sought to 
determine whether gender biases would influence juror behaviour, and if manipulation of 
cognitive load could mitigate the effect of those biases on juror decision making. Previous studies 
have found that cognitive load impairs jurors’ reasoning skills and ability to suppress heuristics 
and prejudices under specific conditions (Kleider 2012; Levinson, 2007).  
4.11 The Effects of Cognitive Load 
Participants in the low cognitive load condition reported taking less time, and requiring 
less mental effort to complete the study than participants in moderate and high load conditions. 
It was expected that participants in the moderate and high cognitive load conditions would be 
more likely to have confidence in clearly flawed forensic evidence, and would therefore be more 
likely to find the defendant guilty. However, participants did not differ in their verdicts across 
conditions. Though participants who found the defendant guilty rated the forensic evidence far 
more highly than those who found the defendant innocent, cognitive load yet again did not have 
a significant effect on forensic evidence ratings. A number of explanations may account for this. 
One reason for these findings may have been the effects of gender biases on juror 
behaviour. Female participants were found to be significantly more likely to render a guilty 
verdict than their male counterparts. Previous literature on gender effects in courtrooms has been 
mixed. Pozzulo et al. (2010) demonstrated that male and female jurors responded differently to 
manipulations of defendant and victim characteristics. Women have also been shown to render 
more guilty verdicts than men in cases involving infant victims, mental illness, elder abuse, and 




Maeder, 2016). Women have also been shown to more readily render verdicts in favour of the 
plaintiff in discrimination cases where the plaintiff was female (Blodorn et al., 2012). Gender 
differences in the context of scientific evidence have scarcely been examined since Kovera et 
al.’s (1999) finding that males but not females were influenced by expert testimony in a hostile 
work environment case. The effects of gender on this study’s outcomes reinforce previous 
findings indicating that gender effects likely require greater consideration when investigating 
juror decision making (Blodorn et al., 2012; Kovera et al., 1999; Pozzulo et al., 2010).  
Further analyses revealed that even when accounting for gender differences, cognitive 
load did not have an effect on verdicts. Similarly, cognitive load did not have an effect on 
likelihood of guilt estimates. Interestingly, likelihood of guilt estimates did not significantly 
differ between males and females, despite a significant relationship between gender and verdict. 
A possible reason for this may be related to how jurors of different genders interpret the verdict 
dichotomy, and likelihood of guilt estimates, when determining guilt. 
4.12 Comparing Verdict and Likelihood of Guilt 
The standard of proof specified for the degree of belief of guilt required before conviction 
in criminal cases is beyond reasonable doubt. Studies have shown that judges interpret reasonable 
doubt at a value of 90% or above (Dhami, 2008; Zander, 2000). Other researchers have found 
that jurors are uncertain and differ in their interpretations of what reasonable doubt entails 
(Reynolds, 2013; Zander, 2000). It has also been shown that jurors lower their probability of guilt 
standards in criminal trial cases relative to judges’ expected values of 90% or greater (Dhami, 
2008; Reynolds, 2013). This effect is magnified when factors such as race, gender, and nature of 
the crime are interpreted by jurors using preconceptions and biases (Reynolds, 2013). In the 
current study, the nature of the crime, and gender of the forensic expert may have biased female 
participants in favour of the forensic evidence, and a guilty verdict. Likelihood of guilt estimates 




were found to be high overall. This lends further support to the theory that gender biases may 
have contributed to the finding of significant differences between male and female verdicts but 
not likelihood of guilt estimates. Interestingly, forensic confidence correlated with verdict, but 
not with gender, indicating two distinct sources of bias. 
Studies have found that mock jurors generally overestimate the strength of forensic 
evidence, and their own ability to comprehend it (Goodman-Delahunty & Hewson, 2010; 
McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009). It has also been found that greater cognitive load prompts use 
of heuristic over rational processing (Kleider et al., 2012; Levinson, 2007). The trial stimulus 
used in this study employed a clearly biased forensic expert who presented questionable findings 
when scrutinised using logic and reason. Yet forensic confidence did not differ across conditions, 
while having a significant effect on verdicts and likelihood of guilt estimates. As forensic 
confidence and gender were not correlated, it is likely that gender and forensic bias had separate 
but significant effects on participant decision making. It is possible that participants reported 
higher forensic confidence in order to justify their verdict selection, though this would not explain 
the linear relationship found between forensic confidence and likelihood of guilt estimates. 
Several explanations come to mind in attempting to account for these findings. 
4.13 Limitations of the Study and Considerations for Future Research 
One explanation would be that participants across conditions did not sufficiently differ in 
cognitive load. Similarly, the findings might be explained if the study did not capture cognitive 
load. Participants in the moderate and high load conditions took longer to complete the study, 
and reported higher mental effort, than those in the low cognitive load condition. Forensic 
confidence also differed across conditions, albeit not significantly. These results suggest that 
there was a difference across conditions, though the magnitude of that difference, particularly 




to the trial stimulus inducing too great a cognitive load in all conditions. If the stimulus material 
was too complex or mentally taxing even without prompting participants to review some or all 
testimony to impose a greater cognitive load, differences in forensic confidence and verdicts 
across conditions would not be as evident as other factors, such as the effect of gender on verdicts. 
This explanation is somewhat supported by significant differences found between low and 
moderate cognitive load conditions, but not moderate and high cognitive load conditions, when 
looking at reported reading time, mental effort, and, to a lesser degree, forensic confidence. The 
effect of gender bias on verdict regardless of cognitive load also indicates that cognitive load 
may have been too great in all conditions, or not sufficiently different from one condition to the 
next. This explanation is also supported by this study’s findings regarding participants’ self-
reported sources of bias. Another potential explanation for the findings in question comes from 
Smith et al.’s (2011) research on juror perceptions of forensic evidence in the courtroom context.  
  Smith et al. (2011) sought to determine whether mock jurors could distinguish between 
strong and weak forensic evidence, and if the context in which that evidence presented would 
have an effect on the ability to make that distinction. Findings indicated that mock jurors 
performed better than expected when no context was provided, reliably recognising weak and 
strong forensic evidence. Interestingly however, mock jurors inflated their estimations of how 
strong the forensic evidence was when presented in a trial context. Furthermore, jurors’ over-
estimation of the objectively weak forensic evidence was greater than that of the objectively 
strong forensic evidence (Smith et al., 2011). The findings suggest that drawing attention to 
forensic evidence, be it through the presentation of evidence in court, or the use of supplementary 
materials, draws attention to forensic evidence inflating jurors’ estimations, even when the 
courtroom presentation or supplementary material are intended to highlight shortcomings of that 
evidence (Smith et al., 2011). These conclusions are supported by this study’s outcomes.  




Within the Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory framework, these findings indicate that 
jurors should theoretically be able to distinguish between weak and strong forensic evidence 
when processing information rationally. However, they also highlight how readily the courtroom 
context, and elements associated with the trial process, may prompt jurors to employ heuristic 
processing, and as a result negatively impact decision making outcomes (Lieberman, 2002; Smith 
et al., 2011). When considering the compounding effects of cognitive load on information 
processing style, it is unsurprising, yet deeply troubling, that the range of methods used in 
attempting to improve juror information processing and decision making have thus far failed, 
particularly with regard to appropriate processing of complex information such as forensic 
evidence (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2011). 
Participants across conditions did not noticeably differ in their self-reported sources of 
bias. Nonetheless a greater proportion of participants in moderate and high cognitive load 
conditions reported that eye-witnesses, but not the forensic evidence and expert, were biased; or 
that the forensic expert’s findings were not compromised by her biases. The proportional 
differences suggest a greater difference between low and moderate cognitive load conditions than 
moderate and high cognitive load conditions. This supports the idea that the difference between 
moderate and high cognitive load conditions were likely not severe enough, and that cognitive 
load was greater than anticipated in all conditions. Another answer for these findings can be 
found in cognitive psychology literature. 
Research shows that people recognise biases in others, but not themselves (Ehrlinger et 
al., 2005). Greater cognitive capacity and education on the subject of biases fail to mitigate the 
bias blind spot effect (Ehrlinger et al., 2005). Participants with forensic bias would therefore be 
expected to report similar levels of bias in eye- and character witnesses as unbiased participants, 




results. Only 154 of 251 participants reported perceived sources of bias. Mandatory reporting of 
perceived biases may have led to more accurate and meaningful results. Participants were also 
not explicitly asked to report their own personal biases, though this may have lent greater support 
to literature on the subject. Nonetheless these findings support the growing number of legal 
experts and researchers who argue for revisiting aspects of the adversarial justice system. 
4.14 Where to from here? Implications for the Adversarial System 
A number of concerns associated with the current justice system have been linked to 
jurors (Brown, 2014; Findley, 2011; Menon, 1995). In response to these issues, there have been 
calls to move away from an adversarial to an inquisitorial justice system (Findley, 2011; 
Grunewald, 2013; Menon, 1995). The adversarial system is characterised by the roles of the 
accuser and the accused in the investigation of a case, and collecting and presenting evidence 
orally before a passive judge, with verdict rendered by a lay jury (DeBarba, 2002; Edmond & 
Vuille, 2014; Grunewald, 2013). The inquisitorial system places responsibility for the 
investigation, prosecution, and trial of the accused in the hands of a neutral party, often a judge 
or judges. Judges take a more proactive role in the investigation and at trial. After examining all 
relevant sources of information and evidence collected prior to the trial, the judge or judges 
prepare a final verdict, often without the involvement of lay jurors (Edmond & Vuille, 2014; 
Findley, 2011; Grunewald, 2013). 
Advocates of the adversarial system have argued that citizens applying common sense to 
determine a verdict is a central component of modern legal conflict resolution, and that individual 
differences in jurors enable them to more effectively approach the search for ‘truth’ and ‘justice’ 
from a multitude of angles (DeBarba, 2002; Edmond & Vuille, 2014; Hodgson, 2010; Menon, 
1995). Yet the adversarial system’s reliability and accuracy has come under increasing scrutiny 
as evidence of a considerable and growing number of wrongful convictions has emerged in recent 




decades (DeBarba, 2002; Edmond & Vuille, 2014; Findley, 2011; Grunewald, 2013; Hodgson, 
2010). The inquisitorial system has generally been considered more effective at minimising 
wrongful convictions, as numerous shortcomings of the adversarial system, including the role of 
the jury, are avoided entirely (Edmond & Vuille, 2014; Findley, 2011; Grunewald, 2013). 
Recently procedural mistakes, unreliable forensic evidence, and institutional tunnel vision have 
been linked to wrongful convictions in Europe, raising doubts over whether the inquisitorial 
system is more successful in mitigating effects of error and bias (Grunewald, 2013).  
Supporters of the adversarial system argue that jurors serve to separate reliable from 
unreliable evidence, thereby rendering more accurate verdicts than could be based on findings of 
police and judicial investigations alone (DeBarba, 2002; Hodgson, 2010). The literature on juror 
behaviour indicates that jurors are more prone to erroneously identifying weak evidence as 
strong, and letting emotions override rational evaluation of testimony (Lieberman, 2002; 
McAuliff et al., 2009). This study’s findings echo this, as gender and overestimation of forensic 
evidence were found to significantly influence juror verdicts. Further research into the effects of 
judicial procedure on juror behaviour is therefore crucial to enable jurors to more effectively 
perform their civic duty, determine the ‘truth’, and render a just verdict. Future investigations 
will also play a critical role in determining whether the use of an inquisitorial or mixed system 

































Literature on juror decision making and forensic bias, has highlighted a pressing need for further 
research into interactions between forensic evidence, juror behaviour, and judicial outcomes. 
Three research projects were conducted in order to explore the use of supplementary materials 
in educating jurors about erroneous forensic evidence, the effects of emotional and rational 
information processing on jurors’ biases when interpreting information, and the role of cognitive 
load in determining juror decision making outcomes. In general, it was found that supplementary 
materials did not enable jurors to more reliably interpret forensic science, or allow jurors to more 
effectively distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ forensic evidence. Results also indicated that 
manipulation of processing style did not deter jurors from processing information heuristically, 
inhibiting jurors’ ability to recognise flawed forensic science and evidence. Finally, it was found 
that differences in cognitive load had some effect on jurors’ processing of information, but that 
extraneous factors, including forensic confidence, and gender differences, play a prominent role 
in juror decision making outcomes. Findings, contributions to the literature, and limitations of 
the research are discussed. Implications of these findings, with emphasis on questions raised 
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5.2 Introduction 
The contribution of forensic science to judicial outcomes has never been greater 
(Edmond, 2015; Goodman-Delahunty & Hewson, 2010; McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009). Yet 
literature has shown that forensic science faces a number of challenges, ranging from issues 
relating to the reliability and validity of forensic techniques to questions concerning the effects 
of a range of cognitive biases on forensic examinations, analyses, and comparisons (Dror et al., 
2006; NAS, 2009; PCAST, 2016). Although a notable body of research has contributed to 
ongoing developments in forensic laboratories and within legal procedures to reduce the 
occurrence and impact of erroneous forensic evaluations, “junk” forensic evidence continues to 
be introduced in courtrooms for presentation to lay jurors (Dror et al., 2006; Kassin et al., 2013; 
NAS, 2009; PCAST, 2016). The relationships between weak or flawed forensic evidence, lay 
jurors’ perception of such evidence, and verdict outcomes have, in light of this, been thoroughly 
underexplored (McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009; NAS, 2009; PCAST, 2016; Smith et al., 2011). 
Jurors play a critical role in today’s administration of justice through the court system 
(Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Lieberman, 2002; NAS, 2009; PCAST, 2016). Jurors are presumed 
to be objective truth seekers, tasked with evaluating all testimony and evidence presented at trial 
in an objective, reliable, and rational manner, before rendering life changing decisions 
(Lieberman, 2002; McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009). The literature on juror decision making 
has demonstrated that this is not the case, and that jurors generally overestimate their 
understanding of evidence, and are influenced by their own preconceptions and biases when 
evaluating testimony and evidence (Kleider et al., 2012; Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff et al., 2009; 
Ohtsubo et al., 2004; Pozzulo et al., 2010). The growing complexities associated with trials, 
particularly when involving forensic evidence, have put jurors in an increasingly vulnerable 
position (Goodman-Delahunty & Hewson, 2010; McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; McQuiston-Surrett 
& Saks, 2009). It is therefore evident that further research is needed. Areas of investigation must 




include how jurors process information, how the use of heuristics, preconceptions, and rational 
processing come into play in jurors’ decision making, and how jurors evaluate forensic evidence. 
A greater understanding of these phenomena is critical in seeking to improve the reliability and 
validity of jury verdicts, and improve the confidence and trust in the Australian justice system 
(Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Kleider et al., 2012; Levinson, 2007; Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff et 
al., 2009). Several studies were conducted looking to identify how jurors process information, 
how that processing of information can be manipulated, and what avenues, if any, there are for 
improving jurors’ comprehension of forensic evidence, including inherent flaws, and cognitive 
biases on the part of forensic examiners.  
5.3 Study 1: Forensic Evidence and Juror Decision Making: Can Jurors Recognise Bias in 
Forensic Reports? 
Though juror information processing and decision making has not been extensively 
researched, problems related to jurors’ interpretation of evidence and testimony have been 
acknowledged in literature, and in legal contexts (Magnussen et al., 2014; McAuliff et al., 2009; 
McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009; NAS, 2009; PCAST, 2016; Tran et al., 2011). The primary 
focus of research on juror behaviour has examined how aspects of a trial such as physical 
characteristics of the accused and the victim, circumstances of the crime, and pretrial publicity 
affect jurors’ decision making outcomes (Kleider et al., 2012; Lieberman, 2002). Findings from 
such studies have led to a greater reliance on various supplementary materials (Daftary-Kapur et 
al., 2010; Found & Edmond, 2012; Simmonsen, 2012). 
Supplementary materials in the legal context refer to the provision of information, 
generally in written or oral form, to improve jurors’ comprehension of aspects of a trial not 
considered lay knowledge (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Found & Edmond, 2012; Halverson et 
al., 1997; Shaw & Skolnick, 1995; Simmonsen, 2012). This may include such materials as jury 
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instructions, in-depth explanations of scientific processes, and forensic reports, to help jurors in 
their processing of information encountered over the course of the trial (Daftary-Kapur et al., 
2010; Found & Edmond, 2012; Howes & Kemp, 2017; Simmonsen, 2012). The effectiveness of 
these supplementary materials has been questioned, with several studies indicating that 
supplementary materials do not enhance jurors’ comprehension of information, and at times 
impede it (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Halverson et al., 1997; Simmonsen, 2012). Howes & 
Kemp (2017) argued that low scientific literacy in the western world has led to forensic experts 
using contentious language when expressing findings, so as to convey scientific information to 
non-scientists while retaining objectivity. Howes (2015) made a number of suggestions relating 
to common sources of written miscommunication between forensic experts, law enforcement, 
judges, and jurors, and how to potentially address them. Found and Edmond (2012) went one 
step further, proposing a report format to address issues generally associated with modern 
forensic reports. 
Found and Edmond (2012) sought to improve comprehension of forensic evidence, 
recognition of flawed methods, and bias in forensic experts, by designing a simplified report 
format modelled after reports designed for publication in scientific journals. The proposed format 
would remove a significant amount of jargon and technical language, and focus on elements that 
should enable jurors to comprehend whether evidence was appropriately collected and analysed, 
and if aspects of that process were likely to bias the expert conducting any analyses (Found & 
Edmond, 2012). Though based on research such as the NAS (2009) report and findings from 
McQuiston-Surrett and Saks (2009), no validation of the report format was conducted to support 
Found and Edmond’s (2012) conclusions. In light of previous literature on the ineffectiveness of 
supplementary materials, and jurors’ overestimation of their own understanding of evidence, this 
thesis first sought to determine whether the Found and Edmond (2012) forensic report format 
presented a viable tool for improving juror information processing and decision making with 




regard to forensic evidence (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Halverson et al., 1997; Simmonsen, 
2012).  
5.3.1 Study 1: Findings 
The central aim of the first study was to determine whether the forensic report format 
proposed by Found and Edmond (2012) would enable jurors to more effectively identify weak 
forensic evidence, and bias on the part of the forensic examiner. The study also sought to 
determine whether this would affect verdict outcomes. It was expected that participants provided 
with a forensic report indicating bias would report lower confidence in the forensic evidence than 
participants provided with a forensic report not indicating bias, or participants without a 
supplementary report. No significant differences in verdicts across participant conditions were 
expected, in accordance with previous literature on jurors’ use of supplementary materials, and 
verdict choices (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Simmonsen, 2012). 
Participants reported a significantly lower confidence in the validity of the forensic 
expert’s study when provided with a forensic report indicating bias, rather than a report not 
indicating bias, or no report. This only represented one part of the Forensic Confidence Scale. 
Forensic confidence on the whole was higher in participants provided with a forensic report, 
regardless of content. Furthermore, forensic confidence had a significant effect on verdict and 
likelihood of guilt, as participants provided with a forensic report, regardless of content, were 
significantly more likely to find the defendant guilty.  
5.3.2 Study 1: Limitations of the Research and Contribution to the Literature 
There were a number of shortcomings limiting the generalisability of the first study’s 
findings. Participants were predominantly university students, and therefore do not accurately 
represent a sample of the general population from which jurors may have been drawn, as 
participants may have been more sensitive to methodological flaws related to the forensic 
146   
 
evidence than lay jurors. Contrary to this, Bornstein et al. (2017) found student samples to be 
comparable to non-student samples for the purposes of jury simulation research. There were also 
no direct measures of jurors’ recognition of bias, which may have more effectively informed 
differences in jurors’ recognition of issues with the forensic evidence across conditions. Forensic 
report manipulation was minor, and may have been too subtle. However, findings of significant 
differences across conditions suggest that greater manipulation would likely only amplify 
findings.  
Despite these limitations, the first study presents a number of findings that notably 
contribute to the current body of literature relating to the use of supplementary materials to 
improve jurors’ evaluation of forensic evidence. Firstly, findings support previous research on 
the subject of supplementary materials, by indicating that jurors may recognise weak forensic 
evidence and forensic bias when made very apparent, but do not sufficiently take that recognition 
into account when making decisions (McAuliff et al., 2009; McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009). 
The study’s findings are echoed by Smith et al. (2011) who found that supplementary materials 
and information provided in a courtroom context inflated jurors’ perceptions of forensic evidence 
strength, even when the forensic evidence is flawed. Results also highlight a direct relationship 
between forensic confidence and verdict outcomes, which few previous studies have done 
(McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; McAuliff et al., 2009; McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009).  
This study found that greater confidence in forensic evidence results in a significantly 
greater likelihood of a guilty verdict. On the surface this may not present as an issue. However, 
this study found that confidence in forensic evidence was high even when the evidence was 
clearly flawed, and when supplementary materials were provided indicating that the evidence 
was not reliable. Findings made it clear that the Found & Edmond (2012) forensic report format 
did not improve juror decision making, demonstrating the need for proper validation of any tools 




or methods used to support jurors. This is particularly troubling in light of the fact that weak and 
flawed forensic evidence continues to be introduced in court, despite prominent efforts to address 
issues with forensic evidence at stages prior to the courtroom (Edmond, 2015; NAS, 2009; 
PCAST, 2016). The positive relationship between confidence in forensic evidence and verdict 
outcomes therefore presents an avenue to investigate how jurors’ ability to distinguish between 
strong and weak forensic evidence may be improved by examining the underlying cognitive 
processes that they use during information processing and decision making (Daftary-Kapur et 
al., 2010; Edmond, 2015; Smith et al., 2011). This could increase the reliability and validity of 
verdict outcomes at the hands of jurors in a world where questionable forensic evidence will 
continue to be admitted to court (Edmond, 2015; NAS, 2009; PCAST, 2016). It would also help 
to inform the design of tools and methods to aid jurors in their interpretation of forensic science 
and expert testimony in court. 
To do this, further research into how jurors process forensic evidence, the effects of 
different information processing on verdict outcomes, and how such information processing may 
be influenced to improve jurors’ ability to distinguish between weak and strong forensic 
evidence, with or without supplementary materials, is critical (Edmond, 2015; Howes & Kemp, 
2017; McAuliff et al., 2009). 
5.4 Study 2: Effects of Emotional and Rational Information Processing on Juror Decision 
Making 
It has become increasingly evident that forensic and cognitive biases not only affect 
experts at crime scenes and forensic laboratories, but also judges and jurors in the courtroom 
(Dror et al., 2006; Gatowski et al., 2001; Kassin et al., 2013; Kovera & McAuliff, 2000; McAuliff 
et al., 2009). Yet research into jurors’ ability to recognise and act on recognition of flawed 
forensic evidence has been scarce, with most literature on the subject examining jurors’ own 
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biases and preconceptions without attempting to address how jurors process information 
(Goodman-Delahunty & Hewson, 2010; Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; 
McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009; Wiener et al., 2006). This has been due in part to the popularity 
of several different models of juror information processing and decision making, including the 
story model, the Heuristic-Systematic Model, and Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory (Chaiken, 
1987; Epstein, 2003; Pennington & Hastie, 1991). It therefore seemed prudent to determine 
which of these models would be most suited for research on jurors’ evaluations of forensic 
evidence, and effects on verdict outcomes. 
Review of the literature found that though popular, the story model offered significantly 
less in explaining the cognitive processes underpinning juror information processing and decision 
making than the Heuristic-Systematic Model, and Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory 
(Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff et al., 2009; Olson-Fulero & Fulero, 1997; Spottswood, 2014). Both 
the Heuristic-Systematic Model and Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory propose that jurors 
process information rationally or emotionally, each information processing mode with their own 
strengths and shortcomings (Chaiken, 1987; Epstein, 2003; Kemmelmeier, 2010; Lieberman, 
2002; McAuliff et al., 2009). Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory has been more widely used, 
and distinguishes itself from the Heuristic-Systematic Model by proposing that emotional and 
rational information processing modes are not independent of each other, but interact along a 
continuum (Epstein, 2003; Hample & Richards, 2014; Kemmelmeier, 2010). It has also been 
previously used in juror decision making research, offering a competent and robust model for 
how and why jurors process information differently across different contexts (Lieberman, 2002; 
McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; McAuliff et al., 2009). 
Previous literature using Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory suggested that jurors could 
recognise methodological flaws and problems with evidence when processing information 




rationally, and less so when processing information emotionally (Epstein, 1994, 2003; Epstein & 
Pacini, 1999; Lieberman, 2002). It has also been shown that jurors using emotional processing 
are more prone to the use of heuristics (mental shortcuts in their processing that require fewer 
cognitive resources and offer an alternative interpretation of information when it can’t be 
rationally understood) and as a result more likely to commit errors when encountering 
information which they cannot comprehend (Epstein, 2003; Kemmelmeier, 2010; Lieberman, 
2002). The study therefore sought to determine if information processing modes could be 
manipulated, and if such manipulation could improve jurors’ recognition of flawed forensic 
evidence, and forensic bias. In light of the first study’s findings concerning the Found and 
Edmond (2012) forensic report, this study also sought to assess whether the Found and Edmond 
(2012) report would enable jurors to recognise bias when prompted to process information 
rationally and not emotionally. 
5.4.1 Study 2: Findings 
Unsurprisingly, verdict correlated with likelihood of guilt estimates. Verdict also 
correlated with forensic confidence, supporting the first study’s findings. While these results 
were expected, other results came as a surprise. One such finding was the effect of jury instruction 
manipulation and evidence manipulation on forensic confidence.  
Jury instructions and forensic evidence were manipulated to prompt jurors to process 
information either rationally or emotionally. The forensic evidence and supplementary forensic 
report indicated that the forensic expert had been biased. Manipulation of instructions and 
evidence had a significant effect on jurors’ forensic confidence. Contrary to expectations, jurors 
prompted to process information rationally reported a greater confidence in the forensic evidence 
than those prompted to process information emotionally. Prompting jurors to process information 
rationally may have inadvertently led jurors to overestimate the importance of the forensics in 
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the context of the study, encouraging heuristic interpretations of forensic evidence likely not well 
understood (Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2011). While the Found and 
Edmond (2012) forensic report had no tangible effect on this study’s outcomes, previous findings 
on how the report increased jurors’ confidence in the evidence, regardless of content, supports 
this idea. A virtually unexplored area of juror decision making touched upon in this study 
concerns the role of education in predicting juror information processing and decision making.  
Direct education of jurors has been attempted in the form of jury instructions and other 
supplementary materials, with mixed results (Found and Edmond, 2012; Goodman-Delahunty & 
Hewson, 2010; Simmonsen, 2012). On the other hand the role of jurors’ schooling, including 
secondary and tertiary education, and the impact of scientific literacy on juror information 
processing and decision making has not yet been thoroughly investigated (Edmond, 2015; 
Goodman-Delahunty & Hewson, 2010; Hope et al., 2004). This study’s findings indicated that 
the more science-based subjects a participant completed at the secondary level, the lower their 
confidence in the forensic evidence. Therefore greater scientific literacy may have enabled some 
participants to more effectively and accurately evaluate the intentionally weak evidence 
presented during this study’s mock trial.  
5.4.2 Study 2: Limitations of the Research and Contribution to the Literature 
As with the previous study, there were a number of shortcomings related to the final 
participant pool. Participants were predominantly university students likely to have a greater 
understanding of scientific methods and capacity for critical reflection than lay jurors. Bornstein 
et al.’s (2017) finding that student samples are comparable to non-student samples for the 
purposes of jury simulation research should, however, alleviate some concerns relating to the use 
of university students for mock jurors. A significant portion of prospective participants also failed 
to complete the study, strongly suggesting that the study’s length may have been greater than is 




practical for research of this nature when conducted online. These factors likely had some effect 
on participants’ mental effort, emotional involvement, and recognition of forensic evidence, 
limiting the effectiveness of the manipulation.  
Despite this, the second study contributes to the currently scarce literature on juror 
information processing and decision making with regard to forensic evidence, from a dual 
processing perspective (Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff et al., 2009). This thesis’ first study indicated 
that the Found and Edmond (2012) forensic report may improve jurors’ recognition of flawed 
evidence and effects of forensic bias, but that they are not likely to act on that recognition 
(Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Simmonsen, 2012; Smith et al., 2011). Instead the provision of a 
forensic report is more likely to result in the overestimation of forensic evidence, particularly 
when that evidence is weak (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2011). The thesis’ second 
study builds on results from the first study about the relationship between forensic confidence 
and verdict outcomes, and demonstrates a number of effects related to the interaction between 
the use of one juror information processing mode over another, and evaluation of forensic 
evidence with and without supplementary materials.  
Manipulating jurors’ information processing appeared to affect their forensic confidence, 
though in the opposite direction of that which had been anticipated. Jurors prompted to process 
information rationally reported a greater confidence in the forensic evidence, even when weak. 
This finding lends further support to the literature proposing that drawing attention to forensic 
evidence will inflate jurors’ evaluation of that evidence, even when it is clearly flawed (Daftary-
Kapur et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2011). This study’s findings nonetheless demonstrate that dual 
processing in accordance with Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory can be used to explain juror 
behaviour (Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; McAuliff et al., 2009). This is a crucial 
finding in that it provides a framework for further investigation into how jurors’ information 
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processing may be influenced to enable jurors to distinguish between strong and weak evidence, 
and render more reliable verdicts. This study yet again highlighted a strong relationship between 
forensic confidence and verdict outcomes. The potential benefits of enabling jurors to recognise 
strong and weak forensic evidence and testimony through manipulation of processing style 
cannot be understated, given findings from the NAS (2009) and more recent PCAST (2016) 
reports. The second study also contributes to the literature by way of highlighting the potential 
role of scientific literacy in predicting the reliability of juror decision making. 
Efforts have been made to educate jurors on legal principles, and forensic techniques and 
procedures relevant to evidence presented at trial, with little to no success (Daftary-Kapur et al., 
2010; Simmonsen, 2012; Smith et al., 2011). Surprisingly the role of science-based schooling, 
including secondary and tertiary education, has barely been mentioned in jury information 
processing and decision making literature (Edmond, 2015; Goodman-Delahunty & Hewson, 
2010; Hope et al., 2004). Yet this study’s findings suggest that scientific literacy may notably 
contribute to how effectively jurors recognise strong and weak forensic evidence, including 
issues with methodology, and causes and effects of forensic bias. Future research presents an 
opportunity to develop a more comprehensive understanding of tools jurors may employ to more 
reliably process and act on forensic evidence (Edmond, 2015; Goodman-Delahunty & Hewson, 
2010; Hope et al., 2004). Similarly, the study’s focus on the interaction between emotional and 
rational information processing, and the manipulation of processing modes, highlights the need 
for a more sophisticated approach to how and why jurors’ comprehension and behaviour may be 
manipulated (Kleider et al., 2012; Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff et al., 2009). Using Cognitive 
Experiential Self-Theory, further efforts to identify how manipulating jurors’ information 
processing might enable them to correctly interpret forensic evidence, and render more accurate 
verdicts, are therefore critical to improving the reliability and validity of judicial outcomes given 




that flawed forensic evidence will likely continue to be presented in courtrooms (Lieberman, 
2002; McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; McAuliff et al., 2009; NAS, 2009; PCAST, 2009). 
5.5 Study 3: The Effects of Cognitive Load on Juror Decision Making in the Presence of 
Forensic Bias 
The interaction between juror information processing and weak or flawed forensic 
evidence, and forensic bias, has been thoroughly under-examined (Edmond, 2015; McQuiston-
Surrett & Saks, 2009; Smith et al., 2011). A prominent body of research has comprehensively 
highlighted a number of issues with forensic science, and the fact that weak and flawed forensic 
evidence continues to be admitted in courts (Gatowski et al., 2001; Dror et al., 2006; Kovera & 
McAuliff, 2000; McAuliff et al., 2009; NAS, 2009; PCAST, 2016). Other studies have shown 
that jurors make poor decisions due to preconceptions and personal biases (Goodman-Delahunty 
& Hewson, 2010; McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009). Jurors also 
overestimate their ability to comprehend information presented in court, and do not benefit from 
supplementary materials designed to try and improve information processing and decision 
making (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Simmonsen, 2012). Despite these findings, literature on 
jurors’ comprehension of forensic evidence is scarce, and has had little to no impact on judicial 
procedure (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff et al., 2009; Simmonsen, 
2012).  
Research on juror information processing and decision making in the context of forensic 
evidence has highlighted risks associated with employing lay jurors to make life changing 
decisions on the basis of information they are not equipped to comprehend (Edmond, 2015; 
McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; McAuliff et al., 2009; McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009). 
Supplementary materials do not address jurors’ overestimation of the strength of forensic 
evidence. Instead, materials inadvertently encourage heuristic processing, compromising jurors’ 
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evaluations of forensic evidence (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Goodman-Delahunty & Hewson, 
2010; McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009; Smith et al., 2011). This is an issue due to findings 
pointing to a direct correlation between forensic confidence and verdicts (McQuiston-Surrett & 
Saks, 2009; Smith et al., 2011). In response, researchers have explored alternative approaches to 
investigating cognitive processes underpinning juror information processing and decision 
making. This has led to a shift away from Pennington & Hastie’s (1992) story model, and toward 
more comprehensive and informative dual processing models such as Cognitive Experiential 
Self-Theory (Chaiken, 1980, 1987; Epstein, 2003; McAuliff et al., 2009).  
According to Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory, individuals process information both 
rationally and emotionally. Rational processing involves effortful cognitive activity based on 
logic and reason, whereas emotional processing prioritises “gut” instincts, emotional 
interpretations, and heuristic processing (Epstein, 2003; Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff et al., 2009). 
The use of rational over emotional processing has been linked to a number of factors, including 
motivation, prior knowledge, cognitive capacity, and complexity of information (Epstein, 2003; 
Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff et al., 2009). Studies have found that jurors are able to identify flaws 
in forensic evidence, and forensic bias, when processing information rationally, and are likely to 
overestimate the strength of weak or flawed forensic evidence when processing information 
emotionally (Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff et al., 2009; McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009). Jury 
instructions and other supplementary materials have been ineffective at prompting jurors to 
process rationally rather than emotionally, with some studies indicating that the courtroom 
context likely prompts involuntary emotional processing of information (Daftary-Kapur et al., 
2010; Goodman-Delahunty & Hewson, 2010; McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009; Smith et al., 
2011). It was proposed that cognitive load, referring to the amount of cognitive effort exerted 
relative to one’s cognitive capacity, may be key to identifying how and why jurors process 
information either emotionally or rationally (Kleider et al., 2012; Levinson, 2007; Sweller, 1994). 




The study therefore sought to determine if jurors’ cognitive load could be manipulated, and if 
such a manipulation would have an effect on jurors’ processing of forensic evidence, and 
recognition of forensic bias. It was hypothesised that jurors burdened with a greater cognitive 
load would be more prone to overestimating the strength of flawed forensic evidence, and 
consequently render less reliable verdicts.  
5.5.1 Study 3: Findings 
As in this thesis’ previous research, verdict was not only correlated with likelihood of 
guilt, but also confidence in the forensic evidence. Contrary to expectations, cognitive load did 
not significantly correlate with forensic confidence, or verdicts. The mock transcript featured a 
young man accused of stalking his ex-girlfriend over the course of a year, and was designed to 
elicit mild gender biases to ascertain whether such bias would factor into how cognitive load may 
influence juror information processing and decision making. Surprisingly, gender had a 
significant effect on verdict, with female participants more likely to find the defendant guilty than 
their male counterparts. Despite this, male and female participants did not differ in their 
likelihood of guilt estimations within or across cognitive load conditions. To understand this 
finding, a number of explanations are proposed 
One explanation for these findings may have been jurors’ interpretation of likelihood of 
guilt estimates relative to verdicts. Research on the subject has indicated that jurors’ standards 
for likelihood of guilt estimates before finding someone guilty vary wildly, and are influenced 
by individual difference factors such as gender, race, nature of the crime, and jurors’ 
preconceptions (Dhami, 2008; Reynolds, 2013; Zander, 2000). These studies might explain the 
discrepancy between differences in male and female participants’ verdicts relative to the 
differences in their likelihood of guilt estimates. This would also imply that female participants 
were more likely to process information emotionally; however, forensic confidence did not 
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significantly differ between males and females. Findings indicate that effects of individual 
differences on juror decision making, including the ability to recognise forensic bias, merit 
further investigation. 
5.5.2 Study 3: Limitations of the Research and Contribution to the Literature 
Several factors may have accounted for these results. One such factor is the manipulation 
of cognitive load. Participants in the moderate and high cognitive load conditions took longer to 
complete the study, and reported higher mental effort, than participants in the low cognitive load 
condition, indicating that some manipulation did occur. Participants across cognitive load 
conditions also differed in likelihood of guilt assessments and forensic confidence scores. 
However, these differences were not statistically significant, suggesting that cognitive load in the 
high condition may not have been sufficiently greater than the cognitive load on participants in 
moderate and low conditions.  
Alternatively, the trial stimulus and materials may have induced too significant a 
cognitive load in all conditions to ensure that there would be a noticeable difference in jurors’ 
information processing. This explanation is somewhat supported by previous literature indicating 
that forensic evidence, even when low in complexity, is likely to induce emotional processing of 
information, particularly in the context of a criminal trial (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; 
McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009; Simmonsen, 2012; Smith et al., 2011). The impact of gender 
on juror verdicts also suggests that differences between cognitive load conditions may not have 
been significant enough. Furthermore, jurors’ self-reported recognition of bias hints at the effects 
of cognitive load on bias recognition, with participants in moderate and high cognitive load 
conditions more prone to reporting that witnesses other than the forensic expert were biased, or 
that the forensic expert was immune to bias. Jurors’ self-reported recognition of bias was 




voluntary, and compulsory reporting may have provided a greater insight into the effects of 
cognitive load on jurors’ ability to discern and act on forensic and other biases. 
Despite these minor concerns, this study has produced several findings that notably 
contribute to the literature on juror decision making and forensic bias. Firstly, findings yet again 
stress a relationship between jurors’ forensic confidence and verdict. Though this thesis’ previous 
studies demonstrated a similar link, and some of the current literature alludes to it, the strength 
of that correlation has thus far been under-examined (McAuliff et al., 2009; McQuiston-Surrett 
& Saks, 2009; Smith et al., 2011). Findings also echo those from previous research on the effects 
of individual differences such as gender on jurors’ information processing and decision making, 
and demonstrate how these can be accounted for within the Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory 
framework (Evans, 2008; Kleider et al., 2012; Levinson, 2007; Lieberman, 2002). This study 
was also one of the first to investigate the effects of cognitive load on juror behaviour. As findings 
on the interactions between cognitive load and jurors’ information processing and decision 
making were inconclusive, further research on the subject may present a significant opportunity 
for advancing the understanding of the cognitions underpinning juror behaviour (Kleider et al., 
2012; Levinson, 2007). Confirming a link between cognitive load and juror behaviour could have 
significant practical implications, particularly if a link between load arising from the complexity 
of evidence and processing style can be established.  
Jurors’ information processing and decision making in the context of forensic evidence 
has come under fire in recent years (Blodorn et al., 2012; Edmond, 2015; Goodman-Delahunty 
& Hewson, 2010; Hawkins & Scherr, 2017; Magnussen et al., 2014; McAuliff et al., 2009; 
McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009). It has become increasingly clear that jurors struggle to 
distinguish between weak and strong forensic evidence and testimony (Howes & Kemp, 2017; 
McAuliff et al., 2009; McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009). This mitigates efforts by research and 
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legal bodies to improve the quality of forensic evidence before it makes it into courtrooms 
(Howes & Kemp, 2017; NAS, 2009; PCAST, 2016; Simmonsen, 2012). Findings from this 
thesis’ first and second study suggest that jurors can be made to recognise flawed forensic 
evidence, but that such recognition generally does not influence their estimation of the evidence’s 
strength. If this is at least in part due to cognitive loads placed on jurors sitting through lengthy 
trials and attempting to interpret vast amounts of information, establishing such a link could 
enable reform relating to trial procedure to reduce the mental strain on jurors.  
The literature on elements unduly influencing juror decision making is comprehensive 
(Blodorn et al., 2012; Edmond, 2015; Lieberman, 2002; Pozzulo et al., 2010; Wiener et al., 2006). 
Yet few serious efforts have been made to investigate the effects of cognitive load and fatigue on 
juror information processing and verdict outcomes (Malavanti, 2014; Nievelstein et al., 2013; 
Van Knippenberg et al., 1999). Identifying such a relationship could have significant 
ramifications for trial procedure, and the design and use of supplementary tools and methods to 
aid jurors in more reliably and accurately evaluating forensic evidence and expert testimony 
(Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; Smith et al., 2011). If reducing cognitive load 
coupled with manipulating jurors to process information rationally can increase the likelihood of 
jurors recognising and acting on differences in forensic evidence strength, then significant efforts 
to reduce the strain on jurors at trial should be made. As flawed forensic evidence has, and will 
continue to be introduced in court, the potential benefits of enabling jurors to more reliably 
identify and account for flaws in forensic evidence cannot be overstated (Howes & Kemp, 2017; 
NAS, 2009; PCAST, 2016).     
In light of this, further research into the specific relationship between cognitive load and 
juror decision making will be crucial going forward (Kleider et al., 2012; Malavanti, 2014; 
McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; Van Knippenberg et al., 1999).  Similarly, legal and psychological 




research will require a renewed focus on how the courtroom context and criminal trial process 
affects information processing and decision making, and what changes could be made to address 
this, given that this study’s findings raise questions about the effectiveness of the jury as part of 
the adversarial court system employed in the United States, and Australia (Brown, 2014; 
Edmond, 2015; Findley, 2011; Grunewald, 2013; Smith et al., 2011).  
5.6 Conclusions of the Research: Is there a Problem with the Adversarial System? 
Forensic science and the trial by jury are two central pillars of the current Australian 
criminal justice system. This is cause for some concern in light of the growing body of literature 
on the range of issues relating to forensic science and evidence, and the reliability and validity of 
juror decision making (Kassin et al., 2013; McAuliff et al., 2009; Saks et al., 2003; Smith & Bull, 
2011). The increasing use of forensic science in courts has been of particular interest to 
researchers and academics who have recognised the significant impact of forensic evidence on 
judicial outcomes (Found & Edmond, 2012; Dror et al., 2006; Risinger et al., 2002). The National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS) (2009) report is a prominent example of the efforts being made to 
improve forensic science as a whole, yet also raises questions and concerns regarding the current 
and future role of forensic evidence in courtrooms. 
Forensic science disciplines have made an invaluable contribution to law enforcement 
(Dror et al., 2006; NAS, 2009). However, flawed forensic science analyses have also contributed 
to wrongful convictions (NAS, 2009). Authors of the NAS (2009) report attribute these faulty 
analyses to a number of factors. One such factor relates to the increasingly broad number of 
forensic science disciplines, and how disparities between well established and newly emerging 
disciplines cause issues for standardising practices and funding, particularly when different areas 
of forensic evidence involve vastly different methods and materials (NAS, 2009). This extends 
to issues relating to certification and accreditation, as these are often not mandatory for a forensic 
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scientist to operate, or a forensic laboratory to be run. Another significant source of frustration 
for critics of the forensic sciences relates to issues arising from how forensic evidence is analysed 
and interpreted, both in laboratories and in court (NAS, 2009). 
Forensic science is commonly used in courtrooms to match a sample, in the form of 
evidence, against a target sample, usually the defendant’s fingerprint, hair, or DNA (Edmond et 
al., 2013; Goodman-Delahunty & Hewson, 2010; NAS, 2009; Saks et al., 2003). However, no 
forensic method has been shown to consistently and reliably demonstrate such a comparison, the 
demonstration of which generally relies on a human element in the form of an expert’s 
interpretation (NAS, 2009; Saks et al., 2003). The lack of standardised tools, methods, and 
measures, and the reliance on a central human component across a number of prominent forensic 
disciplines present serious problems which need to be addressed (Dror et al., 2006; NAS, 2009; 
Wells et al., 2013). The PCAST (2016) report found that attempts to improve the state of forensic 
science have not been successful.  
The PCAST (2016) report’s aim was to evaluate current forensic methods in order to 
establish whether they were supported by scientific standards, and to address the need for clarity 
relating to these standards for the validity and reliability of forensic methods. First, seven feature-
comparison methods were evaluated for scientific validity. Though supportive of forensic science 
and methods involving DNA testing, the report outlined the fallibility of other common forensic 
disciplines (PCAST, 2016). In particular, bite-mark analyses, fingerprint analyses, and even 
firearms analyses were found to be highly questionable forensic disciplines prone to effects of 
confirmation and contextual biases, inadequate proficiency testing, and generally subjective 
evaluations of evidence, significantly limiting the reliability and validity of findings stemming 
from such disciplines by scientific standards (PCAST, 2016). Another significant issue that has 




not been addressed is the misrepresentation of forensic science and evidence in courts (PCAST, 
2016). 
The PCAST (2016) report’s review of literature demonstrated that expert witnesses 
consistently overstate the probative value of evidence they present, beyond the scope of what 
relevant science could justify. These include numerous statements of certainty and error rates not 
scientifically defensible. An example provided in the report comes from data taken from the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the FBI, who reviewed more than 3,000 criminal cases 
involving hair analysis evidence and testimony conducted and provided by forensic experts 
employed by the FBI. According to results released in 2015, FBI examiners had provided 
misleading and scientifically invalid testimony in more than 95% of cases where that evidence 
was used to convict the defendant (PCAST, 2016). The report provides a number of 
recommendations echoing those of the NAS (2009) report, almost all of which are aimed at 
improving laboratory procedures and forensic disciplines through greater adherence to scientific 
standards (PCAST, 2016). In contrast, little feedback is provided in relation to how issues 
associated with forensic evidence ought to be addressed, with all recommendations placing 
greater expectations on judges to play the role of gatekeepers by determining whether forensic 
evidence is sufficiently reliable and valid to be admitted into court. However, previous research 
on the subject has found this to be ineffective in preventing flawed evidence from being 
introduced in court (Gatowski et al., 2001; Kovera & McAuliff, 2000; McAuliff et al., 2009). 
The PCAST (2016) report stresses the range of ongoing issues with forensic science and 
evidence, yet fails to address the role of jurors in identifying and questioning of weak or invalid 
forensic evidence. This is particularly noteworthy given the literature indicating the prevalence 
of such evidence in courts, and this thesis’ findings on jurors’ inability to recognise and evaluate 
flawed forensic science (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Edmond, 2015; Goodman-Delahunty & 
Hewson, 2010; McAuliff et al., 2009). 
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Previous literature has found jurors to be prone to erroneous decision making (Kovera & 
Levett, 2015; Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff & Kovera, 2008). Studies have found that mock jurors 
are influenced by extraneous information such as demographic characteristics of victim and the 
defendant, and descriptions of a crime not relevant to a case (Kleider et al., 2012; Levinson, 2007; 
McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009; Pozzulo et al., 2010). Jurors also overestimate their 
understanding of forensic and other evidence (McAuliff et al., 2009; McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 
2009; Smith et al., 2011). Furthermore, emotional arousal has been linked to heuristic processing 
of forensic evidence and testimony, resulting in jurors’ overestimation of evidence strength 
(Edmond, 2015; Edwards & Bryan, 1997; Krauss et al., 2004; Lieberman, 2002; Wiener et al., 
2006). Though supplementary materials have been proposed to improve juror comprehension, 
information processing, and decision making, the scarce literature on the efficacy of these 
materials suggests that they have little to no impact, with Smith & Bull (2012) even proposing 
that supplementary reports impede jurors’ rational evaluation of forensic evidence (Shaw & 
Skolnick, 1995; Simmonsen, 2012). This thesis’ research has echoed and reinforced these 
previous findings, particularly with regard to jurors’ emotional processing of forensic evidence 
and testimony, and the ineffectiveness of supplementary materials (Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff 
et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2011). Furthermore, this thesis’ study outcomes have strongly supported 
the concept of jurors processing information rationally or emotionally, and that the accuracy and 
reliability of jurors’ information processing and decision making outcomes is influenced by the 
information processing mode they employ (Chaiken, 1980, 1987; Epstein, 2003; Lieberman, 
2002; McAuliff et al., 2009). Findings also indicate that cognitive load, which has scarcely been 
examined in the context of jurors’ processing of forensic evidence and testimony, may explain 
juror decision making, and that reducing jurors’ cognitive load could be key to regulating their 
use of emotional and heuristic over rational information processing (Kleider et al., 2012; 




Levinson, 2007; Sweller, 1994). This raises questions concerning the effectiveness of current 
jury performance evaluation methods.  
The subject of jury competence is not new to legal scholars. Yet an underdeveloped body 
of evidence concerning jurors’ interpretation of forensic science and bias highlights a gap in jury 
performance literature. Judge-jury agreement is often cited as an indicator of jury competence 
(Eisenberg et al., 2005). Eisenberg et al. (2005) examined data from 382 court cases and found 
jurors to be significantly more likely to disagree with a judge’s decision to convict than with a 
judge’s decision to acquit. Local variation in judge-jury agreement rates was found to be high, 
with some data collection sites reporting remarkably low agreement rates of just over 60%, while 
others reported high rates verging on 90%. While Eisenberg et al. (2005) suggest perceived 
evidentiary strength as a contributing factor to judge-jury disagreement, a relationship between 
perceived evidentiary strength and evidence type is not explored. Furthermore, previous research 
has shown judges to lack the prerequisite knowledge to determine the reliability of forensic 
evidence, undermining the presumption of judge-jury agreement as an indicator of jury 
competence in cases involving forensic science (Kovera & Levett, 2015; McAuliff et al., 2009; 
PCAST, 2016). While Hans and Vidmar (2008) found jurors to generally be sound decision 
makers, authors also noted a number of vulnerabilities associated with the jury system, including 
bias in decision making, jurors’ well documented difficulties following legal instructions, and 
concerns relating to the interpretation of complex evidence. In light of this it is clear that jury 
performance evaluation methods may also require revisiting as the growing complexity of 
modern trials presents challenges to jurors not accounted for by traditional evaluation methods 
(Eisenberg et al., 2005; Hans & Eisenberg, 2011; Hans & Vidmar, 2008).  
Further research to corroborate and build on this thesis’ discoveries will play an important 
role in developing the currently limited body of knowledge relating to how jurors process 
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information, and provide invaluable insights into how jurors’ evaluations of forensic evidence 
and testimony may be improved. In addition to work already being conducted to strengthen 
forensic laboratory procedures, such findings will be critical to ensuring the integrity of the jury-
based justice systems going forward.  
Notable publications such as the NAS (2009) review and the PCAST (2016) report on 
forensic science have continued to push for reform in laboratories while neglecting the potential 
benefit of addressing jurors’ comprehensive of forensic evidence. It is therefore concerning, 
although not unexpected, that wrongful convictions due to weak or flawed forensic evidence still 
occur. Calls to explore alternative approaches, such as revisiting fundamental aspects of the 
adversarial system, compared to the increasingly popular, well reputed, and more and more 
widely adopted inquisitorial system, have been on the rise (DeBarba, 2002; Findley, 2011; 
Grunewald, 2013; Hodgson, 2010). 
In a justice system using the adversarial process, the two parties involved in the case, 
generally the accuser and accused, are responsible for any investigations, as well as selection and 
presentation of evidence (DeBarba, 2002; Edmond & Vuille, 2014; Grunewald, 2013). This 
evidence is presented orally at a trial to an impartial judge, and a lay jury tasked with the role of 
weighing up strengths and weaknesses of evidence before rendering a verdict at the conclusion 
of the trial (DeBarba, 2002; Grunewald, 2013). One of the most significant and well documented 
issues with the adversarial system is the imbalance between the two parties in terms of resources 
(Edmond & Vuille, 2014; Findley, 2011; Grunewald, 2013). Most accused individuals have legal 
representation, and are otherwise provided legal counsel (Grunewald, 2013; Hodgson, 2010). On 
the other hand the role of accusation is generally passed onto police, and relevant legal bodies, 
with far greater investigative and legal resources than most accused parties can financially or 




otherwise compete with (Edmond & Vuille, 2014; Findley, 2011; Grunewald, 2013; Hodgson, 
2010). Another glaring problem with the adversarial system stems from its namesake.  
Despite technological advances, improvements in ethical guidelines, and adoption of 
changes in legal procedures, the adversarial process has continued to focus on two opposing 
parties competing with one another to win over the jury, rather than discover the truth (Boudreau 
& McCubbins, 2008; Edmond & Vuille, 2014; Grunewald, 2013). The negative effects of this 
process, including the coaching of witnesses, distortion of information and the way it is presented 
in court, manipulation of fact finders including forensic experts and jurors, and tampering of 
evidence, have been extensively documented (Brown, 2014; Edmond & Vuille, 2014; Findley, 
2011; Grunewald, 2013). In conjunction with the growing body of literature on the pitfalls of 
forensic science and evidence, and jurors’ use of information presented in court when making 
their decisions, the adversarial system seems an increasingly poor choice in the search for truth 
and justice (Brown, 2014; Grunewald, 2013; McAuliff et al., 2009; McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 
2009). The inquisitorial system, while not without fault, addresses a number of these concerns.  
In contrast to the adversarial system, the inquisitorial approach places greater emphasis 
on pre-trial proceedings and investigations than the trial itself (Brown, 2014; Edmond & Vuille, 
2014; Findley, 2011; Grunewald, 2013). Furthermore, contrary to the two parties in question 
being responsible for any investigations, collection and presentation of evidence, and 
representation in court, the inquisitorial system assigns these responsibilities to a neutral element, 
generally a judge or high ranking officer of the law (Edmond & Vuille, 2014; Findley, 2011; 
Grunewald, 2013). This neutral figure is in charge of any and all investigations, evidence 
collection and analysis, and trial procedures, where a judge or panel of judges are expected to 
take a more proactive role in evidence presentation and cross-examination of experts and 
witnesses (Brown, 2014; Edmond & Vuille, 2014; Findley, 2011; Grunewald, 2013). All 
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evidence is converted to a written form, and the resulting dossier is available in full to all parties 
involved (Grunewald, 2013). In some instances, the role of jurors is minimal, as they provide an 
insight into lay peoples’ interpretations of evidence, without determining the outcome of the trial 
(Findley, 2011; Grunewald, 2013). In other instances juries are altogether disregarded 
(Grunewald, 2013). The use of a neutral figure in charge of all aspects of investigative and trial 
proceedings addresses many issues related to human error, bias, and related problems arising 
from the competition inherent in investigations and trials using the adversarial systems (Brown, 
2014; Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Grunewald, 2013). Literature on judge and juror decision 
making has also indicated that judges are significantly more conservative in their estimations of 
guilt, and the strength of particular evidence, as well as their own understanding of evidence 
(McAuliff et al., 2009; McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009; Simmonsen, 2012). In light of this, and 
the increasingly broad body of literature highlighting flaws associated with using jurors in 
modern criminal trials, the inquisitorial system’s focus on a more substantive role of judges in 
investigations, at trial, and in the final outcome, represents a viable alternative to critics of the 
adversarial system’s dependence on lay jurors (Boudreau & McCubbins, 2008; Brown, 2014; 
Edmond & Vuille, 2014; Findley, 2011; Grunewald, 2013). The inquisitorial system is however 
not without its flaws.  
Despite its reputation, the inquisitorial system has recently come under scrutiny in 
Germany after a number of wrongful convictions came to light (Grunewald, 2013). While one 
such conviction came as a result of false accusations in a sexual assault case without physical 
evidence, other instances of wrongful convictions were due to issues common to wrongful 
convictions in the adversarial system, such as flawed or weak forensic evidence, unprofessional 
and unreliable police work, and coerced as well as false confessions (Brown, 2014; Edmond & 
Vuille, 2014; Findley, 2011; Grunewald, 2013). In contrast, false or inaccurate eyewitness 
identifications have not factored into wrongful convictions, and exonerations have not yet been 




based on DNA (Grunewald, 2013). This suggests that the inquisitorial system is more robust than 
the adversarial system, yet faces similar limitations, such as institutional tunnel vision on the part 
of investigators and legal practitioners (Brown, 2014; Edmond & Vuille, 2014; Findley, 2011; 
Grunewald, 2013). This points to entrenched cultural and systemic issues relating to investigative 
and legal beliefs and practices, while also highlighting ongoing challenges associated with the 
increasingly prevalent use of forensic science and evidence (Boudreau & McCubbins, 2008; 
Edmond & Vuille, 2014; Grunewald, 2013; Hodgson, 2010). Yet the focus on pre-trial 
investigations with less emphasis on trial proceedings, and the use of smaller juries with less 
influence over the final outcome, or no juries at all, has evidently reduced, and in some instances 
entirely eliminated issues that come from an adversarial system where opposing parties are 
primarily driven by the need to convince a panel of lay jurors of their version of events, rather 
than seeking out the truth (Brown, 2014; Edmond & Vuille, 2014; Findley, 2011; Grunewald, 
2013). In light of this, as well as the growing body of literature on juror decision making, and 
this thesis’ research findings, several recommendations present themselves.  
5.7 Recommendations for Future Research 
Forensic science has become an integral part of modern law enforcement and legal 
procedure (Edmond, 2013; Edmond et al., 2016; Giannelli, 2010; Goodman-Delahunty & 
Hewson, 2010; NAS, 209; PCAST, 2016). Despite increasingly broad recognition of issues and 
shortcoming associated with the use of forensic evidence, it is likely to only gain greater influence 
as cases become more complex, and advances in science enable investigators to recover 
information and evidence not previously considered (Edmond et al., 2016; Freitag & Found, 
2017; NAS, 2009; PCAST, 2016). The NAS (2009) and PCAST (2016) reports have made 
significant contributions in their summaries of past and current research on the range of factors 
influencing the reliability and validity of forensic evidence collection, analysis, and presentation. 
Though some of the recommendations made in the NAS (2009) and PCAST (2016) reports have 
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been adopted, forensic science and evidence has come under further scrutiny as past miscarriages 
of justice related to flawed forensic evidence have come to light (Giannelli, 2010; NAS, 2009; 
Page et al., 2012; PCAST, 2016; Wells et al., 2013). Fortunately the body of research addressing 
problems with forensic science laboratory procedures has continued to develop, with an 
increasing number of publications proposing clear models for appropriate procedural changes 
within forensic organisations to curb human error rates, including effects of forensic bias (Freitag 
& Found, 2017; Howes, 2015; Howes & Kemp, 2017; Newman et al., 2011; PCAST, 2016; Smit 
et al., 2016). Yet the same cannot be said for research into the link between forensic evidence 
and juror decision making, as researchers have sought to address human error in forensic 
laboratories as a root cause, rather than attempt to counteract the effects of flawed evidence 
entering courtrooms (Freitag & Found, 2017; Howes & Kemp, 2017; PCAST, 2016). 
Unreliable forensic evidence continues to enter courtrooms and influence judicial 
outcomes (Giannelli, 2010; PCAST, 2016; Wells et al., 2013). Though judges have been assigned 
the unofficial role of gatekeepers, research shows that judges lack the prerequisite knowledge to 
consistently determine what scientific evidence should be admitted to court (Gatowski et al., 
2001; Kovera & Levett, 2015; McAuliff et al., 2009; PCAST, 2016). There have been calls to 
revise the adversarial system currently employed in Australia and the United States, in order to 
address investigative issues such as evidence collection and analysis, and problems arising from 
the presentation of flawed evidence to jurors in court (DeBarba, 2002; Edmond & Vuille, 2014; 
Grunewald, 2013). Realistically however, such an overhaul of long-standing and socio-culturally 
ingrained legal practices and procedures is unlikely (DeBarba, 2002; Edmond & Vuille, 2014; 
Grunewald, 2013). Edmond and Vuille (2014) argue that issues relating to forensic evidence and 
testimony are present in adversarial and non-adversarial systems, and that steps required to 
address these are system-specific. As mitigating effects of flawed forensic evidence on judicial 
outcomes is therefore not simply a case of adopting a non-adversarial system, further research 




on how to address effects of bias and human error on evidence presented to jurors, and how jurors 
interpret such evidence, is vital (Edmond & Vuille, 2014; Howes, 2015; Howes & Kemp, 2017; 
PCAST, 2016). One factor that may be key to identifying why some jurors process scientific 
information better than others, and how that gap may be bridged, is scientific literacy (Edmond, 
2015; Howes & Kemp, 2017). 
5.7.1 The Probative Value of Scientific Literacy 
Academics and scholars across legal and psychological domains have, throughout past 
and current research on the miscommunication of forensic evidence, cited scientific literacy as a 
potentially noteworthy predictor of forensic evidence comprehension (Edmond, 2015; McAuliff 
& Kovera, 2008; McAuliff et al., 2009; NAS, 2009; PCAST, 2016; Wheate, 2010). This thesis’ 
findings appear to support this, as jurors with greater scientific literacy reported a lower 
confidence in the forensic evidence and expert in the thesis’ second study. A number of past 
studies have directly investigated jurors’ ability to recognise flaws in scientific evidence, without 
examining potential differences between participants with low and high scientific literacy 
(McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; McAuliff et al., 2009). The NAS (2009) and PCAST (2016) reports 
have also recommended improvement of scientific literacy, albeit with a focus on educating 
judicial elements such as law enforcement, rather than members of a jury.  Efforts to ‘educate’ 
jurors have instead resulted in research aiming to determine the prevalence and effects of the CSI 
effect on juror decision making, and whether dispelling myths about the effectiveness of forensic 
evidence could counteract the supposed damage done by popular film and television falsely 
depicting forensic science (Hawkins & Scherr, 2017; Shelton, 2010; Wheate, 2010). This 
direction however does not address the underlying issue of low scientific literacy in the western 
world (Howes, 2015; Howes & Kemp, 2017). 
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The NAS (2009) and PCAST (2016) reports have pointed to inadequate training and 
education of forensic experts, and members of the legal community and called for more stringent 
requirements, including the development of more comprehensive education and training 
programs. Unfortunately, similar recommendations for the general improvement of scientific 
literacy is likely unreasonable, as the restructuring of Australian secondary education curricula 
is a challenge that the current Australian Government is already facing (Masters, 2016; Treagust 
et al., 2015). A call for further research into the role of scientific literacy in the context of forensic 
science, forensic bias, and juror decision making is warranted, as findings on this subject may 
provide invaluable evidence in support of revisions to jury selection processes, and possibly even 
aforementioned changes to education curricula in order to improve the basic scientific knowledge 
of everyday Australians (Edmond & Vuille, 2014; Howes, 2015; Howes & Kemp, 2017; 
McAuliff et al., 2009; PCAST, 2016). Another area that warrants greater investigation is that of 
cognitive processes underlying juror decision making.  
5.7.2 How Do Jurors Think? Cognitive Load and Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory 
Despite their lack of focus on the subject, the NAS (2009) and PCAST (2016) report 
make it clear that juror decision making in the context of forensic evidence are a cause for 
concern. There is a growing disparity between resources committed to research for improving 
forensic procedures, and research done to determine how to improve juror understanding of 
evidence in court. This is troubling due to questionable and flawed forensic evidence continuing 
to enter courts, where it has been found to noticeably influence judicial outcomes (Giannelli, 
2010; NAS, 2009; Page et al., 2012; PCAST, 2016; Wells et al., 2013). It is clear that 
investigations into juror behaviour, including jurors’ use of scientific evidence when determining 
guilt in criminal trials, have greater merit than thus far attributed to them (Edmond, 2015; 
Hawkins & Scherr, 2017; Kleider et al., 2012). As highlighted by this thesis’ findings, one 
promising direction for juror information processing and decision making research concerns the 




underlying cognitive processes directing juror decision making outcomes (Kovera & Levett, 
2015; Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; McAuliff et al., 2009).  
The question of how jurors process the information they encounter has been at the heart 
of juror behaviour research since it began nearly half a century ago (Diamond & Zeisel, 1975; 
Thomas & Hogue, 1976; Stone, 1969). Yet there have been few significant developments despite 
dramatic changes in the psychological literature and research relating to how people reason, 
including the prominent role of heuristics (Chaiken, 1987; Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Edmond, 
2013; Edwards & Bryan, 1997; Epstein, 2003; Goodman-Delahunty & Hewson, 2010; 
Lieberman, 2002; Toplak et al., 2014). Research conducted as part of this thesis indicates a need 
for the commitment of greater resources toward investigations into how jurors process 
information, and how an understanding of these processes may enable the legal community to 
enhance juror comprehension and decision making (Goodman-Delahunty & Hewson, 2010; 
Kovera & Levett, 2015; Lecci & Meyers, 2009; McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; McAuliff et al., 
2009). As conducted in this thesis, the review of past and current literature should play a crucial 
role in informing approaches taken to investigating juror decision making, as some models and 
paradigms have not aged well, despite still being used by psychologist and legal scholars to 
explain juror behaviour (Edmond, 2013, 2015; Edmond et al., 2016; Kovera & Levett, 2015; 
Wiener et al., 2006).  
This thesis’ findings corroborate previous researchers’ conclusions about the merits of 
using dual processing models of information processing to investigate how jurors evaluate and 
act on forensic evidence (Kleider et al., 2012; Krauss et al., 2004; Levinson, 2007; Lieberman, 
2002; McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; McAuliff et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2011). A renewed focus and 
directing of efforts toward ensuring that this area of research continues to be developed is critical 
to informing future legal theory and practice. Similarly, further research into the cognitive 
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underpinnings of forensic expert, law enforcement, and juror behaviour using methods 
traditionally reserved for clinical and social psychology research should be promoted, and is 
likely to yield insights with practical applications for improving the reliability of law 
administration practices (Busey & Loftus, 2007; Costanzo, 2013; Dror et al., 2006; Giannelli, 
2007, 2010; Kassin et al., 2013; Kleider et al., 2012; Lieberman, 2002; McQuiston-Surrett & 
Saks, 2009; PCAST, 2016; Wells et al., 2013). Such enquiries would also likely support existing 
efforts to improve jurors’ comprehension of forensic evidence, such as Found and Edmond’s 
(2012) forensic report format. This thesis’ research outcomes indicate that the format does not 
improve juror decision making. However, a better understanding of cognitive processes 
underpinning juror information processing could in future enable experts to adapt the report 
format to suit specific audiences. To that end, determining the effectiveness of Found and 
Edmond’s (2012) forensic report format in improving comprehension of evidence by target 
audiences such as opposing or court-appointed experts, and other members of the judiciary, is 
recommended.   
It is clear from the literature that juror decision making is not well understood, and that 
this, in conjunction with flawed forensic evidence, has led to wrongful convictions (Daftary-
Kapur et al., 2010; McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; McAuliff et al., 2009; Simmonsen, 2012). Truly 
committing to delving into the minds of jurors may very well be the key to making significant 
strides toward improving the juror-based justice system (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Edmond, 
2015; Howes, 2015; Kovera & Levett, 2015; McAuliff et al., 2009; Simmonsen, 2012).  
5.8 Summary 
Forensic science has become inseparable from contemporary legal proceedings, and will 
likely only grow in relevance as investigators and court officials come to increasingly rely on 
evidence that can be ascribed a degree of scientific certainty (Edmond, 2015; Howes & Kemp, 




2017; Kassin et al., 2013; PCAST, 2016). Research, and publications such as the NAS (2009) 
and PCAST (2016) reports have established that forensic science is considerably less reliable 
than generally perceived, and that steps should be taken to ensure that the confidence of law 
enforcement, judges, and jurors in forensic evidence is not misplaced (Dror et al., 2006; Edmond 
et al., 2016; Edmond et al., 2013; Giannelli, 2010; Howes & Kemp, 2017; Kassin et al., 2013; 
Wells et al., 2013). One immediate focus of research should be to investigate how jurors use 
forensic evidence in their decision making to achieve practical outcomes for improving the 
integrity of the justice system (Gatowski et al., 2001; Howes, 2015; Howes & Kemp, 2017; 
McAuliff et al., 2009; NAS, 2009; PCAST, 2016). As this thesis has time and again highlighted, 
current knowledge of how jurors process information and make decisions is extremely scarce 
(Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Goodman-Delahunty & Hewson, 2010; Hawkins & Scherr, 2017; 
Kovera & Levett, 2015; Magnussen et al., 2014; McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; McAuliff et al., 
2009; McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009). Many conclusions drawn about the behaviour of 
modern jurors are based on outdated or limited literature, and investigations using more 
contemporary psychological theories of cognition, information processing, decision making, and 
behaviour will be crucial to improving the current body of knowledge (Costanzo, 2013; Daftary-
Kapur et al., 2010; Edmond, 2015; Edwards & Bryan, 1997; Goodman-Delahunty & Hewson, 
2010; Halverson et al., 1997; Kovera & Levett, 2015; Lieberman, 2002; McAuliff et al., 2009; 
Shaw & Skolnick, 1995). Most importantly, renewed efforts to improve understanding of how 
jurors make decisions, in conjunction with ongoing research into how forensic biases may be 
addressed in forensic laboratories, have the potential to greatly improve general confidence in 
the legal system, strengthen the quality of forensic evidence admitted to and presented in courts, 
and dramatically increase the reliability and validity of juror verdicts in a world where forensic 
evidence will more frequently than ever before be the difference between guilt and innocence.  
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Appendix A: Study 1 Trial Transcript 
Please read the following transcript in its entirety. All characters and details of this case are fictitious. 
Any resemblance to real persons, living or dead, and real events, is purely coincidental. You may take 
notes if you wish. If you have any questions please do not hesitate to ask the supervising researcher.  
Crown v Colbert 
 
Judge: Shane Colbert, you are charged that on the 18th day of November 2012, in Rundle Mall, located 
in the city centre of Adelaide in the state of South Australia, you attacked Christopher Bell, causing his 
death, and acting with reckless indifference to human life, or with the intent to kill or inflict grievous 
bodily harm, contrary to section 18 of the Crimes Act. Shane Colbert, how do you plead? 
 
Accused: Not guilty, your Honour. 
 
Judge: Members of the jury, Shane Colbert has been charged with murder. The prosecution will begin 
the trial by outlining their case against Mr Colbert and summarising the evidence of their witnesses. 
The defence will also outline their case in an opening statement. The standard of proof in a criminal 
trial is ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. Therefore, it is the Crown who carries the burden of proof and the 
responsibility for proving the charge against the accused. If, by the end of the evidence, you decide 
that the Crown has not discharged this burden, you must find the accused not guilty. If you are 
convinced that the Crown has discharged this burden, you must find the accused guilty as charged. In 
this trial, you may not ask questions and the evidence cannot be replayed for you. You may take notes 
during the trial, however, you are not required to do so and your notes must not take the place of the 
evidence. The evidence is what you hear from the witnesses, not necessarily what you have recorded 
in your notes. Please do not make any decisions until you have heard all of the evidence in this case. 
At the end of the trial you will be asked to deliberate. You must draw conclusions that are based on 
the facts alone. We will now hear an opening statement from the Crown.  
 
Prosecutor: The Crown alleges that on the 18th of November 2012, between the hours of 1 am and 2 
am, Shane Colbert and Jessica Chamberlain approached Mr Christopher Bell outside the Hotel 
Richmond, located within Rundle Mall, with Shane Colbert intending to recklessly or deliberately inflict 
grievous bodily harm, or to kill Mr Bell. 
 
Christopher Bell used to have a relationship with Jessica Chamberlain, who is now engaged to the 
accused. Mr Bell and Jessica Chamberlain lived together and had a sexual relationship. Six months 
after Jessica Chamberlain separated from Mr James, she became engaged to the accused. Mr Bell 
carried on his life as a successful car sales man. We allege that Jessica Chamberlain had told the 
accused that Mr Bell was a violent man, abusive, a heavy drinker, that even after Jessica Chamberlain 
and the accused were engaged, Mr Bell had threatened her and constantly made threatening and 
abusive phone calls to her as he tried to convince her to leave the accused in order to get back together 
with Mr Bell. We allege that the accused was determined to ‘teach Chris Bell a lesson’. We say that on 
the 18th of November, the accused and Jessica Chamberlain traversed Rundle Mall after having dined 
out at Lemongrass, on Rundle Street. As the accused and Jessica Chamberlain passed outside Hotel 
Richmond, we allege that Shane Colbert recognised and approached Mr Bell. After several moments 
of arguing, Jessica Chamberlain left the altercation, fleeing southbound through Rundle Mall, leaving 
behind Mr Bell and the accused. It is alleged that the accused then maliciously attacked Mr Bell with 
a knife, while Jessica Chamberlain waited by her car, located on Hindley Street. On the 18th of 
November at 2 am, Police, called by Joseph Smithers, arrived to find Chris Bell dead approximately 10 
metres west of the Hotel Richmond, in Rundle Mall. There were found to be 3 stab wounds of varying 
severity on the body and two severe slash wounds to the throat. Mr Bell was murdered, and Shane 
Colbert, the accused, had the opportunity and motive to commit this crime. 
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Judge: We will now hear an opening statement from the defence. 
 
Defence: Good evening. As you have just heard, the Crown has charged Shane Colbert with murder. It 
is true that Shane Colbert’s fiancée, Jessica, used to know Chris Bell and she did have a brief 
relationship with him. She lived with him and she was still in some contact with Chris Bell, even after 
Jessica got engaged to Shane Colbert. It is true that Mr Bell was not happy about Jessica moving out 
and getting engaged to Shane Colbert; Chris Bell constantly called Jessica on her home phone and 
mobile, asking her to leave her fiancée and return to him. This does not, however, make Shane Colbert 
a murderer. In fact, on the night in question, Shane Colbert did not attack Mr Bell. After dining out on 
Rundle Street, Shane Colbert and Jessica Chamberlain passed through Rundle Mall in order to return 
to Jessica’s car. Mr Bell recognised Jessica Chamberlain as Shane Colbert and his fiancée passed Hotel 
Richmond. Mr Bell then approached the couple. At no time, however, did my client, Shane Colbert, 
attack Chris James. Rather, he left the confrontation, leaving Jessica and Mr Bell, and proceeded to 
wait by Jessica’s car, driving his fiancée home after she came from the confrontation. 
 
Judge: Although you will not hear from some witnesses directly, here is a summary of some of the 
evidence in this case: 
 
Prosecution Witness #1: Professor David Manderly, forensic pathologist, testified that ‘there were 3 
stab wounds of varying severity on the body of the victim and two severe slash wounds to the throat. 
The time of death is estimated at somewhere between midnight and 2am on Sunday 18th November 
2012’. 
 
The alleged murder weapon, a switch blade covered in blood, was found approximately 2 meters from 
Chris Bell’s body. It should be noted by the jury that although Fingerprint evidence was collected and 
processed in this case, the results were inconclusive.  
 
Prosecution Witness #2: Joseph Smithers, a witness to the incident testified that ‘a young couple and 
another man were arguing outside Hotel Richmond on the night of the incident. Both parties raised 
their voices as the argument appeared to become more heated. A tall figure stormed off whilst the 
confrontation continued. Moments later, the victim was hunched over, covered in blood, before 
collapsing, as the culprit ran off’. Under cross-examination, Mr Smithers admitted that he could not 
be absolutely certain that it was Shane Colbert who ran off, as lighting conditions were poor, and the 
Hotel Richmond was closed. He also did not see the crime itself being committed.  
 
Prosecution Witness #3: John Watkins testified that as he passed through Rundle Mall on the morning 
of November 18th, after being out drinking with friends, he spotted ‘a man bleeding profusely, sitting 
slouched over near the Hotel Richmond‘ and that he recalled seeing ‘a tall man rapidly pass him from 
the direction of the scene a minute earlier’. Under cross-examination, John Watkins admitted not 
having seen the man’s face, and having been severely intoxicated at the time. 
Judge-led 
 
Judge: I call Dr Eleanor Scrafton, the court’s pattern evidence expert. Please raise your right hand. Do 
you solemnly swear or affirm to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? 
Pattern Evidence expert: I do. 
 
Judge: Please state your full name and occupation. 
 
Pattern Evidence expert: Dr Eleanor Scrafton. I am an independent pattern evidence expert and 
Director of a private forensic laboratory based in Adelaide. 
 




Judge: Please summarise your educational qualifications and background for the jury. 
 
Pattern Evidence expert: I studied forensic science at the University of Sydney, obtained honours and 
then went on to complete a PhD, in which I studied the effects of variable lighting and other conditions 
on the effectiveness of anthropometric facial image comparison using degraded CCTV footage or still 
images. I then spent five years in the United States with a private laboratory specialising in 
anthropometric facial comparison using still images and CCTV. I returned to Australia to establish my 
own laboratory, which analyses still and moving images in support of forensic investigations. 
 
Judge: Dr Scrafton, will you please present your educational material about image comparison that 




Image comparison and anthropometry explained 
 
First, you will be introduced to some of the language used by scientists when discussing forensic image 
comparison evidence in court. Image comparison technology offers a useful tool for identifying people 
when no biological evidence is left at the scene of a crime, and when an image, commonly captured 
via CCTV, presents a clear picture of an individual’s face, and ideally body shape. After pattern 
evidence such as the image comparison presented today in this court, there may be some 
disagreement about its meaning. Pattern evidence should be taken as only one part of all the evidence 
presented.  
 
Anthropometry refers to the comparative study of sizes and proportions of the human body. It can be 
used in certain circumstances to compare an image of a suspect to another image showing the 
offender in the process of committing the crime. Whilst anthropometric comparison does not have 
the same success as fingerprint or DNA identification, it is sometimes the only evidence, and is more 
and more frequently used in today’s courts.  
 
Anthropometry is applied on the basis of a number of important ideas. Firstly, the state and condition 
of bones, bone and facial structure remains largely fixed after an individual is fully grown. Whilst this 
indicates that anthropometry is not very accurate in cases of comparing images of young people, 
assuming time has passed between the capturing of the images, it does imply that facial structure 
stays permanent in adults barring significant injury or surgery. Secondly, there are is an extreme 
diversity with regard to skeletal structure, predominantly in terms of spatial dimensions present in an 
individual as well as their face. The permanence coupled with the extreme diversity present within 
facial bone structures, in terms of the range of scales of sizes and dimension, ensures that one’s face, 
in terms of facial structure, is almost as unique as a fingerprint. Finally, anthropometric measurement 




How is an anthropometric comparison conducted?  
 
The forensic examiner is provided with CCTV or another form of footage, or a still image from such 
footage. The next stage involves the mapping out of facial landmarks, and noting of prominent 
features. The forensic examiner then identifies and conducts a significant number of linear 
measurements, determining distances between different landmarks identified within the image from 
CCTV footage. In cases of no suspect, a facial image database may be employed to try and find a 
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specific match, or alternatively a range of possible matches, from which the forensic examiner would 
select the most accurate image. In cases where there is a suspect, the forensic expert repeats the 
process of identifying landmarks and features, as well as mapping out linear distances between them. 
This then allows the forensic investigator to compare the proportions, locations of landmarks and 
features, and correlations of linear measurements in one image to the other in order to determine 
whether the individual pictured in the picture from CCTV or other footage is the same as the suspect.  
 
 
Facial comparison and the law 
 
The use of pattern evidence comparison with emphasis on facial image comparisons is not particularly 
new, albeit not as old as fingerprint comparison evidence. Identification from photographs or CCTV 
footage is predominantly used in today’s courts in the United States, the United Kingdom, and also 
Australia. Whilst not as accurate as DNA or fingerprinting, facial image comparison is nonetheless 
frequently used in a society where video and other image capturing technology plays an increasingly 
vital part in preventing, as well as recording crime, presenting a vital avenue for the justice system. 
 
Problems with Facial comparison evidence 
 
There are a number of factors to consider when scrutinizing facial image comparison. The quality of 
the footage can have a considerable effect on the reliability and accuracy of any subsequent analysis 
and comparison. Furthermore, any image captured via CCTV or any other device is inevitably affected 
by a wide range of factors including lighting, focal plane, distance to and between objects, the angle 
at which footage was captured, and how footage from CCTV translates into digital formats used during 
analysis. Distance from the incident or culprit may also make anthropometric comparison difficult, if 
not impossible. Whilst a number of image enhancement techniques may serve to mitigate the effects 
of such factors, they may also exacerbate any initial problems with the image, or may cause further 
distortions. That being said, the technology is improving every day, and whilst some images are of 
questionable quality, those used in forensic evidence comparison and admitted to forensic courts are 





Judge: The parties may now examine the witness. The Crown may proceed. 
 
Prosecutor: Dr Scrafton, can you tell me what anthropometric comparison revealed in this case? 
 
Pattern Evidence expert: In this case, I was provided with a photograph of the suspect, which I 
analysed using anthropometric techniques, identifying facial landmarks, linear measurements, and 
several proportions. I was also provided by police investigators with an image from a CCTV camera 
located outside the Hotel Richmond, where the incident occurred. Anthropometric analysis and 
subsequent comparison indicated a very significant degree of similarity between the defendant and 
the image from the CCTV footage. Therefore, I cannot rule out Mr Colbert as a possible source of the 


























Prosecutor: Can you positively identify the accused, Shane Colbert, as the person present in the image 
captured via CCTV outside of the Richmond Hotel? 
 
Pattern Evidence expert: No. At most I can estimate a very high likelihood that the individual in the 
picture is in fact the culprit, and it is my professional opinion that it is highly likely. There is of course 
always possibility that someone with a very similar facial structure may be the person in the footage, 
however in light of other evidence, I deem it unlikely. Furthermore, the anthropometric comparison, 
as presented to the court, speaks for itself, I feel. 
 
Prosecutor: Dr Scrafton, have you consulted on a criminal case before, one involving facial image 
comparison?   
 
Pattern Evidence expert: I personally have done so many times, and my laboratory is regularly 
consulted on such matters. 
 
Prosecutor: Have you ever used anthropometric comparison and been found to have committed an 
error? 
 
Pattern Evidence expert: No. 
 
Prosecutor: Thank you, Dr. Scrafton. 
 
Judge: Are there any questions in cross-examination from the defence? 
 
Defence: Yes, your Honour. Dr Scrafton, you stated before that there is always the possibility of a 
coincidental match. So in this case, is it true, that an individual other than Shane Colbert may have 
been captured by the footage? 
 
Pattern Evidence Expert: It is possible. 
 
Defence: And isn’t it true that the image used in the comparison presented to the court is only 
considered to be of moderate image quality, and that factors such as lighting conditions, restricted to 
lights from the Richmond Hotel, and the angle of the shot may have influenced the image sufficiently 
to make the render the comparison questionable? 
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Pattern Evidence Expert: No, that is not the case. Whilst the image is certainly not of as high a quality 
as it could be, images considered of moderate to low quality are frequently presented as evidence, 
and as part of anthropometric comparison, with high rates of accuracy. Also, whilst lighting and other 
factors certainly influence how an image appears, considerations are made for such factors, and an 
examiner’s experience and expertise generally serves to overcome such issues.  
 
Defence: Dr. Scrafton, would you agree that human error can occur in anthropometric comparison? 
 
Pattern Evidence expert: Yes, that is possible, though forensic experts are trained, hopefully 
sufficiently to overcome this. 
 
Defence: Doctor, would you say that facial profiling is a failsafe procedure? 
 
Pattern Evidence expert: In facial profiling, there is always some risk of human or technical error. It 
cannot be absolutely ruled out that a mistake may occur in the process of facial comparison, either by 
relying on degraded images, insufficient analysis and comparison, or relying on inexperience. 
However, forensic laboratories are accredited and all of the scientists are trained to ensure that the 
chance of that happening is minimised. 
 
Defence: Another question, Doctor. Is it not true that you were aware of some details of the case 
before conducting your analysis? And were you not aware that police had a suspect in custody, as well 
as spoken to persons of interest that had reported seeing the crime occur? And that fingerprints had 
also been lifted from the crime scene? 
 
Pattern Evidence expert: Yes, it is true that I was aware of details of the police investigation, and of 
the fact that police had a suspect in custody, and was evidently provided with a photograph for 
analysis. However this information can help by providing information on the conditions in which 
footage was recorded, and what factors to consider during analysis. 
 
Defence: Yes, thank you Dr Scrafton. 
Judge: Although you will not hear from them tonight, other witnesses in the case gave the following 
evidence: 
 
Defence witness #1: Shane Colbert, the accused, testified that he ‘went out for dinner on Rundle Street 
on the evening of the 17th November’, and then walked down Rundle Mall with his fiancée around 1 
am on the 18th November. He further testified that a confrontation occurred between Jessica 
Chamberlain and Chris Bell, and that he left this confrontation, waiting by the car for his fiancée, 
before driving them home. Under cross-examination, Mr Colbert ‘could not estimate the time that he 
arrived at the car or how long he waited for Jessica Chamberlain.  
 
Defence witness #2: Jessica Chamberlain. Jessica testified that on the night of the 18th of November, 
she and her fiancé walked down Rundle Mall after having gone out for dinner at Lemongrass, on 
Rundle Street. She stated that Chris Bell approached the couple as they passed Hotel Richmond, and 
started an argument, but that the couple did not maintain the conversation, and that Shane Colbert 
first left to go wait by the car, and that Jessica left when Chris Bell became abusive. During cross-
examination she admitted that she could not remember who drove the car on the way home. 
 
Judge: Members of the jury, you have now heard all the relevant and material facts in this case. Now 
it is my obligation to instruct you on the law, after which you will deliberate and arrive at a verdict. 
The defendant has been charged with one count of murder. 
 




In this case, Dr Eleanor Scrafton was called as an expert witness. The expert evidence is before you as 
part of all the evidence to assist you in understanding the facial comparison evidence presented. You 
should bear in mind that if, having given the matter careful consideration, you do not accept the 
evidence of the expert, you do not have to act upon it. 
 
Bear in mind that in the Australian legal system, a defendant is presumed innocent and that the 
burden is on the prosecution to convince you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Shane 
Colbert, committed the crime.  
 
The onus is on the Crown to prove that the accused is guilty of murder and that burden never leaves 
it. It never becomes the responsibility of the accused to prove that he is not guilty or, in this case, to 
prove that someone else committed the murder. Before you convict you must be satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt. If there is a reasonable doubt as to the accused’s guilt, then the accused is entitled 
to the benefit of that doubt. That does not mean that you must be satisfied beyond any doubt 
whatever, if, indeed you can ever be satisfied of anything to that extent. The accused is not entitled 
to the benefit of any whimsical, fanciful, or far-fetched doubt which an agile mind might conjure up. 
Being satisfied beyond reasonable doubt means this—if you regard it as a reasonable possibility that 
someone else murdered Chris Bell, then the accused must be acquitted. If you consider this possibility 
so insubstantial and so remote that no reasonable person would take it into account for a moment, 
then you are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt and the accused must be found guilty. You must now 
decide whether or not the defendant, Shane Colbert, is guilty as charged. 
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Appendix B: Study 1 Forensic Report 
Crown v Colbert, November 2012 
Executive Summary 
Shane Colbert has been charged that on the 18th day of November 2012, he attacked Cristopher Bell, 
causing his death. A member of the South Australia Forensics Laboratory (SAFL) conducted an analysis 
and examination relating to this matter.  
Exhibit(s) submitted for examination: 
Item 1 – One still image picturing the face of the individual who inflicted fatal stab wounds upon the 
victim , low to moderate quality, captured using CCTV, provided by the SAPOL investigative team 
assigned to the case.  
Item 2 – Still image of suspect, provided by the SAPOL investigative team assigned to the case. 
Origin of exhibit(s): 
Item 1 – The provided still image was captured and taken from CCTV footage recorded by a camera 
located outside the Hotel Richmond, on the night and at the time of the incident. The footage indicates 
that the person pictured in the still image caused the death of the victim, Cristopher Bell.  
Item 2 – The image of the suspect was provided to the forensic examiner at the same time as the CCTV 
footage, by the head detective on the SAPOL investigative team assigned to the case. No other images 
were provided.  
Statement of chain of custody of exhibits: 
1. Jeff Backers, authorised representative of SAPOL, took possession of item 1 on the 19th of 
November 2012, and retained custody of item 1, securely stored at SAPOL headquarters in 
accordance with South Australia Police Property Management Practices, until forwarded to 
Dr. Eleanor Scrafton for analysis. 
2. Dr. Eleanor Scrafton, Director of South Australia Forensic Laboratory, took custody of item 1 
and item 2 on the 1st of December, 2012, for the purposes of forensic analysis. When not 
being analysed, exhibits were safely stored at the SA Forensics Laboratory.  
3. Custody of exhibits was given to Jennifer Haighes, forensic evidence management at SAPOL, 
upon completion of analysis by Dr. Scrafton. Exhibits have been stored at SAPOL 
headquarters, and not been accessed since having been submitted to Jennifer Haighes. 
Information that the examiner was provided with: 
Before conducting a forensic analysis, the forensic examiner was informed of details of the case, 
including time, date, and location, and the source of the evidence. Dr. Scrafton was also informed that 
a suspect was in custody, and that eye witnesses to the incident had been approached.  
Qualifications of the forensic examiner, Dr. Eleanor Scrafton: 
 
- Director, South Australia Forensics Laboratory, Australian Federal Police, 2010- Current 
- Assistant Director, Western Regional Crime Laboratory, NY State Police, 2004-2009  
- Ph.D in Forensic Science, University of Sydney, 2000-2003 
Dissertation Title: CCTV image quality: The roles of variable lighting and spatial conditions. 
- Bachelor of Forensic Science (Honours), University of Sydney, 1999 
- Bachelor of Science, University of Sydney, 1995-1998 
 




Methods and materials: 
Item 1 and Item 2 were compared through the use of anthropometric comparison. Anthropometric 
comparison refers to the comparative study of sizes and proportions of the human body. In the case 
of this study, 17 (8 unilateral and 9 bilateral) landmarks were selected for inclusion of anthropometric 
comparison, chosen on the basis of image quality.  
Procedures: 
Using the selected landmarks, a total of 32 linear measurements and 22 proportions were compared. 
Linear measurements and facial proportions were scaled for the purposes of comparison.  
Results: 
 
It was found that 28 of the 32 linear measurements were significantly correlated (p <0.05) within 
acceptable margins of error ( 2mm). 15 of 22 proportions were also found to significantly correlate. 
Comparisons of 3 linear measurements and 5 proportions were deemed inconclusive.  
 
Conclusions:  
The comparison conducted by Dr. Eleanor Scrafton was between a still image from CCTV footage and 
a suspect target image provided by SAPOL. Anthropometric comparison was used to compare faces 
pictured in items provided. Based on anthropometric comparison, the individual pictured in item 1 
shares a very high resemblance to the suspect, pictured in item 2. The moderate to low image quality 
reduced the number of viable linear measurements and proportions used for comparison. Dr. Scrafton 
was also aware of details relating to the case not relevant to the analysis, and a biasing effect cannot 
be discounted. Therefore, whilst findings lend strong support to the hypothesis that the faces depicted 




This statement, consisting of 2 pages signed by me, is true to the best of my knowledge and belief. I 
understand that if this statement is filed in a court for the purposes of a prosecution pursuant to 
Section 104 of the Summary Procedure Act and it is, to my knowledge, false or misleading in a material 
particular, I am guilty of an offence pursuant to provision of the Summary Procedure Act. 
Signed:                                                                                                    Signature witnessed by: 
               Dr. Eleanor Scrafton                                                                      
               Director, South Australia Forensic Lab 
Date: 
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Appendix C: Forensic Confidence Scale 
Forensic Evidence Questions 
Department of Psychology 
The University of Adelaide 
Information Processing and Bias in Juror Decision Making 
 
The following questions are concerning how you felt about the forensic evidence in the trial. For each 
question, indicate how much you agree or disagree by placing an X in the appropriate box. 
 
 
1.  The Expert’s research was based on good scientific principles. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
 
2. The Expert’s study used appropriate techniques for pattern evidence comparison 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
 
3. The Expert’s testimony was helpful in reaching my verdict. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
 
4. My verdict was based on an unbiased and objective assessment of witness testimony and 
evidence. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
5. The Expert’s study was scientifically valid. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
 
6. The Expert did not use appropriate scientific procedures in her study. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
 
7. The findings from the Expert’s study can be used to understand what occurred at the scene of 
the crime at the time of the incident. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
8. The Expert did not use valid methods of image identification and comparison. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
9. Witness testimony and/or forensic evidence was biased, which influenced my verdict.  
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
10. The Expert was unbiased and objective. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 





11. The scientific evidence that I heard in this trial is reliable. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
 
12. Witness testimony was helpful in reaching my verdict. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
 
13. I found that one or more witnesses or pieces of evidence during the trial were biased. 
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Appendix D: Study 1 Participant Questionnaire 
Questionnaire 
Department of Psychology 
The University of Adelaide 
The Role of Forensic Evidence in Juror Decision Making 
 
 
Please read each question carefully before answering. If you have any questions, do not hesitate to 




The following questions relate to the trial about which you have just read. Please read each questions 
carefully, and ask the supervising researcher if clarification is required. You may refer to any notes you 
may have recorded during the reading task. 
 
 




How certain are you of his guilt (place an X anywhere on the line): 
 




Forensic Evidence Questions 
 
The following questions are concerning how you felt about the forensic evidence in the trial. For each 
question, indicate how much you agree or disagree by placing an X in the appropriate box. 
 
 
1.  The Expert’s research was based on good scientific principles. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
 
2. The Expert’s study used appropriate techniques for pattern evidence comparison 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
 
3. The Expert’s testimony was helpful in reaching my verdict. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
 
4. The Expert’s study was scientifically valid. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 





5. The Expert did not use appropriate scientific procedures in her study. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
 
6. The findings from Expert’s study can be used to understand what occurred at the scene of the 
crime at the time of the incident. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
 
7. The Expert did not use valid methods of image identification and comparison. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
 
8. The Expert was unbiased and objective. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
 
9. The scientific evidence that I heard in this trial is reliable. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
 
10. Witness testimony was helpful in reaching my verdict. 
 





General Knowledge Questions 
 
The following questions assess knowledge and general perceptions of forensic science. Please read 
each question carefully, and ask the supervising researcher if clarification is required. You may refer 
to any notes you may have recorded during the reading task. 
 
1. A still image from CCTV footage can be significantly enhanced and cleared up to identify an 
individual (circle one) 
-True 
-False 
-I don’t know 
 
2. Errors in image comparison can occur as a result of (circle one) 
- Errors such as attention deficits, distractions, and erroneous decision-making by the investigator. 
- Bias due to irrelevant knowledge that may result in erroneous identification or evaluation by the 
investigator. 
-Both, technical and cognitive errors may influence accuracy of image comparison. 
-Errors in pattern evidence comparison does not occur 
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-I don’t know  
3. If I just tossed a coin four times and got four heads, the probability of getting a tail when the 
coin is tossed for the fifth time is (circle one) 
-½ 
-Greater than ½ as tails is far more likely this time 
-Less than ½, as I’m obviously on a lucky run 
-⅕, as it is the 5th toss 
-I don’t know 
 
4. An absolute comparison (forensic sample against one suspect) of an image is more accurate 

































I didn’t study any of these  
 
5. Did you or are you studying any of the following subjects at tertiary level? (Please indicate how 
many years) 
Biology                   Years: 
Physics                   Years: 
Chemistry              Years: 
Mathematics         Years: 
Law                          Years: 




I didn’t/don’t study any of these 
6. Which language do you speak most fluently? 
English 
Other (Please specify): 
 
 
7. Past jury duty experience (circle one) 
None 
1 trial 
More than 1 trial 
 






Almost done! Please read the following questions carefully before answering. Place indicate your 
level for each of the following by placing an X in the appropriate box. If you have any questions, do 
not hesitate to ask the supervising researcher. 
 
 
1. My knowledge of facial comparison and research methodology 
 No knowledge  Little knowledge  Some knowledge  Fair knowledge  High knowledge 
 
2. My motivation level during the tasks 
 No motivation  Little motivation  Some motivation  Fair motivation  High motivation 
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Jackson v Fischer 
 
Judge: Jonathan Fischer, you are charged that on the 18th day of November 2010, on Diagonal Road, 
located in the Adelaide suburb of Warradale in the state of South Australia, you lost control of your 
motor vehicle, causing a collision between your vehicle and that of Melanie Jackson, who was in her 
motor vehicle alone at the time, causing her death, and therefore acting and driving with reckless 
indifference to human life, contrary to section 319 of the Crimes Act. Jonathan Fischer, how do you 
plead? 
 
Accused: Not guilty, your Honour. 
 
Judge: Members of the jury, Jonathan Fischer has been charged with reckless driving causing death. 
The prosecution will begin the trial by outlining their case against Mr Fischer and summarising the 
evidence of their witnesses. The defence will also outline their case in an opening statement. The 
standard of proof in a criminal trial is ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. Therefore, it is the Crown who carries 
the burden of proof and the responsibility for proving the charge against the accused. If, by the end 
of the evidence, you decide that the Crown has not discharged this burden, you must find the accused 
not guilty. If you are convinced that the Crown has discharged this burden, you must find the accused 
guilty as charged. In this trial, you may not ask questions and the evidence cannot be replayed for you. 
You may take notes during the trial, however, you are not required to do so and your notes must not 
take the place of the evidence. The evidence is what you hear from the witnesses, not necessarily 
what you have recorded in your notes. Please do not make any decisions until you have heard all of 
the evidence in this case. At the end of the trial you will be asked to deliberate. You must draw 
conclusions that are based on the facts alone. If Jonathan Fischer is found guilty, damages will be 
awarded in reference to claims made by the next of kin of the deceased, Timothy Jackson. We will 
now hear an opening statement from the Crown.  
 
Prosecutor: We allege that on the 18th of November 2010, between the hours of 5 pm and 6 pm, 
Jonathan Fischer recklessly veered his motor vehicle into the oncoming lane on Diagonal Road, located 
in the Adelaide suburb of Warradale, hitting the motor vehicle of the late Melanie Jackson, mother of 
three, who was at the time returning home after grocery shopping by herself. The incident was fatal 
for Melanie Jackson, who succumbed to her injuries in the ambulance transporting her to the Flinders 
Medical Centre.  
 
Jonathan Fischer is 29 years old, and a student at Flinders University. Whilst reportedly a model 
student, we have reason to believe that Jonathan Fischer had a problem with alcohol. Police reports 
indicate that some alcohol was indeed in Jonathan Fischer’s system, albeit below the legal limit. 
Though Jonathan Fischer has had his full license for going on five years, he has previously lost his 
license after a collision with a motor vehicle in 2003, where luckily no one was injured. Forensic 
evidence will be invaluable in highlighting how the motor vehicles collided, and unquestionably prove 
that Jonathan Fischer was at fault, and that his reckless driving caused the death of the late Melanie 
Jackson, mother of three. As this will become more and more evident, you will realize, dear Jury, that 
claims of compensation made by the husband of the late Melanie Jackson, should be awarded in full.  
 
Judge: We will now hear an opening statement from the defence. 
 
Defence: Good evening. As you have just heard, the Crown has charged Jonathan Fischer with murder. 
It is true that Jonathan Fischer was travelling to Flinders University on the night of the 10th of 
November, 2010. It is also true that an accident ensued involving the motor vehicles of Jonathan 
Fischer, and Melanie Jackson. However we contest that Jonathan Fischer is to be charged with reckless 
driving causing death. We also contest the claims of compensation made by the late Melanie Jackson’s 




husband. The death of Melanie Jackson was a tragic accident, and Timothy Jackson and the rest of 
Melanie Jackson’s family and friends have our deepest condolences; however to lash out at Jonathan 
Fischer, a hard working uni student who was also an unfortunate party involved in this motor vehicle 
accident is cruel and unjust. The collision of the two motor vehicles was caused by factors not 
accounted for by the prosecution, which will be brought to light when eye witnesses will present their 
testimony. We will also claim that Melanie Jackson did not take due care and had therefore a 
significant role to play in the outcome and severity of the collision, and that fatal injuries as well as 
significant damages to property could have been avoided, further mitigating the validity of her 
husband’s claims of compensation for damages. 
 
Judge: Although you will not hear from some witnesses directly, here is a summary of some of the 
evidence in this case: 
 
Prosecution Witness #1: Doctor James Bennet, medical specialist, testified that ‘both Melanie Jackson 
and Jonathan Fischer had sustained a number of injuries. The injuries were indicative of a head-on 
collision, with sufficient force to propel Melanie Jackson through the windscreen of her motor vehicle, 
whilst Jonathan Fischer sustained back injuries and a trauma caused by a head injury. The injuries 
were consistent with a head-on collision, but it was not clear from the injuries how the collision had 
occurred. The time of death is estimated at somewhere between 6pm and 7pm on Saturday 18th 
November 2010’. 
 
Prosecution Witness #2: Mathew Blog, a witness to the incident testified that he saw ‘a red motor 
vehicle veer off into an oncoming silver vehicle on Diagonal Road around 5pm or so. I was in shock, it 
all happened incredibly quickly, and there was a lot of blood, and parts from both cars all over the 
street, and other people were on the sidewalk and staring, and cars had stopped on both sides, whilst 
other people were coming out to have a look. But one thing was clear, the red car (vehicle of the 
accused) definitely ran into the silver car (vehicle of the deceased), and not the other way around.’ 
Under cross-examination, Mr Blog admitted that he could not be absolutely certain that nothing else 
had prompted the accident, whether anything had happened immediately prior to the accident, or 
who was behind the wheel of each vehicle at the time the accident occurred, as everything reportedly 
happened very rapidly, and Mr Blog was not paying attention to the road until the sound of the 
accident prompted him to look at the scene of the accident.  
 
Prosecution Witness #3: John Watkins, a student at Flinders University, and until recently acquainted 
with Jonathan Fischer, testified that Jonathan Fischer enjoyed his drinking, and did so at least once or 
twice a week whilst they were acquainted. Mr Watkins had even told Jonathan Fischer to reduce his 
drinking for the sake of his health, and that Jonathan Fischer had come to university hungover on a 
frequent number of occasions in the weeks leading up to the 18th November, 2010. When asked if Mr 
Watkins thought that Jonathan Fischer may have had to drink before driving, Mr Watkins testified that 
he would not be surprised in the slightest. Under cross examination Mr Watkins admitted that he and 
Jonathan Fischer were no longer acquaintances after a drunken physical altercation between the two 
at a party. 
 
Prosecution Witness #4: Stacey McEwan, a long-time friend of Melanie Jackson, testified that Melanie 
Jackson was ‘an extremely confident driver, and a wonderful mother, who would never do something 
to put her children or herself in harm’s way. She also frequently went on the grocery shopping trip 
which she was on that day, and the trip was only a short distance from where Melanie Jackson lived. 
Melanie Jackson also frequently went on charity drives for her local community centre, and 
participated in a similar event for her children’s school earlier that year.   
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Defence Witness #1: Jonathan Fischer, student, and accused driver of the motor vehicle involved in 
the accident with Melanie Jackson’s motor vehicle, stated that he ‘did not remember what happened, 
and that doctors said that this was common in people involved in car crashes, especially when head 
trauma was involved’. Jonathan Fischer stated that he had one beer with a friend at home before 
driving, but that police had cleared him of drink driving as tests at the hospital revealed an almost 
immeasurable amount of alcohol in Mr. Fischer’s blood. Jonathan Fischer also testified that he was a 
confident driver. Under cross examination Mr. Fischer admitted he had been involved in a motor 
accident in 2003, and that the accident resulted in the suspension of his license, but that both drivers 
had been found to be at fault. 
 
Defence Witness #2: Trent Ford, a witness to the incident, testified that he saw ‘a collision between 
two motor vehicles, where a red vehicle veered off into a silver one, but that a young boy, roughly 10 
or 12 years old, crossed the road just before the accident occurred, between the two vehicles.’ When 
asked to be more specific, Mr Ford stated that he would estimate that the cars were 50 or 60 metres 
apart when the child crossed the road roughly 20 metres in front of the red vehicle. There did not 
appear to be an immediate reaction the child crossing, although the accident occurred seconds 
thereafter.  
 
Defence Witness #3: Nick Wood, 12 years old, eye witness to the incident, testified that he ‘crossed 
the road in front of the red car, although the car still had a fair bit of time to spare, and that the car 
wasn’t going very quickly.’ Nick testified that he ‘didn’t even notice that a car crash had happened 
until he heard the screeching of tyres, which made me look to my left to see that an accident had 
happened, and that the red car had run into an oncoming silver car’. Under cross examination Nick 
suggested that the red car might have been going at 50 or 60 kilometres per hour, and that he did not 
know that the speed limit in the area of the accident was 50 kilometres per hour.  
 
Defence Witness #4: Luke Munn, a friend of the accused, testified that ‘John Fischer was a smart guy, 
who excelled at school, and he is no risk taker. Whilst it’s true that he liked to drink, so do most people, 
and that doesn’t mean anything, and certainly has nothing to do with his accident. John would never 
take the chance to drink and drive, even one drink, especially if he was going to uni. He shouldn’t be 
punished for enjoying a drink with his mates.’ Under cross-examination Luke admitted that John had 
gotten into fights before, and that alcohol probably played a role in this. Luke claimed that he did not 




Judge: I call Dr Janice Bligh, the court’s accident reconstruction expert witness. Please raise your right 
hand. Do you solemnly swear or affirm to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? 
 
Accident reconstruction expert witness: I do. 
 
Judge: Please state your full name and occupation. 
 
Accident reconstruction expert witness: Dr. Janice Bligh. I am an independent accident reconstruction 
expert and Director of a private forensic laboratory based in Adelaide. 
 
Judge: Please summarise your educational qualifications and background for the jury. 
 
Accident reconstruction expert witness: I studied forensic science at the University of Sydney after 
initial completing a degree in mechanical engineering at the same university, obtained honours and 
then went on to complete a PhD, in which I studied the effects of variable lighting and other conditions 




on the effectiveness of vehicular accident reconstruction and skid mark assessment. I then spent five 
years in the United States with a private laboratory specialising in accident reconstruction with a focus 
on motor vehicles and variable conditions. I returned to Australia to establish my own laboratory, 
which analyses still and moving images in support of forensic investigations. 
 





First, you will be introduced to the questions accident reconstruction experts aim to answer when 
looking at a collision involving one or more vehicles. We look at a number of critical elements, 
including speeds of involved vehicles at impact, which enables us to assess directional kinetic energy 
involved in the accident, particularly in relation to magnitude of the impact, and how elements such 
as environmental hazards, seatbelts and other factors may have contributed to the eventual outcome. 
The impact location refers to the location of the incident, and is another crucial element in our 
accident reconstruction process. Coupled with pre impact locations of the vehicles, and numerous 
factors associated with occupying and controlling a motor vehicle, we are able to almost perfectly 
reconstruct what happened, in order to determine who, if anyone, was at fault, and if extenuating 
circumstances or factors that have not been accounted for may have been involved in the collision. 
Nonetheless whilst accident reconstruction can be an incredibly valuable and comprehensive tool, it 
is important to note that it should be considered as one part of all the evidence presented in court for 
this case. 
 
The most pertinent factors examined in our analysis include analysis of steering angles, braking and 
break use immediately prior to the incident, the use of lights and turn signals, as well as most 
importantly speed and acceleration, as well as the engine rpm, and whether cruise control had been 
used by either party. Combined with data on weather conditions and environmental hazards, as well 
as any human elements such as illness, history of driver error, or inebriation we develop a 
sophisticated representation and reconstruction of events. 
 
 
Expert accident reconstruction involves the use of both physical measurements and complex 
computer modelling involving tried and true physics formulas regularly used in contexts involving 
motion and displacement of objects such as motor vehicles. Skid marks and tyre treads also further 
enable us to accurately discern changes in factors such as velocity, steering angles, and road 
conditions, as well as the possibility of environmental hazards. Environmental hazards may refer to 
any aspect of the environment, which is to say, not just trees or signs, stones bouncing off the road 
from under wheels, or a round-about, but also people, or animals, or anything that might have 
influenced the actions of either driver, or the outcome of the incident in any way. Whilst this requires 
some presumptions and relies on supplementary information such as eye witness testimony, the 
presence of such hazards is often apparently in the actions of drivers, particularly when unexpected 
behaviours that can’t immediately accounted for appear in the data. 
 
 
How is accident reconstruction conducted? 
 
As already stated, the first step involves collecting as much relevant data as possible. This includes 
measurements from the crash site, witness testimony, and information collected from motor vehicle 
accident reports, whether airbags went off, whether seatbelts were on, where the accident occurred, 
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the distance and shape of skid marks, steering angles, and whatever else we can find that might help 
paint a more accurate picture of what actually happened. Next we input most of this information into 
the relevant computer software, generally one of several commonly used 3D modelling programs also 
used in the car industry to investigate and test safety measures and effects of impacts on cars from 
different angles. Then we test various scenarios involving the vehicles in question with the data that 
we have, to see whether we can find an outcome that reflects what actually occurred. In some clear 
cut cases this can be an incredibly straight forward process, allowing us to confidently outline who or 
what was at fault, what elements were involved, and what ultimately happened and in what order. 
On other occasions it’s not so straight forward, and the reconstructions fail to fully account for all of 
the data we have, and also to meet the expected outcomes that we had set. Generally such cases 
involve some element that was either unaccounted for, or had not been sufficiently factored in, and 




Accident reconstruction and the law 
 
The use of accident reconstruction and analysis to determine the causes and effects of circumstances 
that led to a particular incident or collision is not particularly new. In fact, in contrast to some other 
avenues of forensic science and investigation, accident reconstruction is used quite frequently to 
explain what led to a particular incident. A heavy reliance on mathematics, physics, and tried and 
tested formulas, many of which are also used in the automotive industry, means that the basis for 
forensic investigations and accident reconstructions involving motor vehicles is and has been reliable, 
and invaluable in clarifying the nature of evidence and circumstances surrounding fairly common 
accidents involving motor vehicles, especially cars, though also more increasingly motor bikes. 
Therefore whilst forensic accident reconstruction and analysis is not flawless, it has been a pretty 
reliable and accurate tool for investigators, and therefore been a central part of the justice system 
with regard to crime scene investigation and court proceedings related to motor vehicle accidents.  
 
 
Problems with forensic accident reconstruction 
 
Whilst there aren’t many problems with forensic accident reconstruction, the problems that do exist 
are noteworthy. Firstly, accident reconstruction, whilst using mathematics and physics, involves 
predicting outcomes based on incomplete information in the hopes that we can determine what that 
missing information may be. This may involve guesswork, especially in cases where human error, or 
other human factors, or environmental elements and hazards not accounted for may play a significant 
role. There are also large numbers of measurement techniques involved in reconstructing various 
aspects of pre- during and post-collision models. This may result in some inaccuracies or 
inconsistencies that might arise when different measuring techniques and models that function 
separately but not together. There are also error rates that also need to be accounted for, which can 
pose a problem in particularly complex scenarios, but is generally not an issue as long as the error 
rates are reported and explained, just as is the case in all statistical analyses. Finally the ever changing 
nature of safety precautions and features in and of motor vehicles means that some calculations may 
be affected by factors such as materials or features specific to a particular brand or model of motor 
vehicle that may have a noticeable effect on outcomes. This is more an issue for newer vehicles, but 












Judge: The parties may now examine the witness. The prosecution may proceed. 
 
Prosecutor: Dr. Bligh, can you tell me what accident reconstruction revealed in this case? 
 
Accident reconstruction expert witness: In this case, we were provided with a significant amount of 
data, and measurements of motor vehicles involved, skid marks, details of the surrounding area, and 
information such as speed and steering angle, impact depth, debris patterns, and more. We were also 
provided with the accident report and the police report, though they revealed little that the data we 




















Accident reconstruction expert witness: Firstly, the data unequivocally supported the hypothesis that 
the collision occurred as a result of Jonathan Fischer’s vehicle entering the oncoming lane at close 
proximity to the oncoming motor vehicle of Melanie Jackson, resulting in an almost unavoidable 
accident. Mr Fischer’s motor vehicle hit the left side of the oncoming vehicle, and the angular impact 
appeared to result in a fraction of a delay when it came to Melanie Jackson’s airbag, meaning that it 
was too late to protect her from the forward momentum that resulted in fatal injuries. Neither vehicle 
was going over the speed limit, although Mr Fischer’s vehicle was travelling at circa 45 km/h whereas 
Melanie Jackson was travelling at closer to 35km/h. We can confidently say that we are all but certain 
that Melanie Jackson’s fatal injuries were due to the accident that occurred as a result of Mr Fischer’s 
vehicle entering the wrong lane shortly before colliding with Melanie Jackson’s motor vehicle. 
 
 
Prosecutor: Can you positively identify the accused, Jonathan Fischer, in this court room today? 
 
 
Accident reconstruction expert witness: If by that you mean identify the person who purportedly 
drove the motor vehicle? 
 
Prosecutor: Yes, please, for the court. 
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Accident reconstruction expert witness: Sure, yes. *points in direction of Jonathan Fischer* 
 
Prosecutor: Thank you. Now Dr. Bligh, have you and your team used this technique for any similar 
incidents before? 
 
Accident reconstruction expert witness: Yes, yes we have. We recently assisted SA Police in an 
investigation involving a collision between a truck and a car on South Road, and also assisted in an 
investigation involving a motor vehicle and cyclist, if you can believe it. In both cases, our findings 
cleared up some contradictory witness testimony, allowing SA Police to move forward with the case. 
 
Prosecutor: Dr. Bligh, finally, have you ever been involved in, or known of a case that employed 
accident reconstruction, where the reconstruction drew erroneous conclusions?  
 
Accident reconstruction expert witness: Whilst I have not been directly involved in such a case, they 
do occasionally occur. It would be unreasonable to assume that whilst accident reconstruction relies 
heavily on mathematics, physics, and science, it does not involve a human element, particularly to fill 
in the gaps, though practiced accident reconstruction experts usually have some intuitive knack for it. 
 
Prosecutor: Thank you, Dr. Bligh. 
 
Judge: Are there any questions in cross-examination from the defence? 
 
Defence: Yes, your Honour. Dr Bligh, you stated before that there is always the possibility of human 
error, do you believe that human error may have influenced your findings? 
 
Accident reconstruction expert witness: I do not believe so, at least not with regard to the conclusions 
we have drawn about the outcome of the accident. 
 
Defence: Ah yes, thank you for bringing that up. Whilst you claim to be confident in explaining the 
outcome of the accident, I would like you to please have a look at Exhibit A, more specifically the 
images of the skid marks left by what we presume to be Jonathan Fischer’s motor vehicle. Now if you 
could please elaborate for the court what you believe to have been the cause of this sudden change 
in direction of Jonathan Fischer’s vehicle? 
 
Accident reconstruction expert witness: We included the data in the reconstruction as a loss of control 
of the motor vehicle on behalf of the defendant, though we have no direct explanation for the cause 
of such loss of control. Whilst some speculation can play a role in accident reconstruction, it seemed 
unnecessary in this case, as the Jonathan Fischer clearly lost control, and as a result caused the 
accident in which Melanie Jackson sustained fatal injuries. 
 
Defence: Dr. Bligh, would you agree that the factor you have not accounted for could have been 
someone crossing the road, or an animal, and Jonathan Jackson trying to avoid this unknown party, to 




Judge: Overruled. Please proceed, Dr. Bligh. 
 
Accident reconstruction expert witness: Yes, the possibility is there, though breaking rather than 
swerving out of the way would have been the safest approach. 





Defence: Were the brakes employed at any stage leading up to the accident? And at 50 km/h, the 
speed limit for the area in which the accident occurred, could my client’s car have come to a full stop 
before hitting something that were to cross the road? 
 
Prosecutor: Objection, conjecture. 
 
Judge: I’ll allow it, please answer the question, Dr. Bligh. 
 
Accident reconstruction expert witness: The brakes were used in Jonathan Fischer’s vehicle, though it 
is almost impossible to ascertain at what distance to the oncoming vehicle this occurred, and whether 
it was not related to simply losing control of his vehicle for any other reason. Without an accident 
reconstruction involving a number of largely arbitrary assumptions, we cannot accurately establish 
what caused Jonathan Fischer, to move; however it is clear that Jonathan Fischer’s actions led to an 
accident between two motor vehicles resulting in fatal injuries sustained by Melanie Jackson. 
 
Defence: Another question, Doctor. Were you aware of details of the case outside of your expertise, 
such as the people involved?  
 
Accident reconstruction expert witness: Yes, we were aware of such details, and were provided with 
police and accident reports, however such information is often very relevant when trying to determine 
the effects of a particular impact on the body of a person of a certain height, size, and the like.  
 
Defence: Alright, thank you Dr. Bligh. 
Judge: The prosecution will now outline their claims for compensation.  
 
Prosecutor: Thank you, your honour. The prosecution will now outline a number of claims for 
compensation, and aim to explain them and the monetary sums presented to you, the jury. Please see 
Exhibit C for the detailed presentation of this information. 
 
The first and second claims of compensation are for medical and funeral expenses, which amount to 
a total of $45,000. This sum was based on the actual expenses that had to be covered by Timothy 
Jackson during an incredibly trying time, as Timothy had to come to terms with caring for his three 
children without the emotional and financial support of his late wife.  
 
Following on from that, we request damages to compensate for the loss of income caused by the loss 
of Melanie Jackson. The Jackson family greatly relied on Melanie Jackson’s stable income to support 
three children. Melanie Jackson worked as a teacher at Brighton Secondary School, earning an 
estimated $51,000 a year. As she would have been likely to work another fifteen to twenty years, we 
originally requested damages of $1,000,000 but have revised our request to $750,000 of projected 
lost income. 
 
Furthermore we request $1,000,000 in damages for the loss of companionship suffered by Timothy 
Jackson, and the loss of a mother by their three children. Whilst the companionship of a partner, and 
the invaluable presence and role of a parent whilst growing up is immeasurable, the sum we are 
seeking would significantly reduce the burden of costs associated with looking after the children, 
including education, the costs of which are seemingly permanently on the rise. This has also been the 
case with the general cost of living, promising to put extra strains on a family already suffering from 
what can only be described as a cruel and for many of us inconceivable loss.  
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Finally we also originally requested $1,500,000 in punitive damages but have revised our claim to 
$1,000,000, to be awarded due to the negligence we believe the defendant to have demonstrated, 
serving as part punishment and to cover costs including legal fees, and similar expenses arising from 
the circumstances surrounding the incident we believe to have been caused by the defendant. 
 
Judge: Alright, thank you. Now jury, I have some final words before you go on to deliberate. Firstly 
please recall that this trial commenced after the prosecution and defence presented their opening 
statement, followed by a number of witnesses by both parties. This was followed by forensic evidence 
presented by Dr. Janice Bligh, with regard to skid marks, debris, and impact zones in relation to the 
collision of the two motor vehicles referred to throughout this case. And you just heard the 
prosecution’s claims for compensation, and their arguments for such claims.  
 
Please bear in mind that in the Australian legal system, a defendant is presumed innocent and that 
the burden is on the prosecution to convince you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, 
Jonathan Fischer, committed the crime.  
 
The onus is on the defence to prove that the accused is guilty of reckless driving causing death, and 
that burden never leaves it. It never becomes the responsibility of the accused to prove that he is not 
guilty or, in this case, to prove that it was not negligent or reckless driving. Before you convict you 
must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt. If there is a reasonable doubt as to the accused’s guilt, 
then the accused is entitled to the benefit of that doubt. That does not mean that you must be satisfied 
beyond any doubt whatever, if, indeed you can ever be satisfied of anything to that extent. The 
accused is not entitled to the benefit of any whimsical, fanciful, or far-fetched doubt which an agile 
mind might conjure up. Being satisfied beyond reasonable doubt means this—if you regard it as a 
reasonable possibility that someone else murdered Chris Bell, then the accused must be acquitted. If 
you consider this possibility so insubstantial and so remote that no reasonable person would take it 
into account for a moment, then you are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt and the accused must be 
found guilty. You must now decide whether or not the defendant, Jonathan Fischer, is guilty as 
charged. Furthermore, if Jonathan Fischer is found guilty, you must deliberate and determine the 













Appendix F: Emotionally Arousing Jury Instructions 
Jury Instructions 
Department of Psychology 
The University of Adelaide 
Heuristic-Systematic Reasoning in Juror Decision Making 
 
 
During the case, you will be exposed to some exhibits. A number of these 
exhibits are graphic and vivid photographs of the woman at the location where 
she was struck. You may find these pictures to be somewhat upsetting. In 
addition, you will hear testimony from a number of witnesses, which may be 
graphic in nature and produce a strong emotional reaction in you. After you hear 
the evidence, you will be asked to decide any monetary damages to be awarded 
to the victim. Please read all instructions carefully. If you have any queries or 
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Appendix G: Emotionally Arousing Forensic Evidence 
Forensic Evidence 
Department of Psychology 
The University of Adelaide 
Heuristic-Systematic Reasoning in Juror Decision Making 
 
The following exhibits are supplementary materials referred to during the trial. Some of these 
materials include images that may be explicit and/or confronting. You may examine these materials 
for the duration of the reading task. If you have any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to 
alert the supervising researcher.  
Exhibit A: Images of Skid Marks and Accident Scene 























Exhibit B: Motor Vehicle Accident Report 
1Copyright © 2017 by VCE Investigate Engineering. Image used with permission. 
2Copyright © 2017 by Holzer Edwards, Chartered. Image used with permission. 
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Exhibit C: Alleged Damages Report 




















 Alleged Damages 
Item Original Claim Final Claim Damage Causation Insurance Coverage 
Medical Expenses $ 30,000 
 
$ 30,000 TBD 20% ($6,000) 
Funeral Expenses $ 15,000 
 
$ 15,000 TBD None 
Loss of Income 
(deceased) 
$ 1,000,000 $ 750,000 TBD None 
Loss of companionship $ 1,000,000 
 
$ 1,000,000 TBD N/A 
Punitive damages $ 1,500,000 
 
$ 1,000,000 N/A N/A 
Total $ 3,545,000 
 
$ 2,795,000  - 
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Forensic Report 
Department of Psychology 
The University of Adelaide 
Heuristic-Systematic Reasoning in Juror Decision Making 
 
Jackson v Fischer, November 2010 
Executive Summary 
Jonathan Fischer has been charged that on the 10th day of November 2010, he lost control of his motor 
vehicle on Diagonal Road, in the Adelaide suburb of Warradale, causing a collision resulting in the 
death of Melanie Jackson, therefore driving with reckless indifference to human life.  Members of the 
South Australia Forensics Laboratory (SAFL) conducted an analysis and examination relating to this 
matter.  
Exhibit(s) submitted for examination: 
Item 1 – Several still images depicting the car wreckages, debris patterns, and the scene of the 
accident, including relevant measurements. 
Item 2 – Accident report completed shortly after incident, detailing a range of information including 
details of accident, and personal information. 
Item 3 – Police report containing personal information of involved parties including criminal history, 
motor vehicle history, alcohol blood %, and medical history.  
Origin of exhibit(s): 
Item 1 – Images of accident scene and car wreckages were captured on location but police officers, 
and members of the SAPOL forensic investigation team.  
Item 2 – The Accident report detailing aspects of the incident, as well as personal information of 
parties involved was provided by the head detective on the SAPOL investigative team assigned to the 
case.  
Item 3 – The police report detailing further personal information of parties involved was provided by 
the head detective on the SAPOL investigative team assigned to the case.  
 
 
Statement of chain of custody of exhibits: 
4. Jeff Backers, authorised representative of SAPOL, took possession of items 1,2 and 3 on 
the 19th of November 2010, and retained custody of items 1,2 and 3, securely stored at 
SAPOL headquarters in accordance with South Australia Police Property Management 
Practices, until forwarded to Dr. Bligh for analysis. 
5. Dr. Bligh, Director of South Australia Forensic Laboratory, took custody of item 1, item 2 
and item 3 on the 1st of December, 2010, for the purposes of forensic analysis. When not 
being analysed, exhibits were safely stored at the SA Forensics Laboratory.  
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6. Custody of exhibits was given to Jennifer Haighes, forensic evidence management at 
SAPOL, upon completion of analysis by Dr. Bligh. Exhibits have been stored at SAPOL 
headquarters, and not been accessed since having been submitted to Jennifer Haighes. 
 
Information that the examiner was provided with: 
Before conducting a forensic analysis, the forensic examiner was informed of details concerning the 
context of the accident, and provided accident and police reports.  
 
Qualifications of the forensic examiner, Dr. Katherine Price: 
 
- Director, South Australia Forensics Laboratory, Australian Federal Police, 2010- 
Current 
- Assistant Director, Western Regional Crime Laboratory, NY State Police, 2004-2009  
- Ph.D in Forensic Science, University of Sydney, 2000-2003 
Dissertation Title: Vehicular accident reconstruction and skid mark assessment: The roles of 
variable lighting and spatial conditions. 
- Bachelor of Forensic Science (Honours), University of Sydney, 1999 
- Bachelor of Science, University of Sydney, 1995-1998 
- Bachelor of Mechanical Engineering, University of Sydney, 1991-1994 
-  
 
Methods and materials: 
Data from Item 1 and Item 2 were input into MADYMO 3D crash simulation and modelling software. 
Assumptions input to account for air and road surface temperatures, and lighting conditions.  
 
Procedures: 
Several simulations were run using available data, and several variables in assumptions to explain 





It was found that based on information provided, the motor vehicle of Jonathan Fischer collided with 
the motor vehicle of Melanie Jackson after veering off at an angle of 50 degrees at a proximity of 20 
metres, Jonathan Fischer travelling at 49 km/h until immediately prior to the collision, and Melanie 














The comparison conducted by the forensic laboratory and team led by Dr. Janice Bligh involved the 
use of comprehensive data recorded by police and forensic analysts at the scene of the accident, and 
post-accident using standard imaging technology. Dr. Bligh was also provided with accident reports 
and police reports. Data was collated and input into MADYMO 3D crash simulation software, which 
was then used to run several simulations. Findings indicated that Jonathan Fischer’s vehicle veering 
into the oncoming vehicle was the cause of the accident. Limited information was provided to account 
for the sudden change in direction by Jonathan Fischer’s vehicle. Whilst findings lend strong support 
to the notion that Jonathan Fischer was at fault, some limitations with regard to the cause of direction 
change of Jonathan Fischer’s vehicle mean that any further interpretations should be made with some 
caution.  
 
This statement, consisting of 3 pages signed by me, is true to the best of my knowledge and belief. I 
understand that if this statement is filed in a court for the purposes of a prosecution pursuant to 
Section 104 of the Summary Procedure Act and it is, to my knowledge, false or misleading in a material 
particular, I am guilty of an offence pursuant to provision of the Summary Procedure Act. 
Signed:                                                                    Signature witnessed by:   
               Dr. Janice Bligh Jennifer Haighes 
               Director, South Australia Forensic Lab 
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Appendix I: Rational Jury Instructions 
Jury Instructions 
Department of Psychology 
The University of Adelaide 
Heuristic-Systematic Reasoning in Juror Decision Making 
 
 
During this case you will be exposed to some exhibits. A number of these exhibits 
are photographs of the location where the woman was struck. In addition, you 
will hear testimony from a number of witnesses. After you hear the evidence, 
you will be asked to mathematically calculate any monetary damages to be 
awarded to the victim. The calculations will not be difficult, but may require 
some addition and multiplication. Please read all instructions carefully. If you 




















Appendix J: Rational Forensic Evidence 
Forensic Evidence 
Department of Psychology 
The University of Adelaide 
Heuristic-Systematic Reasoning in Juror Decision Making 
 
The following exhibits are supplementary materials referred to during the trial. You may examine 
these materials for the duration of the reading task. For Exhibit B, please refer to the trial transcript, 
and input any and all missing information. If you have any questions or concerns, please do not 
hesitate to alert the supervising researcher.  
Exhibit A: Images of Skid Marks and Vehicle Wreckages 






















Exhibit B: Alleged Damages Report 
3Copyright © 2017 by Claudio Gedda. Image used with permission. 
4Copyright © 2017 by VCE Investigate Engineering. Image used with permission. 
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 Alleged Damages 
Item Original Claim Final Claim Damage Causation Insurance Coverage 
Medical Expenses $ 
 
$ TBD 20% ($                ) 
Funeral Expenses $ 
 
$ TBD None 
Loss of Income 
(deceased) 





$ TBD N/A 
Punitive damages $ 
 
$ N/A N/A 
Total $ 
 
$  - 




Exhibit C: Motor Vehicle Accident Report 
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Appendix K: Study 2 Participant Questionnaire 
Questionnaire 
Department of Psychology 
The University of Adelaide 
Heuristic-Systematic Reasoning in Juror Decision Making 
 
 
Please read each question carefully before answering. If you have any questions, do not hesitate to 




The following questions relate to the trial about which you have just read. Please read each questions 
carefully, and ask the supervising researcher if clarification is required. You may refer to any notes you 
may have recorded during the reading task. 
 
 




How certain are you of his guilt (place an X anywhere on the line): 
 
0%         10%         20%         30%         40%         50%         60%         70%         80%         90%         100% 
 
How negligent do you think the defendant was? 
 Not at all  Slightly  Unsure  Somewhat  Very negligent 
 
How negligent do you think the victim was? 
 Not at all  Slightly  Unsure  Somewhat  Very negligent 
 
Damages awarded? (Assume you are deliberating on this case with other jury members, 
and a majority of other members have found the defendant liable, so you must award 
damages) Damages awarded should reflect what you deem fair given the information you 
have been provided with, and should range from $1 to a maximum of monetary damages 





Lost income (lifetime) 
$______________ 










Forensic Evidence Questions 
 
The following questions are concerning how you felt about the forensic evidence in the trial. For each 
question, indicate how much you agree or disagree by placing an X in the appropriate box. 
 
 
1.  The Expert’s research was based on good scientific principles. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
 
2. The Expert’s study used appropriate techniques for pattern evidence comparison 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
 
3. The Expert’s testimony was helpful in reaching my verdict. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
 
4. My verdict was based on an unbiased and objective assessment of witness testimony and 
evidence. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
5. The Expert’s study was scientifically valid. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
6. The Expert did not use appropriate scientific procedures in her study. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
7. The findings from the Expert’s study can be used to understand what occurred at the scene of 
the crime at the time of the incident. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
8. The Expert did not use valid methods of image identification and comparison. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
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9. Witness testimony and/or forensic evidence was biased, which influenced my verdict.  
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
10. The Expert was unbiased and objective. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
 
11. The scientific evidence that I heard in this trial is reliable. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
 
12. Witness testimony was helpful in reaching my verdict. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
 
13. I found that one or more witnesses or pieces of evidence during the trial were biased. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
 
14. If you reported that you felt aspects of the trial were biased, please write a brief list of what you 
may have considered bias, and how it affected your verdict, in the box below. 
 














Need for Cognition Questions 
 
The following questions relate to your general and everyday enjoyment and approach to thinking. 
Please read each question carefully, and ask the supervising researcher if clarification is required.  
 
1. I would prefer complex to simple problems. 
 
 Not at all like me  Mostly unlike me  Unsure  Like me  Very like me 
 
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking. 
 
 Not at all like me  Mostly unlike me  Unsure  Like me  Very like me 
 




3. Thinking is not my idea of fun. 
 
 Not at all like me  Mostly unlike me  Unsure  Like me  Very like me 
 
4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to  
challenge my thinking abilities. 
 
 Not at all like me  Mostly unlike me  Unsure  Like me  Very like me 
 
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will have to think in depth 
about something. 
 
 Not at all like me  Mostly unlike me  Unsure  Like me  Very like me 
 
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours. 
 
 Not at all like me  Mostly unlike me  Unsure  Like me  Very like me 
 
7. I only think as hard as I have to. 
 
 Not at all like me  Mostly unlike me  Unsure  Like me  Very like me 
 
8. I prefer to think about small, daily projects than long-term ones. 
 
 Not at all like me  Mostly unlike me  Unsure  Like me  Very like me 
 
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them. 
 
 Not at all like me  Mostly unlike me  Unsure  Like me  Very like me 
 
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. 
 
 Not at all like me  Mostly unlike me  Unsure  Like me  Very like me 
 
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 
 
 Not at all like me  Mostly unlike me  Unsure  Like me  Very like me 
 
12. Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much. 
 
 Not at all like me  Mostly unlike me  Unsure  Like me  Very like me 
 
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve. 
 
 Not at all like me  Mostly unlike me  Unsure  Like me  Very like me 
 
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. 
 
 Not at all like me  Mostly unlike me  Unsure  Like me  Very like me 
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15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat 
important but does not require much thought. 
 
 Not at all like me  Mostly unlike me  Unsure  Like me  Very like me 
 
16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of mental effort. 
 
 Not at all like me  Mostly unlike me  Unsure  Like me  Very like me 
 
17. It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why it works. 
 
 Not at all like me  Mostly unlike me  Unsure  Like me  Very like me 
 
 
18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally.  
 



























I didn’t study any of these  
 
5. Did you or are you studying any of the following subjects at tertiary level? (Please indicate how 
many years) 
Biology                   Years: 
Physics                   Years: 
Chemistry              Years: 
Mathematics         Years: 




Law                          Years: 
I didn’t/don’t study any of these 
 
6. Which language do you speak most fluently? 
English 
Other (Please specify): 
 
 
7. Past jury duty experience (circle one) 
None 
1 trial 
More than 1 trial 
 






Almost done! Please read the following questions carefully before answering. Place indicate your 
level for each of the following by placing an X in the appropriate box. If you have any questions, do 
not hesitate to ask the supervising researcher. 
 
1. My knowledge of facial comparison and research methodology 
 No knowledge  Little knowledge  Some knowledge  Fair knowledge  High knowledge 
 
2. My motivation level during completion of the study 
 No motivation  Little motivation  Some motivation  Fair motivation  High motivation 
 
3. I felt emotionally involved or attached to aspects of the trial 
 Not at all true  Slightly true  Somewhat true  Fairly true  Very true 
 
4. The completion of the study required a lot of mental effort 
 Strongly disagree  Disagree  Unsure  Agree  Strongly agree 
 









236                                                                                   Appendix K: Study 2 Participant Questionnaire 
 
 









Appendix L: Forensic Evidence Evaluation Bias Scale 
Forensic Evidence Evaluation Bias Scale 
Department of Psychology 
The University of Adelaide 
 Information Processing and Bias in Juror Decision Making 
For each of the following questions, please check the box that best reflects your views. Please be 
honest with your responses, all answers will remain confidential.  
 
1.  Every crime can be solved with forensic science. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
2.  Every criminal leaves some physical evidence behind at every crime scene. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
3.  If forensic evidence suggests a defendant is guilty, this should be enough to convict even if        
other evidence (e.g. eyewitness testimony, alibi) suggest otherwise. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
4.  Forensic evidence always eventually identifies the guilty person. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
5.  Forensic evidence always provides a conclusive answer. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
6.  Science is the most reliable way to identify the perpetrators of crimes. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
7.  If no forensic evidence is recovered from a crime scene, it means the investigators did not look 
hard enough. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
8.  If there is no forensic evidence presented in a particular case, then the jury should not convict. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
9.  Police should not charge someone with a serious crime unless forensic evidence is available to 
prove their guilt. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
10.  If no forensic evidence is recovered from a crime scene, the defendant is probably innocent. 
 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Don’t know  Agree  Strongly Agree 
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Appendix M: Study 3 Trial Transcript 
Prosecutor Simpson: If it pleases the court my name is Frances Simpson and I appear for the prosecution. 
 
Counsel Taylor: If it pleases the court my name is Nikki Taylor and I appear for the defence.  
Judge Walker: Thank you Counsel. Please read the charge to the accused.  
Judge's Associate: Brett Baker, you have been charged under section 19AA of the Criminal Law Consolidation 
Act, 1935 of the unlawful stalking of Melanie Cook between January 2010 and December 2010. How do you 
plead?  
Brett Baker: Not guilty. 
Judge Walker: Ms Cook you may now commence your case.  
Prosecutor Simpson: Thank you, Your Honour.  
It is the prosecution's duty to prove that the accused, Mr Brett Baker, committed the offence of unlawful stalking 
that he is charged with. A person stalks another person if on at least two separate occasions, the person follows 
the other person or loiters outside the place of residence of the other person or some other place frequented by 
the other person. There must also be present, the intent to carry out such an act.  
The prosecution will prove that Mr Baker on many occasions between January 2010 and December 2010 
physically committed the offence of stalking by persistently following Ms Melanie Cook and loitering outside 
both her private home and place of employment. We will also prove he had the intention to stalk Ms Cook and 
that this can be inferred from the circumstances. Ms Cook will give evidence to explain how often Mr Baker 
stalked her and her friend, Ms Brooks, will corroborate this evidence. I will now call Ms Cook as my first 
witness.  
Judge's Associate: Please state your full name.  
Witness Cook: My name is Melanie Annabelle Cook.  
Prosecutor Simpson: Can you please tell the court how your association with the accused commenced?  
Witness Cook: We used to go out steadily for about 12 months or so in 2009. I broke off our relationship at a 
New Year's Eve party in 2009 because of his behaviour.  
Prosecutor Simpson: Can you please explain what you mean by "his behaviour"?  
Witness Cook: Yes! He was becoming very possessive and paranoid. He was very jealous and wouldn't let me 
talk privately with any one, not even my female friends.  
Prosecutor Simpson: What prompted you to finally break off the relationship?  
Witness Cook: He had too much to drink and started to argue with me because I was talking to some of my 
friends when he went off to the toilets. Brett pushed one of my male friends and then punched him for no 
reason. I immediately said to him. "That's it, I'm not going out with you." He was angry at first but then tried to 
apologise. This type of thing had happened in the past and I was tired of it. I wanted the relationship to stop.  
Prosecutor Simpson: Ms Cook, could you describe your relationship with the accused since New Year's Eve?  
Witness Cook: I no longer wanted go out with him or to see him again. In fact, I was becoming scared of him.  
Prosecutor Simpson: Why were you becoming scared?  





Witness Cook: He was obsessive. He tried to stop me leaving. He rang me up in the morning to apologise. I 
spoke to him nicely but made it quite clear that I didn't want to see him again.  
Prosecutor Simpson: And what did he do when you told him that?  
Witness Cook: (crying) He kept ringing over and over. I answered the phone two or three times but eventually 
took if off the receiver. He came around about 3pm that afternoon. I was a mess. I spoke to him through the door 
and told him to leave.  
Prosecutor Simpson: Did he leave?  
Witness Cook: Not immediately. He just wandered up and down the front of the house or sat in his car. 
Eventually my friend and flatmate, Jessica Brooks, went outside and asked him to go away. She said I would 
call the police if he didn't leave.  
Counsel Taylor: Objection Your Honour that is hearsay. Ms Cook cannot give evidence about what was said 
by Ms Brooks in her absence.  
Judge Walker: Yes, that is correct. I direct the jury not to take that statement into account.  
Prosecutor Simpson: When did the accused leave?  
Witness Cook: A few minutes later but he rang up continuously for the remainder of the night.  
Prosecutor Simpson: And on what occasions have you seen the accused since that day?  
Witness Cook: Almost daily. He either rings or sits in his car outside of the house. It is very scary.  
Prosecutor Simpson: Do you in any way welcome his telephone calls or invite him over to your place?  
Witness Cook: No! I never have since New Year's Eve. I just wish he would stop making my life hell. I wish 
he’d get a life. My mother and father were worried about my safety and went to the police. A police officer 
came over to my house last year and commenced investigations. I never wanted it to go this far. I just wanted 
Brett to grow up and stop annoying me. I was scared to stay in the house alone, especially at night.  
 Prosecutor Simpson: Thank you Ms Cook. There will be no more questions. That concludes my examination, 
Your Honour.  
Counsel Taylor: Ms Cook, would you say you had a good relationship with Mr Baker before New Year's Eve? 
Witness Cook: Yes, up until....  
Counsel Taylor: Could you please just direct your answers to the question. ...What car do you drive Ms Cook?  
Prosecutor Simpson: Objection Your Honour, I can't see the relevance of that question to the issue.  
Judge Walker: I can't at this stage either Counsel.  
Counsel Taylor: I am going to establish that Ms Cook, in fact, drives Mr Baker's car and has never returned it.  
Judge Walker: I will allow the question.  
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Counsel Taylor: I will repeat the question. What car do you drive Ms Cook?  
Witness Cook: A 1998 Toyota Corolla.  
Counsel Taylor: And who does it belong to?  
Witness Cook: It's mine. It’s got my sticker that says “49% bitch, 51% sweetheart. Don’t push it” on the rear 
window.  
Counsel Taylor: *Hands piece of paper to Ms Cook* Ms Cook is this the registration certificate for the licence 
number of the car you drive?  
Witness Cook: Yes.  
Counsel Taylor: Who is shown on the document as being the registered owner of the vehicle?  
Witness Cook: Brett Baker.  
Counsel Taylor: Miss Cook, I repeat the question. Who owns the 1998 Toyota Corolla you drive?  
Witness Cook: I do. Brett gave it to me.  
Counsel Taylor: Then why isn't it registered in your name?  
Witness Cook: With all the pressure I have been under I haven't been able to get around to it yet.  
Counsel Taylor: But it has been over a year since you claimed to have broken up with Mr Baker. The car 
would be unregistered now. Is it?  
Witness Cook: Yes!  
Counsel Taylor: Well how is that possible?  
Witness Cook: I don't know!  
Counsel Taylor: I will tell you. Mr Baker paid for a year's registration and put the label on the car for you.  
Witness Cook: I didn't know that.  
Counsel Taylor: I think you did and I also believe you encouraged him to do that. What do you say to that?  
Witness Cook: I did not!  
Counsel Taylor: I also put it to you that you have promised to return the car to Mr Baker but keep making it 
difficult for him to take possession of it.  
Witness Cook: That's not true, he gave it to me.  
Counsel Taylor: I also put it to you that you have invited Mr Baker over to your house on many occasions to 
pick up the car but deliberately keep him waiting so you can accuse him of stalking.  
Witness Cook: That's not true, either.  
Counsel Taylor: I put it to you that on every occasion he went to your home that he did so at your invitation!  




Witness Cook: No… 
Counsel Taylor: No further questions your Honour.  
Prosecutor Simpson: Ms Cook, does the accused acknowledge your ownership of the vehicle? 
Witness Cook: Yes! He let me put my sticker on it. In fact when I broke up with him I offered to give it back 
but he said no. He said that it was a present and he didn't want it back. 
Prosecutor Simpson: How do you account for the renewal of registration? That is, how did the rego sticker get 
on your car? 
Witness Cook: I really don't know. I was about to get in my car one morning when I noticed it had been 
renewed. I was about to do it that week, in fact. I suspect Brett put it there in the middle of the night. 
Prosecutor Simpson: Did you give him permission to renew the registration? 
Witness Cook: No! 
Prosecutor Simpson: Have you ever invited Brett over to pick up the car? 
Witness Cook: No, I have not. 
Prosecutor Simpson: Does the accused have a set of keys for your car? 
Witness Cook: I suppose he must because it would have been locked when he told me the new registration label 
was placed on the window screen. I lock the car when I am not in it. 
Prosecutor Simpson: Could the accused have had the opportunity to take your car at any time since January 
2010?  
Witness Cook: Yes, it is often parked outside in the street in front of my house or in the car park near my work. 
Brett knows where I park it when I am at work. 
Prosecutor Simpson: Since January 2010 have you encouraged Mr Baker to phone you or come over to your 
house for a visit? 
Witness Cook: No, his visits and telephone calls are uninvited. 
Prosecutor Simpson: No more questions. Thank you Ms Cook. 
Judge Walker: Thank you Ms Cook. You may now step down and leave the witness box. 
Prosecutor Simpson: I will now call my second witness, Jessica Brooks.  
Judge's Associate: Please state your full name.  
Witness Brooks: My name is Jessica Linda Brooks.  
Prosecutor Simpson: Can you please tell the court about your relationship with Ms Cook.  
Witness Brooks: She is my flat-mate. She is also a very close friend.  
Prosecutor Simpson: How long have you known Ms Cook?  
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Witness Brooks: I have known Melanie for over 10 years. We went to high school together.  
Prosecutor Simpson: What is your relationship with the accused?  
Witness Brooks: He was a friend when he went out with Melanie but I don't want to have anything to do with 
him now. In fact, I find him scary and I’m frightened of him.  
Prosecutor Simpson: Can you please explain?  
Witness Brooks: He just hangs around near the house for no reason.  
Prosecutor Simpson: To the best of your knowledge has Ms Cook ever invited Brett over to your house over 
the past 18 months or encouraged him to telephone?  
Witness Brooks: Absolutely not! I have heard her yell at him over the phone and cry when he walks up and 
down in front of the house.  
Prosecutor Simpson: How did Melanie acquire her car?  
Witness Brooks: Brett gave it to her as a present. I can remember her coming home one day all excited to tell 
me about it. In fact she went out and bought some pink seat covers from Target the very next day. She even got 
an Elvis to put on the dash!  
Prosecutor Simpson: When was the last time you spoke to the accused, Brett Baker?  
Witness Brooks: Well over a year ago. I tried to advise him to leave Melanie alone but it was a waste of time. I 
reckon he is just a plain old stalker who will only stop annoying Melanie when they put him in gaol.  
Counsel Taylor: Objection.  
Prosecutor Simpson: I withdraw the question. No more questions, Your Honour.  
Judge Walker: Your witness, Ms Taylor.  
Counsel Taylor: Is Melanie Cook a close friend of yours?  
Witness Brooks: Yes, very close.  
Counsel Taylor: You would do anything for her, wouldn’t you?  
Witness Brooks: Yes, I would.  
Counsel Taylor: That would include saying things in court that supports her version of events?  
Witness Brooks: No! I would only tell the truth to a court.  
Counsel Taylor: You don't like Mr Baker, do you?  
Witness Brooks: No, I don't. I did but not now after what he’s done.  
Counsel Taylor: No more questions Your Honour.  
Prosecutor Simpson: Just one last question, Your Honour.  Ms Brooks, is the evidence you have given to this 
court the truth as you believe it?  




Witness Brooks: Yes, it is. I only want justice to be done.  
Prosecutor Simpson: Thank you Ms Brooks, no more questions.  
Judge Walker: Thank you for your evidence Ms Brooks. You may now step down.  
Prosecutor Simpson: That concludes the Prosecution's case, Your Honour.  
Judge Walker: Ms Taylor, are you ready to commence the defence's case?  
Counsel Taylor: I would like to call the accused, Mr Baker, as my witness.  
Judge's Associate: Please state your full name.  
Witness Baker: My name is Brett Arnold Baker.  
Counsel Taylor: What is your relationship with Ms Melanie Cook?  
Witness Baker: We are close friends.  
Counsel Taylor: Did you ever have a close and intimate relationship?  
Witness Baker: Yes, in 2009, but we decided to part but remain close friends.  
Counsel Taylor: When did you terminate this close relationship with Ms Cook?  
Witness Baker: There was no single day. It just occurred over a period of time starting early in 2010.  
Counsel Taylor: Would you like to renew that personal relationship with Ms Cook?  
Witness Baker: Well, I would have before this. This is crazy.  
Counsel Taylor: Have you phoned Ms Cook or called round her place to see her since January 2010? 
Witness Baker: Yes. I am interested to see how she is going. As I said we are close friends.  
Counsel Taylor: Has Ms Cook ever invited you over to her house since January 2010?  
Witness Baker: Yes, on a number of occasions. She specifically has asked me to come around and say hello.  
Counsel Taylor: Do you own a car?  
Witness Baker: I have two cars actually, a 1996 Holden Commodore and a 1998 Toyota Corolla.  
Counsel Taylor: Where are they now?  
Witness Baker: The Commodore should be in the Market car park right now as I drove it to the court today. 
Melanie has the Toyota. I lent it to her some time ago.  
Counsel Taylor: Are you sure you only loaned it to her?  
Witness Baker: Yes, I still have the car's registration in my name. I paid for the last 12 months’ rego only a 
short time ago.  
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Counsel Taylor: Why does Ms Cook still have possession of the vehicle?  
Witness Baker: As I have said she is still a friend of mine and she needs the car.  
Counsel Taylor: Have you asked for it back?  
Witness Baker: Yes, my sister's car needs repairing and she wants to borrow the Toyota. I asked Melanie to 
give it back to me and she has agreed.  
Counsel Taylor: Then why haven't you taken possession of it?  
Witness Baker: Every time I go round there it's either locked in the garage or it has a wheel lock on it that I 
don't have a key for.  
Counsel Taylor: How many times has Ms Cook offered to give the car back?  
Witness Baker: Probably about once or twice a week.  
Counsel Taylor: When was the last time you called around to see Ms Cook?  
Witness Baker: Some time in December last year. I stopped going when the police came and saw me and 
accused me of stalking. I was shocked.  
Counsel Taylor: Why do you think this allegation has been made against you?  
Witness Baker: It came as a big surprise to me especially as she has invited me around her place so many times 
to collect the car.  
Counsel Taylor: What are your intentions when visiting Ms Cook?  
Witness Baker: They have always been friendly visits with the view to saying hello and collecting the car.  
Counsel Taylor: No more questions, Your Honour.  
Prosecutor Simpson: Mr Baker, how long is it since you last held Melanie's hand?  
Witness Baker: I don't know, some time ago I suspect.  
Prosecutor Simpson: When was the last time you spoke to her personally face to face?  
Witness Baker: I'm not sure, some time last year.  
Prosecutor Simpson: Well I am going to suggest to you that you have not touched Ms Cook since New Year's 
Eve in 2009 or spoken to her face to face since early January 2010. Don't you think that is a strange way for 
close friends to behave?  
Witness Baker: It is if you put it like that.  
Prosecutor Simpson: Have you visited Ms Cook uninvited, or at inappropriate hours, such as late at night? 
Witness Baker: No, of course not.  
Prosecution Simpson: Why not take the car back?  




Witness Baker: I didn’t want her to think it had been stolen. I knew she’d come up with some bullshit 
allegation like she is now!  
Prosecutor Simpson: I put it to you that the friendship between you and Ms Cook is in your mind only and not 
in hers. She won't even answer the door when you knock.  
Witness Baker: I haven't always knocked on the door.  
Prosecutor Simpson: I also put it to you that you gave the Toyota to Ms Cook and you have no legal right to 
take it back now and Ms Cook has pointed this out to you on a number of occasions in early 2010.  
Witness Baker: No! It was only a loan.  
Prosecutor Simpson: If Ms Cook is procrastinating so much about returning the car then why didn't you go to 
the police and make a complaint?  
Witness Baker: As I said she is a friend.  
Prosecutor Simpson: No more questions, Your Honour.  
Judge Walker: Do you want to re-examine the witness, Counsel?  
Counsel Taylor: If it please the court, Your Honour. Mr Baker, who owns the Toyota motor vehicle?  
Witness Baker: I do, it’s registered in my name.  
Counsel Taylor: Why have you tried to contact Ms Cook so many times at her home?  
Witness Baker: To get my car back after she invited me to do so.  
Counsel Taylor: No more questions Your Honour. That concludes the case for the defence.  
Judge Walker: I call Dr. Cindy Pointer, the court’s pattern evidence expert. Please state your full name and 
occupation. 
 Dr. Pointer: Dr. Cindy Pointer. I am an independent pattern evidence expert and Director of a private forensic 
laboratory based in Adelaide. 
 Judge Walker: Please summarise your educational qualifications and background for the jury. 
 Dr. Pointer: I studied forensic science at the University of Sydney, and went on to complete a PhD on 
improving the quality of degraded CCTV footage or still images. I then established my own laboratory, which 
analyses still and moving images in support of forensic investigations. 
 Judge Walker: Dr. Pointer, will you please present your educational material about image comparison that you 
have prepared. 
 Dr. Pointer: First, you will be introduced to some of the language used when discussing forensic image 
comparison evidence in court. Image comparison technology offers a useful tool for identifying people when an 
image, commonly captured via CCTV, presents a clear picture of an individual’s face, and ideally body shape. 
Pattern evidence should however be taken as only one part of all the evidence presented.  
Anthropometry refers to the study of sizes and proportions of the human body. It is used in certain 
circumstances to compare an image of a suspect to another image showing the offender in the process of 
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committing the crime. Whilst anthropometric comparison does not have the same success as fingerprint or DNA 
identification, it is sometimes the only evidence, and is more and more frequently used in today’s courts.  
  
There is extreme diversity with regard to skeletal structure, predominantly in terms of spatial dimensions present 
in an individual as well as their face. The permanence coupled with the diversity present within facial bone 
structures ensures that one’s facial structure is almost as unique as a fingerprint.  
 The forensic examiner is provided with CCTV footage, or a still image. The forensic examiner conducts a 
significant number of linear measurements, determining distances between different landmarks. This allows the 
investigator to compare the proportions, locations of landmarks and features, and correlations of linear 
measurements in one image to one of the suspect to determine whether the individual in the CCTV or other 
footage is the same as the accused.  
 Whilst not as accurate as DNA or fingerprinting, facial image comparison is nonetheless frequently used in a 
society where video and other image capturing technology plays an increasingly vital part in preventing, as well 
as recording crime. 
Judge Walker: The parties may now examine the witness.  
 Prosecutor Simpson: Dr. Pointer, what anthropometric comparison was made in this case? 
 Dr. Pointer: In this case, I was provided with a photograph of the suspect, which I analysed using 
anthropometric techniques, and seven instances of footage from a CCTV camera located outside and facing Ms 
Cook’s place of residence.  
 Prosecutor Simpson: At what time of the day did the recorded footage take place? And what did it show? 
 Dr. Pointer: Five instances of the footage were recorded during the day, and two were recorded late at night, 
between the hours of midnight and 2 am, on seven different days between February and December 2010. It 
appeared to show a man lurking outside Ms Cook’s residence. 
 Counsel Taylor: Objection Your Honour, Dr. Pointer is not qualified to deem someone to be lurking. 
 Judge Walker: I have to agree here. Please stick to the facts.  
 Prosecutor Simpson: Dr. Pointer, what did your analysis reveal? 
 Dr. Pointer: Anthropometric analysis and comparison indicated a very significant degree of similarity between 
Brett Baker and the person appearing in the CCTV footage.  
 Prosecutor Simpson: Can you positively identify the accused, Brett Baker, as the person present in the footage 
captured via CCTV outside of Ms Cook’s home? 
 Dr. Pointer: No. I can estimate a high likelihood that the individual in the picture is in fact the Brett Baker, and 
it is my professional opinion that it is highly likely. Given the testimony I think the evidence speaks for itself. 
 Prosecutor Simpson: Thank you, Dr. Pointer. 
Judge Walker: Are there any questions in cross-examination from the defence? 
 Counsel Taylor: If it pleases the Court. Dr. Pointer, you stated that there is always the chance of a coincidental 
match. So in this case, is it true that a person other than Brett Baker may have been captured by the footage?  
 Dr. Pointer: It is possible. 




 Counsel Taylor: Did any of the footage contain other individuals passing through the area? 
 Dr. Pointer: Yes, though only during instances of footage recorded during the day. 
 Counsel Taylor: Dr. Pointer, Brett Baker has also admitted to being outside Ms Cook’s residence per Ms 
Cook’s invitation numerous times throughout the year, does your analysis do anything to dispute that fact? 
 Dr. Pointer: Well, the times at which he appeared in the footage provided seemed quite late, and his 
movements suspicious.  
 Counsel Taylor: Suspicious? 
 Dr. Pointer: Like he wasn’t meant to be there. In the footage provided Mr Baker regularly paced back and 
forth outside Ms Cook’s property before leaving. 
 Counsel Taylor: Dr. Pointer, is it not true that the quality of CCTV footage can be significantly influenced by 
lighting conditions within the recorded footage, such as whether footage was recorded during the day or at 
night? Does the degradation of footage in such a manner raise some concerns regarding your identification of 
the individual in the footage? 
 Dr. Pointer: It is true that night time conditions and other factors can influence the quality of footage, or an 
image from a footage. However I have received extensive training in the field and stand by my analysis. 
 Counsel Taylor: Another question, Doctor. Is it not true that you were aware of some details of the case before 
conducting your analysis? And were you not aware that police had a suspect, as well as spoken to witnesses?  
 Dr. Pointer: Yes, it is true that I was made aware of details surrounding the police investigation. This allowed 
me to get a better idea of what I was examining in the footage. 
 Counsel Taylor: No further questions, Your Honour. 
Judge Walker: Ms Simpson, would you like to re-examine the witness? 
 Prosecutor Simpson: Just one question, Your Honour. Dr. Pointer, now that you are face to face with the 
defendant in this courtroom, do you believe the person in the footage could have been Brett Baker? 
 Dr. Pointer: Yes, I believe the person in the footage was Brett Baker. 
 Prosecutor Simpson: Thank you, Dr. Pointer. No further questions. 
Judge Walker: Are you prepared to give your closing address, Mr Simpson?  
Prosecutor Simpson: The prosecution has the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To do this I must 
prove that the accused had the intent to stalk Ms Cook and that he physically committed the crime of stalking.  
As Ms Cook said under oath, evidence supported by Ms Brooks, that she had broken off her relationship with 
Mr Baker on New Year's Eve 2009 and asked him not to contact her again. He did not follow that advice. His 
subsequent attention was uninvited and, his visits to her home and telephone calls, clearly constitute the physical 
element of the offence of unlawful stalking as I outlined in my opening address.  
Both prosecution witnesses have said, under oath, that the accused has never been invited to their house after 
January 2010. He was also told not to come around yet he still did. The accused clearly had intent to contact Ms 
Cook in a desperate bid to re-build a failed relationship. All of this is supported by the evidence provided by the 
court’s expert witness.  
248                                                                      Appendix M: Study 3 Trial Transcript 
 
Both prosecution witnesses also testified under oath that Mr Baker gave the Toyota to Ms Cook as a present. 
The ownership issue is an excuse dreamed up by the accused to explain why he kept Ms Cook under close 
surveillance. 
You should find the accused guilty as charged.  
Judge Walker: Defence Counsel, are you ready for your closing address.  
Counsel Taylor: Ms Cook is a ‘wannna-be bad girl’, ladies and gentlemen. Pink seat covers in her hatch-back, 
listening to the beat of the 90’s and dreaming of times with Brett. The prosecution has the burden to prove guilt 
beyond reasonable doubt. If there is any element of doubt regarding Mr Baker's guilt, he must be given that 
benefit of doubt and you have an obligation to deliver a verdict of not guilty. 
The prosecution has been unable to prove the two elements of the offence of stalking. Mr Baker had no intent to 
stalk Ms Cook. She had invited him over on many occasions to collect his Toyota but always made it impossible 
for him to do so. She, in effect, caused him to lawfully wait outside her house because she would not hand the 
vehicle over to him. Ms Cook wants to see Brett pay. The forensic expert’s testimony does not dispute this, as 
Brett would have likely been capture by footage during the day, whereas the quality and accuracy of the expert’s 
conclusions regarding the night footage are dubious at best, and criminally inaccurate at worst.  
There has been no stalking as Ms Cook invited the accused to her house. This is further proven by the fact that 
Ms Cook acknowledges that the Toyota's registration is still in my client's name. Surely, if she was genuine in 
her claims she would have arranged for the transfer of registration or make attempts to do so. I ask you to 
discount completely the evidence of Ms Brooks. She is in the front passenger seat and along for the ride.  
Clearly the prosecution has not proven its case and I ask you to find the accused not guilty.  
That concludes my closing address, Your Honour.  
Judge Walker: That concludes the cases for the prosecution and the defence. It is now my responsibility to sum 
up the case.  
 You, as the jury, are ultimately in charge of the facts. Anything I say is to assist you. You may disagree with 
me. You are however bound by what I say is the law. You are charged with the responsibility of determining the 
guilt of the accused. You must weigh up the conflicting evidence presented by the three witnesses, decide which 
facts you find proven beyond reasonable doubt if any, and reach a verdict of guilty or not guilty.  
 In many respects your decision will depend upon your view of the credibility of the conflicting witnesses, the 
forensic evidence, and the inherent plausibility of the stories they told. 
 
I now ask you to retire to reach a verdict. 
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Brent Dreamer has been charged with unlawful stalking, an offence pursuant to Section 19AA 
of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act, 1935. He was found to have a case to answer at a 
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Judge Boomer :   Good morning.  
 Prosecutor Driver :  If it pleases the court my name is Francis Driver and I appear for the     
prosecution.  
 Counsel Shield :  If it pleases the court my name is Nick/Niki Shield and I appear for the defence.  
 Judge Boomer:    Thank you Counsel.   Please read the charge to the accused.  
The accused, Brent Dreamer, stands in the dock and faces the Bench.  
Judge's Associate:  Brent Dreamer, you have been charged under section 19AA of the Criminal Law 
Consolidation Act, 1935 of the unlawful stalking of Molly Simpson between January 2000 and 
December 2000. How do you plead?  
Brent Dreamer:   Not guilty  
Ms Driver you may now commence your case.  
 Prosecutor Driver :  Thank you, Your Honour.  
 It is the prosecution's duty to prove that the accused, Mr Brent Dreamer, committed the offence of 
unlawful stalking that he is charged with.  This burden must be met to a very strict standard of proof. 
You, ladies and gentleman of the jury, must decide the facts and you must be satisfied that the 
accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.  If an element of doubt exists you must find the accused 
not guilty.  
Mr Dreamer is accused of unlawful stalking. A person stalks another person if on at least two 
separate occasions, the person follows the other person or loiters outside the place of residence of 
the other person or some other place frequented by the other person. There must also be present, 
the intent to carry out such an act.  
 The prosecution will prove that Mr Dreamer on many occasions between January 2000 and 
December 2000 physically committed the offence of stalking by persistently following Ms Molly 
Simpson and loitering outside both her private home and place of employment.  We will also prove 
he had the intention to stalk Ms Simpson and that this can be inferred from the circumstances.  
 Ms Simpson will give evidence to explain how often Mr Dreamer stalked her and her friend, Ms 
Clancy, will corroborate this evidence. I will now call Ms Simpson as my first witness.  
Witness Simpson :  My name is Molly Annabelle Simpson.  
Prosecutor Driver :  Do you know the accused, Mr Dreamer?  
 Witness Simpson :  Yes I do.  
 Prosecutor Driver :  Can you please tell the court how your association with the accused 
commenced?  
 Witness Simpson :  We used to go out steadily for about 12 months or so in 1999.  
 Prosecutor Driver :  You said "used" to.  Can you clarify what you mean?  
 Witness Simpson :  I broke off our relationship at a New Year's Eve party in 1999 because of his 
behaviour.  
 Prosecutor Driver :  Can you please explain what you mean by "his behaviour"?  




Witness Simpson :  Yes!  He was becoming very possessive and paranoid.  He was very jealous and 
wouldn't let me talk privately with any one, not even my female friends.  
 Prosecutor Driver :  What prompted you to finally break off the relationship?  
Witness Simpson :  He had too much to drink and started to argue with me because I was talking to 
some of my friends when he went off to the toilets.  
Prosecutor Driver :  And what happened?  
 Witness Simpson :  Brent pushed one of my male friends and then punched him for no reason.   I 
immediately said to him. "That's it, I'm not going out with you."  
Prosecutor Driver :  And then what happened?  
Witness Simpson :  He was angry at first but then tried to apologise.  This type of thing had 
happened in the past and I was tired of it.  I wanted the relationship to stop.  
 Prosecutor Driver :  And how did you get home that evening?  
Witness Simpson :  I wanted to find my own way home but Brent wouldn't let me.  In the end I 
phoned my father and he came and picked me up.  
Prosecutor Driver :  Have you seen Brent at your home since that date?   
Counsel Shield :  I object Your Honour, the prosecution is trying to lead the witness.  
Judge Boomer : I have to agree with Counsel Ms Driver. It is a point in issue.  Perhaps you could 
rephrase the question without prompting the answer.  
Prosecutor Driver :  If you please Your Honour.  Ms Simpson, could you describe your relationship 
with the accused since New Year's Eve?  
Witness Simpson :  I no longer wanted go out with him or to see him again.  In fact, I was becoming 
scared of him.  
Prosecutor Driver :  Why were you becoming scared?  
Witness Simpson :  He was obsessive. He tried to stop me leaving.  He rang me up in the morning to 
apologise.  I spoke to him nicely but made it quite clear that I didn't want to see him again.  
Prosecutor Driver :  And what did he do when you told him that?  
Witness Simpson :  (crying) He kept ringing over and over.  I answered the phone two or three  times 
but eventually took if off the receiver.  
Prosecutor Driver :  And then what happened?  
Witness Simpson :  He came around about 3pm that afternoon.  I was a mess.  I spoke to him 
through the door and told him to leave.  
 Prosecutor Driver :  Did he leave?  
Witness Simpson :  Not immediately.  He just wandered up and down the front of the house or sat in 
his car.  Eventually my friend and flatmate, Jessica Clancy, went outside and asked him to go away.  
She said I would call the police if he didn't leave.  
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Counsel Shield :  Objection Your Honour, that is hearsay.  Ms Simpson cannot give evidence about 
what was said by Ms Clancy in her absence.  
Judge Boomer :  Yes, that is correct.  I direct the jury not to take that statement into account.  What 
was actually said will depend on Ms Clancy's evidence.  
Prosecutor Driver :  When did the accused leave?  
Witness Simpson :  A few minutes later but he rang up continuously for the remainder of the night.  
Prosecutor Driver :  And on what occasions have you seen the accused since that day?  
Witness Simpson :  Almost daily.  He either rings or sits in his car outside of the house.  It is very 
scary.  
Prosecutor Driver :  Do you in any way welcome his telephone calls or invite him over to your place?  
Witness Simpson :  No! I never have since New Year's Eve.  I just wish he would stop making my life 
hell.  I wish he’d get a life.  
Prosecutor Driver :  And when did the police become involved?  
Witness Simpson :  My mother and father were worried about my safety and went to the police.  A 
police officer came over to my house last year and commenced investigations.  
Prosecutor Driver :  What is your response to the police action against the accused?  
Witness Simpson :  I never wanted it to go this far.  I just wanted Brent to grow up and stop annoying 
me.  I was scared to stay in the house alone, especially at night.  
Prosecutor Driver :  Thank you Ms Simpson. There will be no more questions.    
 That concludes my examination, Your Honour.  
Judge Boomer :  Do you wish to cross examine Ms Shield?  
Counsel Shield :  Thank you Your Honour. Ms Simpson, would you say you have had a good 
relationship with Mr Dreamer before New Year's Eve?  
Witness Simpson :  Yes, up until ....  
Counsel Shield :  Could you please just direct your answers to the question. ...What car do you drive 
Ms Simpson?  
Prosecutor Driver :  Objection Your Honour, I can't see the relevance of that question to the issue.  
Judge Boomer :  I can't at this stage either Counsel.  
Counsel Shield :  I am going to establish that Ms Simpson, in fact, drives Mr Dreamer's car and has 
never returned it.  
Judge Boomer :  I will allow the question.  
Counsel Shield :  I will repeat the question.  What car do you drive Ms Simpson?  
Witness Simpson :  A 1992 Toyota Corolla.  
Counsel Shield :  And who does it belong to?  




Witness Simpson :  It's mine. It’s got my sticker that says “49% bitch, 51% sweetheart. Don’t push it” 
on the rear window  
Counsel Shield: May the witness be shown this document? It’s a current registration  certificate 
issued by the Department of Road Transport.  
Judge Boomer: Do you have any objections, Ms Driver?  
Prosecutor Driver : No, Your Honour  
Counsel Shield: Ms Simpson is that the registration certificate for the licence number of the car you 
drive?  
Witness Simpson: Yes.  
Counsel Shield: Who is shown on the document as being the registered owner of the   vehicle?  
Witness Simpson: Brent Dreamer  
Counsel Shield: Your Honour I wish to tender that document as evidence.  
Judge Boomer: Yes. Please mark it as Exhibit D1  
Counsel Shield: Miss Simpson, I repeat the question. Who owns the 1992 Toyota Corolla you drive?  
Witness Simpson:  I do.  Brent gave it to me.  
Counsel Shield: Then why isn't it registered in your name?  
Witness Simpson: With all the pressure I have been under I haven't been able to get around to it yet.  
Counsel Shield: But it has been over a year since you claimed to have broken up with Mr Dreamer.  
The car would be unregistered now.  Is it?  
Witness Simpson: Yes!  
Counsel Shield: Well how is that possible?  
Witness Simpson: I don't know!  
Counsel Shield: Well I will tell you.  Mr Dreamer paid for a year's registration and put the label on the 
car for you.  
  
Witness Simpson: I didn't know that.  
Counsel Shield: I think you did and I also believe you encouraged him to do that. What do you say to 
that?  
Witness Simpson: I did not!  
Counsel Shield: I also put it to you that you have promised to return the car to Mr Dreamer but keep 
making it difficult for him to take possession of it.  
Witness Simpson: That's not true, he gave it to me.  
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Counsel Shield: I also put it to you that you have invited Mr Dreamer over to your house on many 
occasions to pick up the car but deliberately keep him waiting so you can accuse him of stalking.  
Witness Simpson: That's not true, either.    
Counsel Shield: I put it to you that on every occasion he attended at your home that he attended at 
your invitation!  
Witness Simpson: No  
Counsel Shield: No further questions your honour.  
Prosecutor Driver: Ms Simpson, who does the 1992 Toyota Corolla belong to?  
Witness Simpson: It’s mine.  
Prosecutor Driver: How did you obtain it?  
Witness Simpson: Brent Dreamer gave it to me as a present in 1999.  
Prosecutor Driver: Why didn't you register it in your name?   
Witness Simpson: I had intended to but all of the problems of the past year or so have occupied my 
time.  
Prosecutor Driver: Does the accused acknowledge your ownership of the vehicle?  
Witness Simpson: Yes!  He let me put my sticker on it. In fact when I broke up with him I offered to 
give it back but he said no.  He said that it was a present and he didn't want it back.  
Prosecutor Driver: How do you account for the renewal of registration? That is, how did the rego 
sticker get on your car?  
Witness Simpson: I really don't know.  I was about to get in my car one morning when I noticed it 
had been renewed.  I was about to do it that week, in fact.  I suspect Brent put it there in the middle 
of the night.  
Prosecutor Driver: Did you give him permission to renew the registration?  
Witness Simpson: No!  
Prosecutor Driver: Have you ever invited Brent over to pick up the car?  
 Witness Simpson: No, I have not.  
 Prosecutor Driver: Does the accused have a set of keys for your car?  
 Witness Simpson: I suppose he must because it would have been locked when he told me the new 
registration label was placed on the window screen.  I lock the car when I am not in it.  
 Prosecutor Driver: Could the accused have had the opportunity to take your car at any time since 
January 2000?  
 Witness Simpson: Yes, it is often parked outside in the street in front of my house or in the car park 
near my work.  Brent knows where I park it when I am at work.  
 Prosecutor Driver: Since January 2000 have you encouraged Mr Dreamer to phone you or come 
over to your house for a visit?  




 Witness Simpson: No, his visits and telephone calls are uninvited.  
 Prosecutor Driver: No more questions.  Thank you Ms Simpson.  
 Judge Boomer: Thank you Ms Simpson. You may now step down and leave the witness box.  
 Prosecutor Driver: I will now call my second witness, Jessica Clancy.  
Judge's Associate: Please state your full name.  
Witness Clancy: My name is Jessica Linda Clancy.  
Judge Boomer: You may be seated  
Prosecutor Driver: Can you please tell the court about your relationship with Ms Simpson.  
Witness Clancy: She is my flat-mate.  She is also a very close friend.  
Prosecutor Driver: How long have you known Ms Simpson?  
Witness Clancy: I have known Molly for over 10 years.  We went to high school together.  
Prosecutor Driver: Are you familiar with the accused, Brent Dreamer?  
Witness Clancy: Yes!  He was Molly's boyfriend until the New Year's Eve party in 1999.  
Prosecutor Driver: What is your relationship with the accused?  
Witness Clancy: He was a friend when he went out with Molly but I don't want to have anything to 
do with him now.  In fact, I find him scary and I’m frightened of him.  Page 11 of 20  
Prosecutor Driver: Can you please explain?  
Witness Clancy: He just hangs around near the house for no reason.  
Prosecutor Driver: To the best of your knowledge has Ms Simpson ever invited Brent over to your 
house over the past 18 months or encouraged him to telephone?  
Witness Clancy: Absolutely not!  I have heard her yell at him over the phone and cry when he walks 
up and down in front of the house.  
 Prosecutor Driver: How did Molly acquire her car?  
 Witness Clancy: Brent gave it to her as a present.  I can remember her coming home one day all 
excited to tell me about it.  
 Prosecutor Driver: Are you sure?  
 Witness Clancy: Absolutely!  In fact she went out and bought some pink seat covers from Target the 
very next day. She even got an Elvis to put on the dash!  
 Prosecutor Driver: When was the last time you spoke to the accused, Brent Dreamer?  
 Witness Clancy: Well over a year ago.  I tried to advise him to leave Molly alone but it was a waste 
of time.  I reckon he is just a plain old stalker who will only stop annoying Molly when they put him 
in gaol.  
 Counsel Shield: Objection  
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 Prosecutor Driver: I withdraw the question. No more questions, Your Honour.  
 Judge Boomer: Your witness, Ms Shield.  
 Counsel Shield: Is Molly Simpson a close friend of yours?  
 Witness Clancy: Yes, very close.  
 Counsel Shield: You would do anything for her, wouldn’t you?  
 Witness Clancy: Yes, I would.  
 Counsel Shield: That would include saying things in court that supports her version of events?  
 Witness Clancy: No!  I would only tell the truth to a court.  
 Counsel Shield: You don't like Mr Dreamer, do you?  
 Witness Clancy: No, I don't.  I did but not now after what he’s done.  
 Counsel Shield: No more questions Your Honour  
 Judge Boomer: Would you like to re-examine the witness Ms Driver?  
 Prosecutor Driver: Just one question, Your Honour.  Ms Clancy, is the evidence you have given to 
this court the truth as you believe it?  
 Witness Clancy: Yes, it is.  I only want justice to be done.  
 Prosecutor Driver: Thank you Ms Clancy, no more questions  
 Judge Boomer: Thank you for your evidence Ms Clancy.  You may now step down.  
 Prosecutor Driver: That concludes the Prosecution's case, Your Honour.  
Judge Boomer: Mr/Ms Shield, are you ready to commence the defence's case?  
 Counsel Shield: I would like to call the accused, Mr Dreamer, as my witness.  
 Judge's Associate: Please take the Bible in your hand.   Do you swear that you will tell the truth, the 
whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Say “I swear”.  
 Witness Dreamer: I swear!  
 Judge's Associate: Please state your full name.  
 Witness Dreamer: My name is Brent Zalon Dreamer.  
 Judge Boomer: You may be seated  
 Counsel Shield: What is your relationship with Ms Molly Simpson?  
 Witness Dreamer: We are close friends.  
 Counsel Shield: Did you ever have a close and intimate relationship?  
 Witness Dreamer: Yes, in 1999, but we decided to part but remain close friends.  
 Counsel Shield: When did you terminate this close relationship with Ms Simpson?  




 Witness Dreamer: There was no single day.  It just occurred over a period of time starting early in 
2000.  
 Counsel Shield: Would you like to renew that personal relationship with Ms Simpson?  
 Witness Dreamer: Well, I would have before this. This is crazy.  
 Counsel Shield: Have you phoned Ms Simpson or called round her place to see her since January 
2000?  
 Witness Dreamer: Yes.  I am interested to see how she is going.  As I said we are close friends.  
 Counsel Shield: Has Ms Simpson ever invited you over to her house since January 2000?  
 Witness Dreamer: Yes, on a number of occasions.  She specifically has asked me to come around 
and say hello.  
 Counsel Shield: Do you own a car?   
 Witness Dreamer: I have two cars actually, a 1996 Holden Commodore and a 1992 Toyota Corolla.  
 Counsel Shield: Where are they now?  
 Witness Dreamer: The Commodore should be in the Market car park right now as I drove it to the 
court today.  Molly has the Toyota.  I lent it to her some time ago.  
 Counsel Shield: Are you sure you only loaned it to her?  
 Witness Dreamer: Yes, I still have the car's registration in my name.  I paid for the last 12 months’ 
rego only a short time ago.  
 Counsel Shield: Why does Ms Simpson still have possession of the vehicle?  
 Witness Dreamer: As I have said she is still a friend of mine and she needs the car.  
 Counsel Shield: Have you asked for it back?  
 Witness Dreamer: Yes, my sister's car needs repairing and she wants to borrow the Toyota.  I asked 
Molly to give it back to me and she has agreed.  
Counsel Shield: Then why haven't you taken possession of it?  
Witness Dreamer: Every time I go round there it's either locked in the garage or it has a wheel lock 
on it that I don't have a key for.    
Counsel Shield: How many times has Ms Simpson offered to give the car back? Page 14 of 20  
Witness Dreamer: Heaps of times.  
Counsel Shield: Can you be more precise?  
Witness Dreamer: Probably about once or twice a week.    
Counsel Shield: When was the last time you called around to see Ms Simpson?  
Witness Dreamer: Some time in December last year.  I stopped going when the police came and saw 
me and accused me of stalking.  I was shocked.  
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Counsel Shield: Why do you think this allegation has been made against you?  
Witness Dreamer: It came as a big surprise to me especially as she has invited me around her place 
so many times to collect the car.  
Counsel Shield: What are your intentions when visiting Ms Simpson?  
Witness Dreamer: They have always been friendly visits with the view to saying hello and collecting 
the car.  
Counsel Shield: No more questions, Your Honour.  
Judge Boomer: Do you wish to cross-examine the witness, Mr/Ms Driver?  
Prosecutor Driver: Yes please, Your Honour.  Mr Dreamer, how long is it since you last held Molly's 
hand?  
Witness Dreamer: I don't know, some time ago I suspect.  
Prosecutor Driver: When was the last time you spoke to her personally face to face?  
Witness Dreamer: I'm not sure, some time last year.  
Prosecutor Driver: Well I am going to suggest to you that you have not touched Ms Simpson since 
New Year's Eve in 1999 or spoken to her face to face since early January 2000.  Don't you think that 
is a strange way for close friends to behave?  
Witness Dreamer: It is if you put it like that.  
Prosecution Driver: Why not take the car back?  
 Witness Dreamer: I didn’t want her to think it had been stolen. I knew she’d come up with some 
bullshit allegation like she is now!  
 Prosecutor Driver: I put it to you that the friendship between you and Ms Simpson is in your mind 
only and not in hers.  She won't even answer the door when you knock.  
Witness Dreamer: I haven't always knocked on the door.   Page 15 of 20  
Prosecutor Driver: I also put it to you that you gave the Toyota to Ms Simpson and you have no legal 
right to take it back now and Ms Simpson has pointed this out to you on a number of occasions in 
early 2000.  
Witness Dreamer: No!  It was only a loan.  
Prosecutor Driver: If Ms Simpson is procrastinating so much about returning the car then why didn't 
you go to the police and make a complaint?  
Witness Dreamer: As I said she is a friend.  
Prosecutor Driver: No more questions, Your Honour.  
Judge Boomer: Do you want to re-examine the witness, Counsel?  
Counsel Shield: If it please the court, Your Honour.  
 Mr Dreamer, who owns the Toyota motor vehicle?  




Witness Dreamer: I do, it’s registered in my name.  
Counsel Shield: Why have you tried to contact Ms Simpson so many times at her home?  
Witness Dreamer: To get my car back after she invited me to do so.  
Counsel Shield: No more questions Your Honour.  That concludes the case for the defence.  
Sheriff’s Officer escorts the witness back to the dock.  
Judge Boomer: Are you prepared to give your closing address, Mr/Ms Driver?  
 Prosecutor Driver: The prosecution has the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To do 
this I must prove that the accused had the intent to stalk Ms Simpson and that he physically 
committed the crime of stalking.  
 As Ms Simpson said under oath, evidence supported by Ms Clancy, that she had broken off her 
relationship with Mr Dreamer on New Year's Eve 1999 and asked him not to contact her again. He 
did not follow that advice.  His subsequent attention was uninvited and, his visits to her home and 
telephone calls, clearly constitute the physical element of the offence of unlawful stalking as I 
outlined in my opening address.  
  
Both prosecution witnesses have said, under oath, that the accused has never been invited to their 
house after January 2000.  He was also told not to come around yet he still did.  The accused clearly 
had intent to contact Ms Simpson in a desperate bid to re-build a failed relationship.  
 Both prosecution witnesses also testified under oath that Mr Dreamer gave the Toyota to Ms 
Simpson as a present.  The ownership issue is merely an excuse dreamed up by the accused to 
explain why he kept Ms Simpson under close surveillance.  
You should find the accused guilty as charged.  
Judge Boomer: Defence Counsel, are you ready for your closing address.  
 Counsel Shield: May it please the Court Your Honour. Let me commence by painting a picture of Ms 
Simpson. Ms Simpson is a ‘wannna-be bad girl’, ladies and gentlemen. Pink seat covers in her hatch-
back, listening to the beat of the 80’s and dreaming of times with Brent. I remind you that the 
prosecution has the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.  It there is any element of 
doubt regarding Mr Dreamer's guilt, he must be given that benefit of doubt and you have an 
obligation to deliver a verdict of not guilty.  
 The prosecution has been unable to prove the two elements of the offence of stalking.  Mr Dreamer 
had no intent to stalk Ms Simpson.  She had invited him over on many occasions to collect his Toyota 
but always made it impossible for him to do so.  She, in effect, caused him to lawfully wait outside 
her house because she would not hand the vehicle over to him. Ms Simpson wants to see Brent pay.  
 There has been no stalking as Ms Simpson invited the accused to her house.  This is further proven 
by the fact that Ms Simpson acknowledges that the Toyota's registration is still in my client's name.  
Surely, if she was genuine in her claims she would have arranged for the transfer of registration or 
make attempts to do so.  
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I ask you to discount completely the evidence of Ms Clancy.  She is in the front passenger seat and 
along for the ride.  
Clearly the prosecution has not proven its case and I ask you to find the accused not guilty.  
That concludes my closing address, Your Honour.  
Judge Boomer: That concludes the cases for the prosecution and the defence.  It is now my 
responsibility to sum up the case.  
You, as the jury, are ultimately in charge of the facts. Anything I say is to assist you. You may 
disagree with me. You are however bound by what I say is the law. You are charged with the 
responsibility of determining the guilt of the accused.  You must weigh up the conflicting evidence 
presented by the three witnesses, decide which facts you find proven beyond reasonable doubt if 
any, and reach a verdict of guilty or not guilty.  
 The case in many regards is a simple one. There is little contention that Mr Dreamer did attend at 
Ms Simpson’s house on a number of occasions since New Years and the end of their relationship. On 
his own evidence, Mr Dreamer attended at Ms Simpson’s home on a number of occasions. I direct 
you that if you find he did go to the house that this is sufficient to satisfy the physical element of the 
offence of stalking. It seems to me the real issue in this case is whether you can be satisfied beyond 
reasonable doubt that Mr Dreamer intended to stalk Ms Simpson. This is the mental element 
required.   
 To be satisfied of this you will need to consider the conflicting claims of Mr Dreamer and Ms 
Simpson about the reason for his attendance at her home.  
You will need to exclude as a possibility that Mr Dreamer was attending at her home at her invitation 
to collect a car that he loaned her in order to find him guilty. This will require consideration of the 
issue about the ownership and registration of the vehicle and Ms Simpson’s claim it was a gift.  
In many respects your decision will depend upon your view of the credibility of the conflicting 
witnesses and the inherent plausibility of the stories they told.  
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The following text was displayed immediately after each testimony for participants prompted to 
review some or all testimony.  
 
 
You will now be shown the most recent testimony a second time. Please review it at your 
own leisure.   
  
When you have done so, please complete the questions on the following page. Please answer 
honestly and truthfully. There are no right or wrong answers, and all answers will remain 
confidential. The trial transcript will continue afterward. 
 
 
You will now be shown all the testimony presented so far a second time. Please review it 
at your own leisure.   
  
When you have done so, please complete the questions on the following page. Please answer 
honestly and truthfully. There are no right or wrong answers, and all answers will remain 
confidential. The trial transcript will continue afterward. 
 
 
The following text was displayed immediately after participants prompted to review testimony were 
presented with the testimony or testimonies in question for review. 
 
If you were required to provide a preliminary verdict at this point, given the evidence provided so 





What do you currently believe to be the likelihood of the defendant’s guilt? (place an X anywhere 
on the line): 
 
0%         10%         20%         30%         40%         50%         60%         70%         80%         90%         100% 
 
Did you take your time and review the testimony? (select one) 
 
-I reviewed most/all of it 
-I reviewed some of it 
-No 
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